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ABSTRACT
The airport industry is changing. Once understood as stand-alone public infrastructures,
many modern airports now operate within privatized multi-airport systems and contend
with previously unknown competitive pressures. As a result, many of the same airports
which once enjoyed natural monopolies and government protections must now compete
with secondary facilities both for airline patronage and for passenger traffic. Further,
changes in the airline industry such as the success of the low-cost carrier, ongoing
consolidation, and possible changes to the hub structure now threaten to impose new
demands on airport services. In this environment, airport owners are being made to
tackle not only significant uncertainty in traffic levels and passenger demand but also the
sometimes conflicting needs of varying airline customers.
By referencing the experiences of airports across Europe and the US, this paper seeks to
highlight strategies for confronting these uncertainties. In particular, research
conclusions focus on providing flexible responses that may prove useful given the
continued growth of multi-airport systems, expansion of low-cost carriers, and associated
industry restructuring.
To this end, this thesis presents methodologies for evaluating the financial benefits which
may be accrued through applying real options principles at new and developing airports.
Two evaluative models, one focused on the construction of airport runway systems and
the other on airport terminal design, are presented. Each model - as developed by the
author - is designed to permit the simple application of economic and decision analyses
in order to gauge the possibility of success in terms of airport cost, accessibility, and
patronage. The models are therefore particularly useful for the preliminary evaluation of
various airport development strategies, especially within educational contexts. The
development of a second major airport outside of Lisbon provides the central case study.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard de Neufville
Title: Professor of Engineering Systems and of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The implementation of a successful airport system faces significant uncertainties, both in
design and management. Along with fluctuating customer requirements, unpredictable
demand growth and ongoing technological shifts, changes in the airline industry and in
government policy can cause substantial deviations from predicted revenues and service
levels. As a result, maintaining the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances during
each stage of the airport lifecycle can offer significant benefits.
This thesis, by focusing on the concept of real options design, aims to reveal value-
enhancing methods for incorporating flexibility into modem airports. Further, it seeks to
adapt the notion of flexibility so as to inform airport policymaking in the public and
private sectors. The central hypothesis - given high uncertainty, flexible designs can
simultaneously reduce costly planning errors and increase project value - has already
been proven. Research within the petrochemical (Babajide, 2001), satellite (de Weck, de
Neufville, & Chaize, 2004), road transportation (Hodota, 2006), and even air transport
(de Neufville & Odoni, 2003) industries, for instance, demonstrate that alternative growth
strategies at each stage of project development allow stakeholders either to capitalize on
unforeseen opportunities or to mitigate the effects of misfortune. However, the effect of
continuing changes in air transportation such as the growth of low-cost carriers and
multiple airport systems leaves room for further study. The work presented here attempts
to address this gap.
In pursuing these goals, the thesis expands upon previous work demonstrating that
traditional, rigid master planning is unsuitable for airport design (Odoni & de Neufville,
1992) and highlighting flexible airport configurations (de Neufville, 1996). The ultimate
research goal is to demonstrate the value of these alternate, real options methods in the
design, construction, and development of airport systems.
1. Study Rationale
Historically, traditional inflexible planning methods have led to several expensive
failures. As a result, multiple over-designed airports have lacked the ability to adapt to
changing traffic levels, technologies, and customer demands. For instance, while
Washington/Dulles's facilities remained underused for 20 years (de Neufville, 1995),
Canada's costly Montreal/Mirabel will likely close due an inability to attract customers.
In both cases, the airports suffered due to an inability to either predict or direct future
states.
Ongoing trends in the airport and aviation industries do not augur greater predictability.
Instead, both continued deregulation and the growth of smaller, secondary airports
suggest increasing hardships in determining traffic flows. Due to increased competition,
planners may no longer assume that large, metropolitan airports will attract the lion's
share of nearby air-travelers based on location alone. Equally important, the ongoing
success of the low-cost carrier has created disparate demands on airport design. As a
result, airport planners must now prepare to accommodate large network carriers (NC)
and new low-cost carriers (LCC) despite different standards for terminals, passenger
facilities, congestion levels, and even airport fees. Together, these trends imply greater
difficulties in both forecasting and attracting airport traffic and belie the notion that
airports can be constructed in a rigid "one-size-fits-all" fashion.
Given that the current development of the aviation industry suggests increasing
uncertainty in passenger traffic and customer requirements, proper airport design is
essential to financial success. Further, the ability to counter uncertainty in the
development of airports is gaining in importance. Revealing the usefulness of flexible
planning in dealing with this challenge is therefore the central aim of this thesis.
2. Research Methodology
The research employs analytical tools common to real options theory including
projections of traffic through binomial lattices, decision tree analysis, and the calculation
of project worth through net present value. Sources of uncertainty in the development of
airport systems were determined through an extensive literature review. As a result,
major trends such as deregulation, increased airport competition, and the growth of low-
cost carriers were identified in order to inform the thesis and its models. Simultaneously,
the literature review also revealed examples demonstrating the ability of different
planning methods to mitigate uncertainties. The thesis' various conclusions are therefore
bolstered through a series of references to airports worldwide. Finally, the completion of
a representative case study focusing on the development of a major new airport in
Portugal is meant to prove the applicability of a flexible planning approach to airport
development.
Economic Analysis
Given that economics is a primary driver in airport development and maintenance, this
study's analyses largely focus on the ability of airport planners to recover costs and to
create profits within a given time period. Only revenues internal to the airport are
considered, though the models can be reconfigured to account for external factors (i.e.
regional economic benefits resulting from airport development).
Due to the long lifespan of an airport system, all economic calculations within this thesis
account for the "time-value of money", a concept which states that a given amount of
money is more valuable to an investor today than in the future. As a result, the valuation
of each flexible alternative rests upon the determination of net present value (NPV),
wherein the worth of an investment is derived by converting future cash flows to
represent their current worth. The use of the net present value approach was selected as it
represents common industry practice for long term-financial planning.
Other considerations important to the economic analyses include the ability of the airport
to inexpensively meet changing capacity requirements or to undertake modifications in
order to service new or returning customers. Value-at-risk (and value-at-gain), or the
total losses (or gains) which may be incurred given the performance of the airport system,
is also considered.
All calculations are facilitated through Microsoft Excel©, which is generally suited both
to handling problems of this size and to providing comprehensible instruction regarding
the valuation of flexibility.
Binomial Lattice Model
A binomial lattice model simulating probable demand projections for the case airport in
Portugal is used in order to determine possible economic returns. The binomial model is
useful as it directly accounts for the effects of uncertainty, given a historically determined
growth pattern and standard deviation.
Decision Tree
In instances where assuming a particular growth pattern over several years is impossible
or inappropriate (due to the likelihood of significant changes in past trends) or where
several different decisions are possible during varying periods of system evolution, a
decision tree analysis was found to be more useful than the standard binomial model.
Therefore, the use of decision trees in this study is meant to bolster the research
conclusions by helping to explore cases in which airport planners cannot assume future
growth patterns or must account for more complex flexible alternatives. The evaluation
is designed to illustrate a particular methodology for decision-making rather than to
imply a set of correct actions for a particular airport. As before, net present value
provides the primary metric for comparing flexible and rigid designs.
Selection of Reference Airports
This study references the relative success and failure of various airports worldwide in
order to illustrate the value of flexible design. Reference airports have been chosen in
order to represent the influence of low-cost carriers, multi-airport systems, and demand
volatility on airport systems.
Central Case Study
Finally, a case study approach has been applied in order to test the thesis' central
hypothesis regarding flexibility and added value. As such, conclusions drawn through
the review of existing flexibility literature as well as from an examination of various
international airports have been applied to the development of a national air
transportation system in Portugal, where the government intends to build a secondary
airport outside of Lisbon while developing a series of regional airports to better connect
various regions. Given the test environment chosen, special attention is given to the
influence of low-cost carriers and to the development of multi-airport systems, thereby
leading to suggestions regarding the applicability of real options thinking in the initial
development of niche, low-cost markets for new airports and to ensuring the flexibility
required for continued growth outside of that niche.
As a research tool, the case study is further intended to assess the hypothesis that
employing real options theory to inform the incremental development of airport systems
and to allow airports to flexibly adapt to changing passenger levels and industry
standards has quantifiable financial benefits.
3. Pedagogical Goals
Aside from exploring its central hypothesis, this thesis further aims to instruct the reader
in the understanding of real options theory and the use of applicable tools. As a result,
much of the work encapsulated here is intended to be instructional. Small mathematical
examples accompany the introduction of several key concepts; in addition, the thesis
presents a workable Microsoft Excel© structure for analyzing the benefits of several real
options concepts in the development of a modern airport.
4. Thesis Structure
Chapter 1 - Summarizes the theories and valuation methods central to the thesis while
presenting the central hypothesis that designing flexibility into a system can create value,
especially when uncertainty about future states is high.
Chapter 2 - Provides an overview of the modern airport industry, the uncertainty it
currently faces, important trends, and the valuation methods currently employed.
Further, it highlights important problems with current airport planning methods and
provides a baseline for comparison against the new planning methods proposed by this
document.
Chapter 3 - Introduces the theory of real options, complete with its development history,
valuation methodology, and applicability to systems replete with uncertainty.
Chapter 4 - Expands the purview of real options theory in order to make it applicable to
the development of an airport system. In so doing, it highlights design practices which
may prove useful to airport stakeholders at the national, regional, and private sector
levels.
Chapter 5 - Illustrates the usefulness of flexible design as demonstrated through
application to the development of a major new airport in Portugal.
Chapter 6 - Concludes by presenting findings regarding the application of a flexible
design approach to the creation of airports, as can be drawn from the literature review,
economic analysis, and case study valuation.
CHAPTER 2: UNCERTAINTY AND THE TRADITIONAL AIRPORT
Chapter 2 - Provides an overview of the modern airport industry including common
planning methods, important trends, and well-known sources of industry uncertainty.
Further, it discusses the growth of the low-cost carrier and the multi-airport system from
the perspective of the increasing uncertainties which they introduce to the planning
process.
Airport decision-making occurs on several levels. Within Europe and the United States,
for instance, supra-national, national, regional and local bodies each influence important
decisions ranging from airport size and location to whether an airport is constructed at all.
Whereas the upper echelons of government generally concern themselves with creating
transportation gateways to support (inter)national cohesion and economic development,
locals tend to focus not only on the home economy but also on environmental issues such
as pollution, noise, and the destruction of local norms (Caves & Gosling, 1999). This
convergence of different interests makes airport planning a complicated and lengthy
process. As a result, facilities such as Denver International Airport (DIA) and Munich/
Franz Josef Strauss (MUC) have suffered due to changing or unforeseen stakeholder
requirements. Denver's cost more than tripled from a projected US $1.5 billion to US
$5.3 billion partially because the main airline demanded late design changes; Munich's
Strauss, though being one-tenth the physical size of Denver International and serving
7/10 the number of passengers in 2005, opened three decades after planning began at a
cost of over US $7 billion largely due to environmental litigation issues (Dempsey,
2000).
Together, DIA and MUC offer examples of a common difficulty. Every airport -
whether constructed as a national symbol, local travel hub, or regional source of wealth
and power - is subject to significant uncertainty. Capital costs, time-to-completion, and
traffic flows are only the first of many unpredictable factors. Because airports survive
based on their ability to provide a useful service, they must also contend with fluid
government interests and the changing needs of their primary customers (airlines and
passengers) over a long period of operation. Unfortunately, traditional airport planning
methods have not always provided the key to success. Indeed, different variations on
airport planning have come and gone while the problem of uncertainty has remained, ever
vibrant. This chapter introduces different airport planning methods, focusing mainly on
master planning, the most prominent technique. Further, it attempts to identify
weaknesses in common planning techniques by detailing several uncertainties which
often obfuscate the planning process.
1. Master Planning: An Introduction
Antonin Kazda and Robert Caves, authors of Airport Design and Operation, describe the
airport master plan rather favorably both as a construction plan that envisions the
maximum development of the site and as a guide for the advancement of its facilities
(Kazda & Caves, 2000). Within this context, several other benefits become apparent.
Airport master plans, because they describe the airport's size, layout, and costs, are useful
in the creation of key milestones and in delineating possible profits. Further, they help
national and regional governments ensure that each airport under their purview helps to
promote common goals and provide an important blueprint for airport owners and
managers. In theory, the process of creating a master plan should also ensure the useful
involvement of airport stakeholders on every level. The process defined by the
International Air Transport Association (IATA), for instance, includes a review of
national planning strategies, an appraisal of community sentiments, and various revisions
of the airport development strategy (IATA, 2004).
In an attempt to garner these benefits, airport planning organizations worldwide subscribe
to the master planning model in some form. Although the procedures for formulating
master plans may differ by nation, significant commonalities in the planning process do
exist. In fact, a review of planning literature produced by the International Civil Aviation
Authority (ICAO) (ICAO, 2006), International Air Transport Association (IATA) (IATA,
2004), United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (FAA, 2005), and United
Kingdom Department for Transport (DfI') (Dff, undated) shows several similarities. The
basic elements, as aggregated and presented roughly in order of completion, are as
follows:
1. Current environment survey
2. Aviation activity forecasts
3. Evaluation of airport alternatives
4. Facilities implementation plan
5. Financial Analysis
The following subsections describe the purpose and methodology of each.
Current Environment Survey
The airport master planning process generally begins with an examination of existing
conditions. This encompasses several factors starting with environmental restrictions,
regional socio-economic indicators, an inventory of political players, and a description of
the geographic location. Given data on regional travel patterns, economic growth, and
historical aviation activity, airport planners determine how best to adapt the airport
business model to its region. In cases where the airport under investigation already
exists, the current environment survey also includes an inventory of current facilities.
Aviation Activity Forecasts
Aviation forecasting is central to master planning; in essence, it provides the basis for
each successive step in the planning process. The required forecasts come in a multitude
of forms: airport planners generally require speculative data on aviation activity in terms
of the number of aircraft operations, passenger types and aircraft mix over the short term
( 5 years), medium term (10 years), and long term (over 10 years). In addition, planners
often demand far more detailed information on future occurrences such as the amount of
passengers served during the busiest hour of the busiest day of the typical year.
Numerous inputs (many of which can prove quite difficult to measure) inform the
generation of these forecasts. The FAA, for instance, suggests that the master plan
account for future trends in regional business and economic activity, the activity of
competitor modes of transportation, and possible future trends in aviation including
airline mergers and new aircraft technologies. Other important factors include local
demographic indicators such as the average amount of leisure time, favored recreational
activities, and the level of disposable income per capita. The list does not stop there;
rather, forecasters can find themselves incorporating an ever increasing number of data
points including - but not limited to - the distance between urban centers in the airport
region, the influence of local politics and taxes, fuel costs, and shifting attitudes toward
air transport.
Once data are gathered, forecasters may choose from several possible methods to predict
the future. The ICAO forecasting manual (ICAO, 1985) and the FAA Advisory Circular
on Master Planning (FAA, 2005) name the most common techniques: trend projection,
econometric forecasting and regression analysis, and market surveys. Whereas trend
analysis extrapolates future states based on historical patterns, regression analysis and
econometric forecasting use statistical methods to account for changes in several different
variables. Market analysis, on the other hand, attempts to determine the local demand for
air transport as a function of competition for predicted national or regional demand. Each
method, of course, has particular strengths and weaknesses which makes it more
appropriate for particular forecast time periods, airport size, and regions.
Evaluation of Airport Alternatives
Once forecasts have been finalized, airport planners focus on creating different strategies
for accommodating the predicted level of activity. In doing so, planners must account for
the capacity required in the airfield, airspace, and airport landside. Further, they attempt
to correctly size car parks, determine an adequate number of personnel, account for
security considerations, and uphold a particular strategic vision for the airport project
under review.
As before, the process is multi-tiered. Aside from separating the various airport elements
and ordering them based on importance, airport planners are generally required to create
multiple designs for individual areas (terminals, airside, and transportation, etc.) and to
produce various airport layouts. Planning for capacity is particularly intricate, as the
process often requires translating yearly demand forecasts into an estimate of how many
passengers the airport will have to serve at a given moment. Though the exact procedure
differs by nation, the idea is the same: designers use a series of historically determined
multiplicative factors to transform the forecast of passengers per year into a forecast for
the number of passengers served in the busiest hour of the busiest day. This result is then
used to size airport facilities. Once this process is complete, airport managers then
choose from a multitude of possible alternatives for airport development, quite often
opting for a development path meant to survive the airport's lifetime.
Figure 2-1: FAA Process for selecting among alternatives (FAA, 2005)
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Facilities Imolementation Plan
Next, the master planning process calls on its proponents to finalize their decision choices
by creating an airport layout plan (ALP), which is a graphic representation of the
expected evolution of facilities over the airport lifetime. The ALP, further, can provide a
blueprint for airport development, show expected land-use patterns on and around the
airport site, and provide possibilities for surface access.
In addition to the formation of an airport layout plan, this stage of master planning often
includes the formation of a schedule for airport development, again corresponding to the
short-, medium-, and long-term. This schedule, in addition with the airport capital
improvement plan (CIP), ideally encompasses a description of all planned airport
facilities, settles on dates for their construction and opening, and assigns activities and
responsibilities to key stakeholders.
Financial Analysis
Finally - and quite importantly - airport master planners close by examining the financial
feasibility of the airport, as constructed to the specifications defined by the survey of
local conditions and forecast-determined capacity requirements. Although an evaluation
of benefits and costs is important during each stage of master planning, common practice
often leaves the determination of financial feasibility until after a capital improvement
plan is complete (Crites & Bauman, 1998). This final stage then, demonstrates the
sponsor's ability to fund the airport project based on an accounting of various funding
sources and an analysis of expected cash flows. Given that the sponsor is able and that
the master plan can survive public scrutiny, the master planning process is complete and
airport construction can move forward.
2. Master Plans Complicated: The Role of Uncertainty
Although master planning provides the standard for airport development, the process is
not without its detractors. For example, Paul Stephen Dempsey commented that the
"FAA's airport planning model only provides an idealized approach that cannot produce
optimal results" (Dempsey, Goetz, & Szyliowicz, 1997, p.492). This criticism cannot be
limited to the FAA though: indeed, FAA procedures closely mirror the standards
propagated worldwide.
Other commentators have lodged similar complaints with the master planning process,
many of which share a common thread. According to detractors, forecasts - regardless of
method - present an idealized and consistently incorrect vision of the future. Even Kazda
(who is quoted above highlighting the benefits of master planning) notes that though it is
"sensible to predict requirements perhaps 35 years ahead ... the ability to predict even 15
years ahead is questionable" (Kazda & Caves, 2000, p.7). In reality, most instances
permit the creation of several conflicting forecasts depending on the forecast method and
on the assumptions made regarding regional economic health, local regulations,
population growth, and passenger demands. Therefore, no single forecast can be entirely
correct; small disparities in assumption can yield large differences.
Further, the linearly designed master planning process is primarily reactive; it provides
little means of proactively controlling for the numerous uncertainties which reduce its
benefits. Despite this, planning for multiple scenarios is often eschewed. FAA reviews
of airport planning, for instance, focuses on one "most-likely" scenario. As a result,
traditional airport design, being dependent on fixed forecasts, is susceptible to any
number of uncertainties common to transportation systems.
Finally, master planning has proven prone to error. Even with a single forecast, the
master planning process tends to falter when translating traffic predictions into functional
designs. As in the case of determining peak hour traffic, the usefulness of the procedure
hinges on the expectation that historical trends predict future outcomes and is highly
subject to minor assumptions and misinterpretation (Odoni and de Neufville, 1992). In
sum, the master planning process, by creating inflexible designs specifically suited to a
particular forecast, has led to several expensive missteps.
Of course, airport planning is not alone in these particular weaknesses. The following
sections describe the uncertainties that plague transportation systems in general and
airports in specific.
Uncertainty in General Transportation Systems
The aviation industry is not unique in its susceptibility to significant uncertainty. To the
contrary, public works - and specifically transportation systems - have been shown to
exhibit significant disparities between expected and actual values in construction costs,
time to completion of facilities, and passenger throughput. Simply phrased, the forecast
is "always wrong".
Cost estimations and traffic forecasts, which together determine profitability and
viability, are particularly prone to misestimation. According to one study, nine out of ten
transportation infrastructure projects cost more than originally predicted; the
phenomenon is both global and time-insensitive (Flyvbjerg, 2002). In addition, any
number of factors can quickly accrue to undermine forecasting: Petkova, for instance,
shows that inputs ranging from oil prices to GDP - each of them requiring their own
forecasts - can affect the predictability of traffic demand (Petkova, 2007).
Incorrect traffic forecasts are similarly common but perhaps more damaging. Because
incorrect traffic forecasts bias the value of an investment, they can lead to the
construction of expensive but underused facilities. Montreal Mirabel Airport (YMX), for
instance, was constructed in 1975 in expectation of some 40 million passengers by 2025;
however, the airport failed to attract enough traffic to support continuing operations and
was closed to passenger traffic in 2004 (Canadian Press, 2006). In addition, overly
pessimistic or generous traffic forecasts can negatively affect the size and engineering
characteristics of the transportation system. Bangkok's two billion dollar (US $2 billion)
Skytrain, for one, suffers from oversized platforms, idle cars, and multi-million dollar
inefficiencies because passenger forecasts exceeded actual traffic levels by 250%
(Flyvbjerg, 2005).
Airport systems have proven quite prone to these difficulties. One study of traffic
forecasts for major New England airports, for instance, showed an average discrepancy
between predicted and actual traffic of 23% for five-year forecasts and 78% for 15 year
forecasts (Maldonado, 1990). Nonetheless, it appears that forecasters continue to
incorrectly ascribe to the "myth of predictability": in assuming that future states will
necessarily be determined by today's trends, planners subject their projects to the risks of
under-utilization and obsolescence (Caves & Gosling, 1999).
Back to Airports: Established Sources of Uncertainty
The large discrepancies which weaken forecasts emanate from several different - and at
times conflicting - sources. Externalities such as fluctuations in local and global
economies, changes in technologies and regulations, and the arrival of new market
participants as well as internal factors such as industry restructuring can each have
important though unpredictable effects. In fact, previous studies demonstrate that long-
term forecasts generally are more likely than not to be at least 20% off from reality (de
Neufville, 1991a).
Table 2-1: Unreliability of Forecasts (Adapted from Maldonado, 1990)
PLANNING HORIZON F/A RATIO CHARACTERISI1 CS
Years Range Std. Deviation Error Range
(Half f eyond)
FIVE 0.64 - 1.96 0.30 23%
TEN 0.58 - 2.40 0.54 34%
FIFTEEN 0.66 -3.10 0.69 76%
FIA Ratio = Forecast Values I Average Values
Although volatility of demand is particularly important and is therefore highlighted
throughout this document, the following list of uncertainties is meant to more fully
address several areas of airport planning.
Economic Shifts
Unlike in other transportation systems, air travel tends to impose relatively high customer
costs. Therefore, the air transport industry is particularly sensitive to unforeseen changes
in regional economic health. This principle carries for both business and leisure
travelers. Whereas airports in areas of increasing economic importance and wealth may
simultaneously expect more incoming business travel and increased outgoing tourism,
airports in declining economies may fairly expect an overall decrease in traffic as former
customers either avoid the region entirely or choose cheaper transportation alternatives.
As a result, an economic downturn within an airport's home region could not only
negatively affect the number of businesspeople visiting the area but also depress the
number of tourists leaving the region for short trips. Even relative economic shifts -
rather than actual economic decline - can cause negative effects. Canada's Mirabel, for
example, suffered as the increasing economic importance of Toronto made Montreal less
attractive as Canada's gateway city (Hall, 2004).
Regulatory and Technological Change
Technological change can have multiple impacts. Consider, for instance, the case of the
Airbus A380, which is slated to enter the aviation market in 2007 as the world's largest
aircraft. Aside from changing the expected throughput of airports served by the new
aircraft, the introduction of the A380 also portends changes in airport physical design.
Certainly, larger aircraft carrying more individuals may require larger runways, more
efficient luggage carriage, increased area for processing passenger traffic, and so forth.
Past experience has proven the lesson: on a smaller scale, the introduction of e-ticketing
has prompted the development of more efficient terminal check-in areas worldwide.
In much the same way, new regulations can demand different airport designs, alter airport
financing methods, or introduce unforeseen traffic volatility. In fact, new regulatory
schemes have created some of the most important trends in aviation and airport design.
Thus, Europe, Australia, and the United States have each witnessed the formation of low-
cost airlines and their parallel airport networks following deregulation and privatization
initiatives within the airline industry.
Competition
Recent trends in the development of communication and transportation systems have
exposed airports to uncertainty due to an increasing competition for customers. This
effect is compounded by the nature of the aviation product: very few people purchase an
airline ticket for the sake of flying. Rather, an airline ticket is simply a means to an end;
the ticket represents an opportunity to travel or to assemble with others. Consequently,
air travel must compete with other methods of travel or assembly. Thanks to modern
technologies, today's airport customer may choose from among multiple alternatives.
Whereas high-speed rail now provides rapid connections between several cities, advances
in internet communication permit many individuals to forego traveling altogether.
Those who opt to fly have also gained more choices and, in many cases, may now select
to travel to/from their airport of choice. In past, this vulnerability had been rather
limited; only airline hubs competed on a significant scale for airlines and their transfer
passengers. However, it is now true that many non-hub airports can no longer expect to
monopolize traffic within a given area; the introduction of multiple airport systems has
significantly altered patterns of airport traffic.
Airline Restructuring
Trends specific to the airline industry have also introduced new uncertainties into the
planning of airport facilities and the development of traffic forecasts. The advent of the
low-cost carrier (discussed below) and the restructuring of the airline industry imply
particularly destabilizing effects. Airports which depend principally on a single carrier
are particularly susceptible as their financial status and traffic levels are largely tied to
that carrier's success, failure, or divestiture. In 1980, for example, the American Airlines
decision to shift its base of operations from Chicago/O'Hare created a 20% drop in traffic
at that destination. Today, the possibility of airline mergers and hub restructuring may be
advancing the possibility of similar events once again.
Public Support and Catastrophic Change
Prevalent trends aside, shifts in public opinion can also create large discrepancies in
airport forecasts. Osaka's Kansai International Airport (KIX), for one, was built at great
expense by the Japanese government in response to both capacity constraints and
complaints regarding noise at Osaka/Itami International Airport (ITM), then the region's
main airport. However, once the new airport opened, the public chose to support the
noisier Itami rather than to travel to the less centrally located Kansai and the employees
at Itami successfully blocked the closure of that airport (de Neufville, 2003).
Public support for the aviation industry in general has also affected the accuracy of traffic
forecasts and influenced the success of airport facilities. To be certain, no forecast could
have reasonably predicted the effect on passenger travel resulting from the Asian
economic collapse of the 1990's, the events of September 11, 2001, or the 2002 SARS
outbreak, each of which produced significant negative effects on aviation.
3. Novel Uncertainties: Growth of the Low Cost Carrier
Established sources of uncertainty aside, it appears that the aviation industry must now
learn to handle new unknowns. Though long accustomed to economic cycles due to
regional changes, new aircraft, and shifting propensities to travel, air transportation has
come to bear the effects of deregulation and the creation of a new competitive
environment wherein airline restructuring ranging from bankruptcy, divestiture, and even
mergers now presage significant transformations in the airport-airline relationship. In
effect, changing aviation trends have introduced new uncertainties which must be
properly considered during the airport design process.
Of these changes, the growth of low-cost carriers (LCC) such as Southwest and JetBlue
in the United States and easyJet and Ryanair in Europe promises the most enduring
effects. In an industry previously protected from outside competition by high fixed costs
and government intervention, these new airlines have grown substantially by gaining
market share from competitors and by increasing the passenger market as a whole. The
introduction of LCC, moreover, has in some cases effected ongoing changes not only in
the relationship between airlines and airports by promoting an unbundling of services and
long-term contracts with joint marketing and risk sharing but also between air and rail
travel (Graham, 2004). This leaves airports with the significant responsibility of
changing their structure in order to service new LCC customers while maintaining the
interests of long-standing airline partners. Equally important, the continued success of
low-cost carriers creates many new questions - and therefore uncertainties - for airport
designers to handle.
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[1] LCC have shown an affinity for secondary airports.
[2] LCC are more able to shift operations between airports than NC.
What will b aee e a ofMe aiindfe ndusWtry?
[1] LCC and NC are competing for market-share.
[2] Increasing competition has prompted new mergers and alliances.
[1] Low-cost airports generally receive lower aeronautical revenues.
[2] Non-aeronautical revenues are gaining in importance.
[1] LCC focus on point-to-point rather than hubbing operations.
[2] LCC often avoid airport staples favored by NC.
[3] Increased competition among airports may suggest focusing on niche
markets.
We rich passengers alsoumt atspors cate fto?
[1] LCC passengers appear to require fewer airport amenities
[2] Some LCC have expressed interest in serving intercontinental routes.
Figure 2-2: Low Cost Carriers: New Questions, New Uncertainties
LCC Characteristics, History, and Growth
One of the most noted low-cost carriers, the United States' Southwest Airlines, entered
the aviation market in 1971. Having started with a model of low cost, direct service
between three major regional cities, Southwest has expanded its domestic routes to
become the third largest airline in the world in terms of the number of passengers carried.
Financially, the airline has proven equally successful. With a 2004 market capitalization
that exceeded that of all major US airlines combined, Southwest's stock was the best
performing in the United States from 1972 to 2002 (Bonamici, 2004).
Due to the intense success of low-cost airlines inside the United States, the low-cost
model has been transplanted globally. In Europe, 2006 witnessed the operation of 50
different low-cost carriers the sum of which controlled over 16% of the air passenger
market in terms of total flights (Eurocontrol, 2006). At the same time, Europe's major
low-cost carriers, easyJet (UK) and Ryanair (Ireland), have experienced growth rates of
25 - 30% per year (Dennis, 2004). Aggressive marketing and cost-cutting measures have
further advanced LCC development: experts expect LCC to capture from one-quarter
(Mercer, 2002) to one-third (Francis, 2003) of the total passenger market by 2010,
yielding serious repercussions for the international and national carriers with which they
compete and for the airports which service them.
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Figure 2-3: LCC Traffic Growth (Various Sources)
This phenomenal expansion is of particular importance to airports because of core
differences between the LCC and "legacy" network carrier (NC) customer. Unlike the
large legacy carriers which had previously exercised quasi-monopoly power in air
transportation, low-cost carriers embrace a business model much different in its customer
base, air network, and provision of services by focusing on the more cost-sensitive leisure
travel market and providing point-to-point (rather than hub-based) service.
Consequently, low-cost carriers and their "legacy" competitors often exert opposing
pressures on the design of air routes and of individual airports.
LCC Customer Base
The growth of the LCC in Europe, the United States, and now in Asia appears to rest on
two pillars - the provision of low-cost service and the ability to focus on customer
segments not emphasized by larger carriers. European low-cost leaders Ryanair and
easyJet, for instance, focus on providing air services for travelers seeking to visit friends
and relatives. In addition, both have successfully attracted cost-conscious business
travelers. By focusing on these groups, LCC have demonstrated an ability to grow the
overall passenger market, especially on routes with strong tourist appeal (Dennis, 2004).
According to one study, 40% of those surveyed would not have chosen to travel were it
not for LCC offers (Pantazis, 2006). Further, the LCC passenger often has different
airport needs, placing more value on low-cost airfare and minimum hassle rather than on
distance to airport, departure times, and airport amenities.
No Frills Travel
Catering to cost-sensitive markets holds other important ramifications. In order to
minimize ticket prices, low-cost carriers strive to reduce the complexity of their
operations. Airlines such as Ryanair and easyJet, for instance, eschew free on-board
food, frequent flyer programs, indirect sales through travel agencies, and even printed
tickets. Francis notes that, in 2001, over 80% of tickets for travel aboard Ryanair and
easyJet were purchased over the Internet (as cited by jvdz.net, 2006). Through these
activities, LCC have cut costs and gained the title of"no frills airlines."
Although some have postulated that this model - particularly in Europe - yields poor
customer service, the evidence seems to suggest otherwise. Rather, by reducing the
available amenities, LCC can provide reliable, convenient service while catering to the
customer's most important demand - price. As evidence, a September 2004 survey of
UK leisure travelers showed that a significantly higher proportion of leisure travelers
would recommend "no-frills" carriers rather than traditional airlines, despite the fact that
many LCC have low rankings with regard to leg room, comfort, catering, and cleanliness
(Doganis, 2006).
Routes/Destinations
Diverging further from the model espoused by the conventional airlines, low-cost carriers
have established a separate network of routes and destinations based on short-haul point-
to-point travel (de Neufville, 2002). This parallel network operates quite differently from
the traditional hub-and-spoke network used by classical network carriers. Unlike the
hub-and spoke archetype which maximizes the productivity and frequency of long-haul
routes by aggregating flights at major airports, point-to-point travel serves the LCC base
by establishing direct routes between popular destinations and avoiding connections at
busy airports. In most cases, these low-cost carriers therefore shun flying into congested
major airports by selecting smaller, secondary airports in the region of major hubs and
tourist areas. Whereas most large airports are sited on expensive properties chosen for
their proximity to major cities and economic centers, airports serving low-cost carriers
and their passengers need not follow this standard. Belgium's successful Brussels South
Charleroi Airport (CRL), for instance, services its customers from an economically
depressed region of the country. In addition, Charleroi's location has allowed it to attract
the majority of its passengers from affluent areas nearby which were otherwise not served
by a low-cost carrier. Certainly, the development of this parallel network of secondary
airports has important implications both for new and operating airports, as is discussed
later in this chapter.
Aside from creating a parallel route network in regions already served by traditional
airlines, low-cost carriers have also proven adept at choosing destinations which are less
attractive to major carriers. In the European Union, this has manifested itself in an LCC
focus on "warm-water destinations" attractive to leisure travelers, as evidenced in the
Figure 2-4.
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Figure 2-4: easyJet's Continental Destinations (adapted from easyJet, 2006)
An analysis of LCC market share reveals their success in focusing on tourist destinations.
On routes from London to leisure destinations serving less than 1 million passengers per
year, for instance, low-cost carriers have attained more than 50% of overall market share,
at times even displacing major carriers from those destinations. However, this does not
suggest that low-cost carriers have been unsuccessful on larger routes. To the contrary,
they have captured up to 25% of traffic from London to major hubs and up to 50% of
traffic from London to other major airports with traffic surpassing 1 million passengers
per annum (Dennis, 2004).
LCC and the Restructurine of Air Transoort
By no means are the airlines the only group affected by the success of low-cost carriers.
Rather, the successful entrance of the low-cost carrier into the airline market has yielded
significant effects across the aviation industry. Both airlines and airports have been
subjected to changes resulting from an increasingly competitive market for their services.
Travelers, on the other hand, have discovered new destinations and new means of
arriving there.
Airlines
Most obvious among the effects of LCC entry is the increased competition faced by
traditional carriers such as United and Delta in the United States or British Airways or
Lufthansa in the European Union. By offering a differentiated aviation product at a
lower cost, LCC have successfully lured leisure travelers and cost-conscious business
travelers away from traditional carriers and charter airlines. This success appears to be
leading to permanent structural changes in the airline industry, in part due to the response
of the network carriers to increased competition.
Despite some anecdotal evidence that network carriers have attempted to oust low-cost
carriers by increasing capacity on LCC routes, much of the competitive response has
been focused on price-matching (Morrell, 2005). In other instances, competitive
responses have manifested themselves in the creation of low-cost airlines within the
structure of a network carrier, as in the unsuccessful case of Delta's Song in the United
States and others in Europe. Whether these changes will result in overall efficiency
increases and the creation of a new business model for large carriers remains unclear.
However, there is evidence to suggest that a trend toward airline partnerships capable of
combating LCC growth will permanently change the face of the airline industry.
According to Mercer Management Consulting, one-third of national flag carriers and
second-tier airlines may exit the passenger market in the coming years, leaving behind a
consolidated group of major international carriers dominating business travel and two to
three leading low-cost carriers with significant market share in the intra-European market
(Mercer, 2002). Certainly, such changes would have important implications for airport-
airline interaction, effectively changing the bargaining power of and relative economic
strength of each.
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Figure 2-5: Projected Segmentation of European Aviation Market (Mercer, 2002)
Airports
Aside from demanding a very different airport product, low-cost carriers have effected
important changes in the provision of airport services by avoiding the congestion and
airline costs associated with large "legacy" airports such as London/Heathrow (LHR) in
favor of smaller secondary or regional airports. In so doing, low-cost carriers have
shaken the so-called "natural" monopolies formerly enjoyed by large airports and
introduced previously unseen competitive forces into the provision of airport services.
Table 2-2: Example Airport Preferences of EU and US Low Cost Carriers (Informed by de Neufville,
2005)
Region City Primary Airport Secondary LCC at 2nd AirportAirport
EU Berlin Tegel (TXL) Schonefeld (SXF) Ryanair, easyJet,
Brussels Airlines
EU Frankfurt Main (FRA) Hahn (HHN) Ryanair, Wizz Air
Stansted (STN) Ryanair, easyJet,
EU London Heathrow (LHR) Sky Europe
Luton (LTN) easyJet, Monarch,
Wizz Air
EU Milan Malpensa (MXP) Bergamo (BGY) Ryanair, Wizz Air
EU Rome Fiumicino (FCO) Ciampino (CIA) Ryanair, easyJet,
Wizz Air
US Miami/Fort International Southwest, ,
Lauderdale (MIA) International (FLL)Air Tran
US Chicago O'Hare (ORD) Midway (MDW) Midway, SouthwestAir Tran, ATA
Boston/New Providence (PVD) SouthwestUS England Logan (BOS) Manchester
(MHT) Southwest
Long Beach(LGB) JetBlue(LGB)
Ontario ATA, JetBlue,
US Los Angeles International (ONT) Southwest
(LAX) Bob Hope (BUR) JetBlue, Southwest
John Wayne Southwest(JWA)
Notes: Some low-cost carriers do choose to serve more congested airports for various
reasons. For example, serves BOS, Air Tran BOS and DCA, and easyJet MXP.
In essence, airports can no longer depend on location alone to provide traffic; to the
contrary, evidence suggests that low-cost customers are willing to bypass nearby airports
in order to fly on a low-cost carrier (Dennis, 2004). LCC evolution, therefore, has
contributed to a differentiation of airport products wherein closely-located airports
compete to serve different customer markets, airlines, and routes. The London multi-
airport system demonstrates this occurrence particularly well. Whereas Heathrow (LHR)
focuses on international traffic, Luton (LTN) caters to holiday tours, Stansted (STN)
attracts LCC, and London City (LCY) advertises to business travelers. As a result of this
differentiation, secondary airports in the vicinity of major cities have experienced
significant growth.
Passengers
In general, low-cost customers demand a different product than the business travelers
which often supply the lion's share of airline revenue. Leisure travelers, for instance, do
not require the flexible schedules demanded by their business counterparts, meaning that
their service providers need not schedule as many flights throughout the day on any given
route. In addition, they are less sensitive to increased travel times to airports or to
reductions in airline services. Business passengers are not immune to the lure of the
LCC, however. Indeed, low-cost carriers have challenged the position of many major
carriers by attracting more flexible and cost-conscious businesspeople.
Meanwhile, passengers in general have benefited from lower ticket costs and, due to the
increasing use of smaller, less congested airports, reduced waiting times and shorter
walking distances within terminals. Despite suffering an increase in journey time from
city centers, the overall growth in the number of passengers seems to imply that the
benefits of LCC service outweigh this downside for many travelers.
Redefining Airport-Airline Interactions
In addition to increasing competition between airports, the introduction of the low-cost
carrier has also affected the effective bargaining position of airports when dealing with
their airline customers. Whereas airlines had previously been willing to acquiesce to
airport demands in order to gain the use of airport services, evidence suggests that this
dynamic is changing. Low cost carriers, due to their proven ability to attract traffic to an
airport or region, have gained a particularly strong bargaining position and have managed
to negotiate long-term contracts, joint marketing and risk sharing, and significantly
reduced airport fees. In one case, the Belgian government offered to pay Ryanair to
service its airport at Charleroi, rather than having Ryanair pay for airport services
(Dennis, 2004)!
These changes are not limited to low-cost carriers, however. Rather, by increasing the
number of useable airports in Europe and the Americas, low-cost carriers may be placing
all airlines in a relatively stronger position by increasing their ability to switch between
airports in the same region (Graham, 2004).
Novel Demands on Airport Facilities
Whereas previous subsections have focused on the generalized effects of low-cost
carriers on airport siting and bargaining power, a great deal of evidence remains
regarding the specific standards which LCC are demanding of airports. These have a
Table 2-3: Facilities Requirements of LCC and NC (Pitt, 2001)
Low-fare carrier Network carrier
Access
Location of secondary importance. Good road and rail
links not essential but preferable.
Terminal
Small ticketing area only (concentration on low cost
sales over Intemet)
Fast check in preferred but quality of location is a
secondary issue. Control of speed essential
Terminal services (such as food etc.) of secondary
importance
Terminal facilities not important
Gate
Low tech gate facilities (comfort of secondary
importance)
Power in and out of gate (eliminating wasting push
back time)
Economy lounge facilities only
Ability to separately route incoming and passengers
preferable to save time
General
Minimal catering facilities required
Cleaning staff required less frequently. Minimal facilities
requirement
No standby aircraft parking during daytime
Efficient removal and loading of aircraft baggage and
cargo
Convenient location essential to service, particularly for
non-economy passengers
High profile ticketing desk reflecting corporate image and
presence
Check in convenience and profile is of great importance
Important that passengers feel purchasing needs are met
Image of major international hub with good facilities
preferable
High tech gate facilities (creating professional/polished
image)
Air-bridge essential to product image wherever possible
Business and first class lounges required in addition to
economy space (separation of different classes essential
to product)
Long turn around times provide outgoing passengers
ample time to route passengers in appropriate manner
Facilities for preparation of in flight food essential as
forms part of package
Aircraft deanliness essential part of package
Standby aircraft require parking
Efficient delivery of arriving baggage to customer a
priority
particularly important effect on airport design. Given the trend of LCC development,
successful airports must now be able to provide for both LCC and NC demands or be
prepared to succeed while forfeiting the patronage of one of the two. This subsection
highlights several key differences between LCC and NC demands and presents proactive
measures which airport designers can take to promote LCC entry.
Non-Traditional Siting
The catchment area model, which posits that an airport's location relative to passengers
within a region primarily drives airport traffic, has long been a standard in airport siting.
Despite several studies disputing its usefulness (de Neufville, 2002), the catchment model
has remained in use. However, low-cost carriers have provided a strong challenge to this
thinking; airports serving low-cost carriers have shown the ability to attract passengers
from well outside their traditionally defined catchment areas. Only 18% of passengers at
Charleroi airport, for instance, derive from the airport's natural catchment area (Dennis,
2004). Similar data are available for airports throughout Europe, including at
London/Stansted (STN), the United Kingdom's 3 rd busiest airport (BAA, 2007).
Airport Ground Access
Perhaps even more so than with airports serving legacy carriers, those serving no-frills
airlines require exceptional ground access. One study by Warnock-Smith and Potter, as a
result, shows that airport accessibility is a leading factor in the airport choices of low-cost
carriers (Warnock-Smith & Potter, 2005). This finding derives directly from the LCC
passenger's willingness to travel longer distances in order to reduce trip costs and from
the LCC predilection for secondary airports. Airports seeking to attract LCC, therefore,
generally require inexpensive transportation modes with good access to areas lacking
low-cost. This requirement need not call for expensive rail services; rather, simple road
transit is often satisfactory (de Neufville, 2006).
These standards contrast with the model for larger airports with legacy patrons, several of
which have developed much celebrated high speed, fixed-route access that has not
provided a good investment return (de Neufville, 2006). Indeed, some high speed
systems, by tending to focus more on city centers than on a larger region, are unlikely to
serve low-cost carriers well. Rather, the costs of such a system, if passed on to the
airport, airlines, and passengers, could deter LCC service.
Rapid Turn-Around Times
According to one survey of European low-cost airlines, the availability of convenient
slots for take-off and landing and the ability to rapidly return a plane to flight are among
the dominant airport requirements for low-cost carriers, second only to regional demand
for low-cost service (Warnock-Smith & Potter, 2005). This requirement maximizes the
productivity of aircraft, a primary factor in minimizing costs. Therefore, low-cost
carriers have managed to increase the usefulness of their aircraft substantially (de
Neufville, 2006) relative to their competitors. Maintaining such efficiency thus requires
airports with the capacity to provide an uncongested airfield and airspace. By contrast,
network carriers often prefer major hub airports such as the Frankfurt Main Airport City
(FRA), where some 23.6% of flights are delayed with an average delay time of 37.2
minutes (AEA, 2007).
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Figure 2-6: Delay Rates at Major European Airports (AEA, 2007)
Low Cost Services and Simple Passenger Facilities
In order to maintain the low ticket prices essential to their appeal, low-cost carriers are
careful to select airports with low airport fees. In so doing, LCC encourage the sale of
unbundled airport services; they often choose to purchase only the minimal number of
services required and avoid expenses such as business lounges, retail services, air-
bridges, and amenities. Further, low-cost carriers have proven adept at negotiating lower
fees for aeronautical services.
The implication for airport planning is significant. Those airports serving low-cost
carriers cannot expect LCC to provide the level of aeronautical revenues attained by hub
airports. However, this need not impede success; Germany's Frankfurt/Hahn Airport
(HHN), which abolished landing fees entirely for the Boeing 737 weight aircraft often
operated by LCC (Francis, Fidato, & Humphreys, 2003), for instance, turned an operative
profit for the first time in 2006 (HHN, 2007) after becoming a regional center for
Ryanair.
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Low cost airports also benefit from increased non-aeronautical revenues due to passenger
demand for catering and shopping services not provided by the airline (Barrett, 2004).
Airports hoping to serve low-cost passengers, therefore, must emphasize simple
terminals, rapid check-in procedures, and functional catering facilities in order to both
attract the low-cost customer and to provide time for the customer to purchase goods. In
many cases, these principles contrast with the design of elaborate shopping areas, high-
profile ticketing areas, business lounges, and transfer passenger facilities common at
main airports, thereby exacerbating the design conflict for those wishing to serve both
network and low-cost carriers.
Additional Capacity
Finally, European low-cost airlines emphasize the importance of additional airport
capacity in determining their airport choice (Warnock-Smith & Potter, 2005). Given that
the introduction of the low-cost carrier has been shown to result in massive increases in
passenger traffic, airports wishing to service a low-cost carrier must be able to support
that increase. Europe's Frankfurt/Hahn (HHN) provides a prime example. Hahn, a
leading European low-cost airport, spent E 27 million on renovations before the arrival of
Ryanair, which raised its passenger levels from 450,000 in 2001 to 1.5 million in 2002
(Gillen & Lall, 2004)1.
This presents a particularly interesting problem for airport design, as unused spare
capacity - which could easily result if an airport or its airline partners fail to achieve large
traffic increases - can represent significant monetary waste. However, it appears that
airports need only have the flexibility to grow in order to be successful, a prime point of
this thesis. Baltimore's Washington International Airport (BWI), for instance, began its
expansion soon after Southwest began servicing the airport. Since then, BWI's US $1.8
billion expansion and renovation program - which includes the creation of new
concourses and the refurbishing of existing facilities in order to provide more parking,
longer runways, and less terminal congestion - has attracted a second LCC, AirTran, and
made BWI the region's second busiest airport (21 million passengers in 2006) ahead of
regional giant Reagan International (DCA: 19 million passengers) and right behind
Dulles International (lAD: 23 million passengers). Interestingly, BWI's competitor
airport, Dulles, provides a second example, as it only recently surpassed BWI in traffic
after itself acquiring low-cost service in 2004. Clearly then, low-cost carriers have
shown a powerful ability to affect airport success.
4. Novel Uncertainties: Rise of the Multi-Airport Systems
Although the growth of the low cost carrier has clearly demonstrated its effect on air
transport, LCCs are not alone in their ability to transform the airport industry. To the
'When placed in the context of today's billion dollar terminals, Hahn appears to have secured quite a deal!
contrary, the continued growth of multi-airport systems (MAS) has also added increasing
uncertainty to airport management.
Certainly, MAS are not new. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, for
instance, has operated three major airports - Kennedy (JFK), LaGuardia (LGA), and
Newark Liberty (EWR) - since 1948 (Port Authority, 2006). Across the Atlantic, the
London airport system has developed five significant airports under the control of BAA,
including Heathrow (LHR) and Stansted (STN). However, the role and influence of
multi-airport systems are growing rapidly with the development of LCC-driven
secondary airports and the general increase in aviation demand. Moreover, many airports
within the same region have not shown the level of cooperation enforced by joint
management or ownership as in New York and London. To the contrary, MAS have
fostered increased competition between airports in much the same way that LCCs have
introduced new competitive forces to airlines. In effect, multi-airport systems - like low-
cost carriers - are well on their way to becoming a permanent part of the air-
transportation landscape, adding new uncertainties to which airport managers must
adjust.
Figure 2-7: Multi-Airport Systems: New Questions, New Uncertainties
MAS Characteristics, History, and Growth
As defined by de Neufville and Odoni, multi-airport systems consist of the set of airports
serving 1 million or more passengers per year (or 100,000 tons of freight) in a common
metropolitan region (de Neufville & Odoni, 2003). This definition gives no emphasis to
airport ownership or to political boundaries; to the contrary, experiential data show that
these factors are unimportant from the perspective of the airport customer. Boston's air
travelers, for instance, choose between three airports in different states: Massachusetts'
Boston Logan (BOS), New Hampshire's Manchester Boston Regional (MHT), and
Rhode Island's T.F. Green (PVD). In effect, the metropolitan region - the area that is
accessible to the airport passenger - is more important than the city itself. The impetuses
for this development have developed over time: while deregulation paved the way for
[1] Secondary airports create increased competition for traffic.
[1] Secondary airports are allowing for the creation of new route structures.
[2] Secondary airports and LCC challenge hub-and-spoke arrangements.
[1] Competing airports yield increased differentiation.
[2] Some airports are moving toward the "aerotropolis" idea; others are simplifying
to better serve LCC.
[1] Increased airport differentiation allows for passenger segmentation.
[2] Some large airports are attempting to integrate non-traveling customers into
their revenue base by adding malls, offices, etc.
airlines to choose new airports, increased passenger demand created the need for new
capacity and low-cost carriers sought to reduce costs.
Demand Impetus
Due to the rapid growth in passenger traffic, the growth of MAS in the United States has
been particularly pronounced. In cases where capacity at the main airport is limited, the
use of secondary regional airports has come to provide a clear alternative. Bonnefoy and
Hansman, for instance, demonstrated the importance of capacity constraints and delay
rates at core airports (including Boston Logan) in the development of successful
secondary facilities, especially in cases where some secondary "population basin" could
be identified near the new airport (Bonnefoy & Hansman, 2004). de Neufville and
Odoni, meanwhile, have noted that most airports handling over 14 million non-transfer
passengers per year may have the capability to support secondary airports (de Neufville
& Odoni, 2003).
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Figure 2-8: Availability of runways longer than 5000 ft at secondary airports in 16 US systems
(Bonnefoy & Hansman, 2004)
Within this context, the creation of multi-airport systems can confer some important
benefits. Airport competition aside, cooperation between system airports can defer losses
to regional economies due to airport capacity constraints. Further, secondary airports can
relieve congestion, as in the case of London, where Luton airport (LTN) has proven
crucial to alleviating the effects of summer peaks in passenger travel at Heathrow (de
Neufville, 1995b).
Other Impetus
Capacity constraints have not proven the sole factor in the creation of second airports.
Rather, political and practical factors have also motivated multi-airport systems. In cases
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where the main airport is incapable of handling different types of traffic, for instance,
new airports have been necessitated in the absence of threshold demand levels, as
evidenced below.
Table 2-4: Multi-airport systems existing primarily due to political/technical reasons
(Adapted from de Neufville & Odoni, 2003)
MbaotRegn Remato•••en for Sytm
DOsseldorf/Bonn Political: former capital
Moscow Political/military
St. Louis Political: mid-American access point
Berlin Political: result of divided city
Sco Paulo Technical: runway length
Taipei Technical: runway length
Buenos Aires Technical: runway length
Rio de Janeiro Technical: runway length
Belfast Technical: runway length
Though perhaps not the primary reason for the development of multi-airport systems,
MAS also carry other benefits. First, they increase passenger choice by allowing
passengers to select from among multiple airports. Second, they allow for differentiation
between airports in multi-airport regions, making competition and cooperation possible.
The five airports within the London system, for instance, each tend to cater to different
customer groups and differentiate their services to match.
The Role of LCC
As in other sectors of the air transportation industry, low-cost carriers have played an
undeniable role in the development of multiple airport systems. In fact, research
conducted within the United States names the entry of a low-cost carrier as the "essential
stimulus" to the emergence of the secondary airports that form MAS (Bonnefoy &
Hansman, 2004). As detailed in the section on low-cost carriers, the LCC predilection
for secondary airports is clear: these facilities offer reduced congestion and lower cost
while still providing access to key population centers. With this in mind, the growth of
LCC and of MAS can be viewed as occurring in tandem, with each phenomenon
fostering the growth of the other.
MAS and the Restructuring of Air Transport
Forecasting Difficulties
As a result of the symbiosis between MAS and LCC, then, both tend to be influencing the
air transport industry in a similar pattern. As with LCC, for instance, the growth of the
multi-airport system has added increased uncertainty to the practice of forecasting.
Certainly, the development of multiple nearby airport facilities provides a significant
challenge to the normal operation of the catchment area model. More importantly,
though, secondary airports often defy predictions on traffic development despite attempts
to relocate traffic as at Paris/Charles de Gaulle (CDG) or to close the core airport as at
Osaka/Kansai International (KIX).
Further, the creation of secondary airports has been shown to increase the volatility of
traffic for the entire airport system (Cohas, 1993). This volatility has been especially
pronounced during the developmental phases of secondary airports; because these
facilities generally have lesser amounts of traffic and are often served by fewer carriers,
decisions made by a single airline can significantly affect traffic levels and profitability
(de Neufville, 1995). According to de Neufville, such uncertainty can commonly last up
to 20 years after the opening of the second airport (de Neufville, 1995b).
Table 2-5: MAS and Increased Traffic Volatility
(Cohas, 1993, as cited in de Neufville, 1995)
Multi-Airport Sy m Higher Traffic at ndividual
New York + 10 %
San Francisco + 86 %
Washington/Baltimore + 127%
New Market Dynamics
Multi-airport systems, commensurate with LCC development, have also added to the
development of new market dynamics within air transport. The development of niche
airport markets is of particular interest as per its effects on airport design. This
phenomenon is in no way limited to London, as mentioned above. Rather, airport
differentiation is increasingly becoming a mark of increased competition. Whereas some
facilities have sought to simplify and to cater to the LCC customer, others such as
Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS) have moved towards creating aerotropoli, airport cities
which go far beyond providing traditional airport services. The Schiphol Real Estate
group, for instance, partakes in the commercial development of office complexes, hotels,
shopping, and exhibition spaces under the airport name; Hong Kong International (HKG)
includes one million square meters of retail, exhibition, business, hotel, and entertainment
space near its passenger terminal (Airport Innovation, 2007).
Further, Graham suggests that a new MAS-enhanced atmosphere of competition and
cooperation may eventually affect the relative bargaining powers of airport and airlines,
as demonstrated in some limited cases. Already, some horizontal and vertical integration
has been observed: BAA operates a rail link to LHR, the Heathrow Express; Cardiff
International (CWL) operates its own travel agency; the Schiphol and Fraport airport
groups have formed the Panatares alliance; and in an extreme case, airport company
PlaneStation acquired the LCC EUjet to provide for its operations2 (Graham, 2004). The
growth of any of these trends could each signal significant changes in the aviation
industry and carry unknown uncertainties. In most cases, however, changes to the
traditional relationship between airports and airlines within the MAS/LCC environment
has been more timid, marked instead by increased cooperation and negotiation.
Novel Demands on Airport Facilities
Finally, the development of multi-airport systems appear to be exerting influence on the
design of airports themselves, an issue of particular important to airport planners. In
most cases, these changes are in line with those influences exerted by low-cost carriers, a
common patron of secondary airports. Perhaps the most pronounced difference,
however, lies in the necessity of superior airport access. In the case of
Baltimore/Washington (BWI) for example, the airport has developed train service to the
DC area in order to better compete with the two major airports already in the region,
Dulles (IAD) and Reagan (DCA).
5. Handling Uncertainty: Other Methods
Even without the influence of new trends in the aviation industry, several observers had
already noted potent flaws in the master planning process. The introduction of low-cost
carriers and the correlated growth of multi-airport systems have only heightened the
difficulties. Given the increased influence of uncertainty, master planning must be
augmented. The following subsections describe various proposals meant to help airport
planners achieve success.
An Evolution of Planning
Over time, several different techniques have been introduced in order to improve
planning practice. Though perhaps not specifically aimed at airports and transportation
systems, each has been an attempt to avoid the flaws associated with dealing with overly
idealized forms, as in master planning. Some of the most notable techniques include
Simon's organizational approach (Simon, 1955), which integrates elements of
psychology; Lindblom's incremental approach (Lindblom, 1959), which attempts to
reduce the burden of fact-gathering by emphasizing the human predilection for steady
change; and Etzioni's mixed scanning approach (Etzioni, 1967), an effort to avoid the
conservatism inherent in incrementalism through employing a two-stage evaluation
strategy3. Over time, however, each has waned in popularity.
2 This experiment in integration failed with PlaneStation's loss of bank support in July, 2005.
3 All planning references (Simon, Lindblom, and Etzioni) are as cited in Dempsey, 1997.
Strategic & System Planning
Strategic and system planning approaches, however, have enjoyed greater popularity. In
contrast to master planning, strategic planning aims to be more proactive in creating
effective designs. System planning, meanwhile, attempts to account for the wide variety
of factors which affect projects by emphasizing the importance of the project's
relationships with the wider world. Together, strategic and system planning create a
paradigm of holistic thinking meant to identify levers for creating success. In order to
facilitate this goal, strategic system planning focuses on the evaluation of various "what-
if' scenarios which describe possible future events.
Despite having gained support from major organizations, traditional strategic and system
planning has nonetheless lost some of its appeal within the aviation community. Even
Michael Porter4, a prominent founder of the technique, noted that strategic planning had
not necessarily led to strategic thinking (as cited by de Neufville, 2003). Rather, the
consideration of multiple scenarios and the evaluation of numerous levers within a highly
complex system often resulted in a large and expensive planning process. Moreover,
airport strategic planning often proved unidirectional; early errors in describing the
overall system tended to propagate downstream in much the same way as in master
planning (Caves & Gosling, 1999).
Even though the system of strategic planning for airports remains under review - Caves
and Gosling present a re-evaluation in their 1999 book Strategic Airport Planning - it
would therefore appear that airport planning techniques can still bear improvement. The
benefits of strategic system planning aside, its unidirectional attempt to describe a
complex world weaken its appeal in dealing with the increasingly uncertain world of air
transport.
Real Options
Real options planning, while not in any way diminishing the benefits of being proactive
(strategic) or system-oriented, has come to provide an increasingly popular alternative.
In contrast to master planning and its substitutes, real options thinking does not
emphasize the use of fixed forecasts or of complex system mapping. Rather, it uses a
number of techniques to minimize the risks associated with uncertainty. The paradigm is
simple. In real options planning, designers do not settle on a single most-likely forecast
or scenario; instead, they seek to maintain the flexibility to adapt, regardless of what the
future brings.
6. Wrapping Up: A review
A significant amount of experiential history has revealed that transportation projects are
subject to a multitude of uncertainties. Variations in demand, economics, politics, and
4 For more on Porter's techniques, please see Porter & Montgomery, 1991.
public opinion each constrain the ability of planners to successfully design for future
needs. In an ideal world, planners could isolate and predict the effect of these
uncertainties. However, the real world is not so forgiving. Instead, attempts to predict
future states have led to the simple conclusion that the forecast is always wrong.
The air transportation industry is far from immune to these difficulties. Indeed, several
iterations of airport planning methods have struggled to account for uncertainty. New
trends in air transport do not signal relief. To the contrary, the growth of low-cost
carriers and of multi-airport systems raises new, unanswerable questions about the future.
Within this context, real options planning can provide a useful alternative to other
planning techniques. By avoiding forecasts and promoting flexibility, the real options
paradigm promises to reduce risk and to help promote success. These real options
strategies will be explored in Chapter 3 and provide the basis for this thesis.
CHAPTER 3: REAL OPTIONS THEORY
Chapter 3 - Introduces the reader to the basics of real options theory, including its
logical antecedents in finance, major concepts, and mathematical valuation methods.
Dealing with uncertainty presents a common challenge for the designers of long-term
engineering systems. In contrast to short-lived projects, enduring engineering structures
suffer increased difficulties due to greater complexity in predicting future specifications
and in designing to future needs. As a result, systems designers must attempt to plan for
unforeseeable circumstances such as changing functional requirements, novel
technological developments, evolving load patterns, and new regulations that can create
demands which conflict with initial designs and threaten obsolescence or financial
failure.
The creation of a toll highway provides a simple example. Assuming that a highway is
constructed to connect two major cities, several possible failures external to the
engineering success of the design are possible. Given that "the forecast is always
wrong," incorrect demand forecasts may lead to the creation of too many (or too few)
lanes, resulting in financial losses. Otherwise, the introduction of new technologies such
as an inexpensive rail connection between the two cities or of regional economic changes
can create unexpected demand shocks to which the highway, even if designed exactly to
specifications, simply cannot adjust. Another example, the development of airport
systems, supplies a more complex archetype of long-term engineering projects; changes
in aircraft, airline, economy, passenger type, and local competition can each create
considerable adjustment challenges.
Ensuring that such adjustments are possible gives primary rationale to real options
thinking. Real options, as termed by MIT Professor Stewart Myers (Coy, 1999), provide
the right, but not the obligation to take actions which can help maintain or even increase
the value of an engineering project despite uncertainty. This section presents the
evolution and thinking behind real options theory. It further provides an overview of
several analytical tools which can be useful in applying real options theory to the
development of actual engineering projects.
1. Real Options: Theory and Evolution
In 1983, current Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke argued that the
presence of uncertainty can increase the value of delaying a financial investment
(Bernanke, 1983). In so doing, Bernanke examined investments subject to two simple
assumptions. The first assumption, irreversibility, posited that some investment decisions
cannot be undone or substantially changed without incurring great or sometimes
prohibitive costs. The second assumption held that decision-makers do not often have all
the information relevant to making an irreversible decision although that information may
become available in the future. Armed with these two assumptions, Bernanke concluded
that postponing a commitment, while maintaining the ability to commit at a later time,
can sometimes prove desirable by allowing an investor to make choices only after
important information is revealed.
This conclusion lends credence to the primary thesis of options theory. In essence,
Bernanke maintained that the right (option) to make a decision in the future has inherent
value. The toll highway analogy again proves useful. Clearly, constructing unnecessary
lanes is an irreversible process; the cost of removing additional lanes is likely prohibitive.
Further, information regarding future economic conditions and the probability of a rail
connection would certainly influence designers by giving a truer picture of highway
traffic. Empirically then, what Bernanke proved true for financial systems also holds in
engineering systems; options theory as it was developed for the financial markets can
carry benefits in the physical world.
Financial Options to Real Options
The concept of "real options," wherein options theory is applied to physical objects,
developed out of financial options theory, the primary subject of Bernanke's argument.
Within the financial realm, purchasing an option gives investors the right to acquire (call)
or divest from (put) a particular stock at a time determined based on the option type. As
such, financial options provide a powerful tool for deferring irreversible investment
decisions and managing uncertainty. Indeed, the success of options within the financial
realm led to the extension of the theory into the physical world of engineering, hence the
"real option."
Unlike financial options, real options regard a physical structure or system, such as the
toll highway described earlier. However, the role of the option is the same; real options,
like financial options, allow investors the opportunity to purchase the right to delay
expensive or irreversible decisions. They therefore recognize the role that active
management can play in either minimizing the damage from or taking advantage of an
uncertain future (de Neufville & Neely, 2001). This concept has received increasing
potency due to the work of several authors (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; de Neufville,
2006) and the promotion of the concept at universities such as MIT. More recently, the
United States Office of Management and Budget recognized the usefulness of real
options formulations, noting the effectiveness of real options thinking in situations where
the costs of incorrect action outweigh the benefits of rapid action, as they often do when
constructing long-term engineering systems. As such, the Office concluded as follows:
'Real options' methods have ... formalized the valuation of the added flexibility
inherent in delaying a decision. As long as taking time will lower uncertainty,
either passively or actively through an investment in information gathering, and
some costs are irreversible, such as the potential costs of a sunken investment, a
benefit can be assigned to the option to delay a decision. That benefit should be
considered a cost of taking immediate action versus the alternative of delaying
that action pending more information. However, the burdens of delay-including
any harm to public health, safety, and the environment-need to be analyzed
carefully (US Office of Management and Budget, 2003, p.39).
Real Options "on" a System
Just as one may differentiate between real and financial options, one may also distinguish
between two types of real options, namely real options "on" and "in" a system (Wang &
de Neufville, 2006). This differentiation aptly separates real options in terms of
identification, value determination, and complexity.
Real options "on" a system closely mirror financial options in terms of use (Mittal, 2004).
In many ways, they provide a direct analog of financial options. Referring back to the
example of a toll highway, a real option "on" the system would allow investors to either
acquire or sell the highway at a given time based on its financial performance up to that
date. In this case, the value of the option is fairly simple to determine, being a function
of the money saved (or gained) after selling (or acquiring) the highway. One possible
analog within the realm of airport development is the practice of landbanking, wherein
investors seeking to develop a future airport acquire the land required well before making
the decision to build the airport. In this scenario, the decision is not irreversible; the land
can be sold or used to develop non-aviation products. However, landbanking helps to
ensure that an airport can be built in the future and likely helps to lock in a lower cost.
To further the analogy, landbanking could also ensure that a current airport could be
expanded as necessary.
This description reveals three primary maneuvers common to real options "on" a system:
1. The right to acquire (buy) engineering systems.
2. The right to divest (sell) engineering systems.
3. The right to expand the size of engineering systems.
4. The right to contract the size of engineering systems.
Each of these maneuvers, though different, provide the option owner with the ability to
defer important investment decisions until the information required becomes available,
therefore helping to protect against uncertainty.
Real Options "in" a System
In contrast to real options "on" a system, real options "in" a system are far more diverse,
complex, and more difficult to identify and appraise. These options cannot be applied to
a system without consideration of the system's internal workings; rather, real options "in"
a system derive from the system's design and therefore require an appropriate level of
engineering knowledge. Moreover, the decision to implement a real option will likely
affect and be affected by other design decisions and exhibit path-dependency.
The 25 de Abril Bridge, which spans the Tagus River outside of Lisbon, gives one
example of the successful application of real options "in" a system (Gesner & Jardim,
1998). Completed in 1966, the Tagus River Bridge was constructed as a four-lane
roadway that could be retrofitted to in order to support both a highway and a railroad. As
a result, bridge designers made engineering decisions internal to the bridge design which
allowed for future retrofits. These decisions paid off in 1992 after the region's
population and economic growth caused bridge traffic to exceed the original
expectations. Whereas other cases may have led to the total reconstruction of the bridge,
engineers were able to widen the roadway deck to six lanes and to install a railroad deck
without causing major disruptions to bridge traffic. As such, the Tagus River example
demonstrates the usefulness of delaying a decision (whether or not to build more road or
rail lanes) by designing an engineering structure which provides for future eventualities.
Had the designers chosen to build a six-highway bridge with railroad capabilities in 1966,
the Tagus River Bridge would have remained underused for over 25 years. However, had
the designers chosen not to allow for future expansion, the bridge would have remained
over capacity or required great financial losses to expand. Rather, the decision to combat
uncertainty by designing flexibility into the system allowed for the bridge to be expanded
only when necessary at minimum cost.
2. Appraising Real Options: Square One
As with all financial mechanisms, the usefulness of a real option correlates with
calculations of its costs and expected benefits. This section and its successors introduce
common evaluative methods for financial options and contrast them with techniques used
in engineering practice. Finally, the chapter ends by revealing approaches which allow
for real options - options with importance to engineering - to be appraised while
accounting for uncertainty.
Financial Options Valuation
The chief assessment methodology for appraising financial options, known as Black-
Scholes formula, led to a Nobel Prize for creators Myron Scholes and Robert Merton in
19975. Computation through Black-Scholes assumes that options can be valued by
envisioning them as a portfolio of assets and loans which can be bought and sold in a free
market. The value of the option, then, equals the portfolio's market, given that there are
no opportunities for arbitrage profits.
Although this methodology was developed specifically for financial options, it does not
however translate well for the financial evaluation of all real options. Whereas financial
options such as the ability to obtain or reject a stock at a given time are easily converted
into an equivalent set of tradable assets and loans, this is often not the case in engineering
systems. Rather, physical limitations restrain the ability of a particular material item - an
additional highway lane or airport runway, for example - to be replicated and sold freely.
3. Appraising Real Options: Square Two
Stakeholders involved in the construction of large projects have several methodologies
for selecting investments, most of which are quite different from those used for valuing
5 Fischer Black was ineligible for the Nobel Prize as a result of his death.
financial options. In general, these techniques allow investors to rank the desirability of
different ventures based on costs and expected profits. Traditionally, several of these
approaches share a common failing - an inability to account for uncertainty.
Net Present Value
The calculation of a net present value (NPV) remains one of the most common methods
for evaluating the financial worth of a particular investment. By resolving the worth of
each project into a single monetary value, the net present value (alternatively, discounted
cash flow) method allows for a simple ranking of different alternatives; more favorable
projects have a higher NPV than less favorable ones.
Though simple, net present value calculations are quite powerful, as they reflect the
relationship between the value of money invested and the time at which the investment is
made. This concept, the "time value of money," results from the financial notion that
money today (or yesterday) carries greater value than money tomorrow (or today). This
is not the result of inflation alone; rather, present money is worth more than future money
because of the value which can be obtained from today's investments. Since different
groups tend to profit from investment at different rates, all net present value calculations
therefore depend on determining a discount rate which represents the investor's minimum
acceptable return from choosing to invest in the present rather than at some point in the
future. Upon determining the discount rate, the method can then be applied using
Equation 3-1 which requires the discount rate per period (r), the number of periods (n),
and the revenue in each period (F,,).
Equation 3-1: Net Present Value Calculation
NPV=X "
t=o (1+r)
Figure 3-1 provides an example wherein an investor compares two airport projects over
three periods. Airport B, though significantly more expensive than Airport A, grows in
revenue at a greater rate.
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Figure 3-1: 2-Stage Evolution of Stock Prices
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Simply summing the revenues in each period - in effect, applying a discount rate of 0%
per period - provides an incorrect project ranking, implying that the faster growing
Airport B is more profitable over three periods. However, applying a discount rate of
12% more accurately represents the time value of money and shows that Airport A is in
fact the superior investment.
The airport example further reveals a key concern relevant to the use of net present value
rankings; all results are highly dependent on the discount rate, for which no definitive
means of determination exists. As such, low discount rates tend to favor projects with
higher initial capital investments. In the airport example, for instance, a discount rate of
6% suggests that Airport B - the more capital intensive options - is the more favorable.
Net present value carries other flaws which render it inappropriate for the evaluation of
flexibility if used on its own. Since the determination of revenues during each period
generally relies on fixed forecasts, net present value neither incorporates uncertainty nor
does it recognize the benefits of flexibility over the long term. To the contrary, net
present value calculations tend to diminish benefits acquired due to flexibility over the
course of long-term investments. Later sections of this chapter address this problem.
Internal Rate of Return
Evaluating projects based on an internal rate of return avoids the complication of
choosing a project-specific discount rate. Rather, the internal rate of return is defined as
the discount rate which makes the net present value zero. Though also a common
measure, internal rate of return suffers from most of the same difficulties as NPV
evaluation; neither uncertainty nor flexibility may be easily accounted for.
Benefit Cost Approach
The benefit cost approach (BCA) represents a popular mechanism for determining the
value of large government projects such as airports and railroads, hence its relevance to
this thesis. In addition, BCA - unlike traditional NPV calculations - allows for a fairer
ranking of projects of different sizes. Quite simple in execution, cost-benefit analysis (as
it is alternatively called) categorizes projects on the basis of Equation 3-2. Favorable
projects carry a ratio greater than 1; that ratio increases with the project's desirability.
Equation 3-2: Benefit-Cost Calculation
C BenefitsBCA = E Costs
As in the net present value approach, both benefits and costs are discounted, meaning that
the analysis is subject to errors in choice of discount rate. Further weaknesses of the
method include inconsistent definitions of benefits and costs and a natural bias against
high operating costs. For this reason, many financial institutions tend to avoid the
measure (de Neufville, 1990a).
4. Appraising Real Options: Square Three
As with all investments in financial options and traditional engineering projects,
decisions regarding the implementation of flexibility require knowledge of expected costs
and benefits. However, ranking flexible (and inflexible) alternatives is fundamentally
different from ranking other types of ventures. First, evaluating flexible options requires
comparing variations on the same project rather than comparing entirely different
projects. Second, the evaluation must account both for uncertainty and for the ability to
adapt to new conditions. This section presents a series of different approaches suited to
financial evaluation while focusing on those methods most applicable to assessing real
options.
Accounting for Uncertainty
Flaw ofAverages
In one common, intuitive means of accounting for uncertainty, variations in an uncertain
variable may be tackled by considering the average value of that variable over time.
Therefore an investor can consider an airport which serves no passengers in year 1, 2
million passengers in year 2, and 10 million passengers in year three to have an average
throughput of 4 million passengers per year. The flaw in this thinking is evident; the
airport, if constructed to suit its average traffic, remains underused for the first two years
and severely overcapacity in the third. Stanford University's Sam Savage explored the
dangers of this type of assessment, the "flaw of averages," in a 2000 article, arguing that
"plans based on the assumption that average conditions will occur are usually wrong
(Savage, 2000)."
In other words, using average values to account for uncertainty often leads to suboptimal
results. Mathematically, Jensen's inequality expresses this concept. A convex function
of a variable's expected value does not equal the expected value of that function.
Equation 3-3: Jensen's Inequality
IF(EV(x) * EV(F(x))
Clearly, the use of average values for uncertain parameters does not provide a satisfactory
means of valuing options or of ranking flexible alternatives.
Value at Risk and at Gain
Conversely, the value at risk and gain (VaRG) concept provides a useful analytical
method for including uncertainty into financial evaluations. By emphasizing the reality
that an investor can only foresee the actual value of any particular project
probabilistically, VaRG calculations stress the role of uncertainty in design. By
definition, VaRG assigns a confidence level (90% certainty) to an investor's expected
maximum loss or minimum gain. Viewing the value at risk for a particular project as a
cumulative distribution function, the value of flexibility becomes clear. A well designed
flexible alternative can decrease a project's maximum loss (or increase its minimum gain)
for a particular confidence level.
Figure 3-2: VARG Illustration
Valuing Flexibility in Physical Systems
Binomial Lattice Model
In 1979, Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein presented the binomial options pricing model as a
mathematically accessible alternative to the Merton/Scholes approach (Cox, Ross, &
Rubinstein, 1979). Though intended as a means of simulating uncertain fluctuations in
stock prices, the model has proven useful in the valuation of real options, subject to
important conditions.
The strength of the binomial lattice lies in its ability to reduce a large set of future
possibilities to a manageable size. Within the context of markets and financial options,
one may consider the evolution of stock prices. In general, the price of a given stock
undergoes a random evolution. Even if it were assumed that the stock price only
increased or decreased in value by a fixed amount during each period, the number of
possible outcomes would grow exponentially (2") with the number of periods (n).
Therefore, if each period represented one day, an investor attempting to determine a stock
price on the 20 days in the future would have over 1 million possibilities (220 states) to
consider.
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Figure 3-3: 2-Stage Evolution of Stock Prices
The binomial lattice model simplifies the investor's dilemma significantly. Given the
parameters of the Cox-Rubenstein structure, the stock price is assumed to either increase
by a fixed factor (u) or decrease by a different, fixed factor (d = u-') during each period.
This condition forces the lattice to recombine: an upward followed by a downward
motion is equal to a downward followed by an upward motion. Since the number of
possible states now increases linearly with period (n), the investor must consider only 21
possibilities on the 20"' day. Figure 3-4 illustrates.
Period 0
Stock Price
$200
Period 1
Price Up
$220
Price Down
$180
Period 2
Price Up
$242
Price Down/Up ,
$198
Price Down
$162
Up Factor (u) = 1.1
Down Factor (d) = .9
Figure 3-4: Binomial 2-Stage Evolution of Stock Prices
Further, binomial lattices allow the user to determine probabilities for each state, as in
Figure 3-5, which continues the stock price example.
Period 0
Figure 3-5: Binomial 2-Stage Evolution of Probabilities
Although the evolution of stock prices may not necessarily be important for any physical
engineering system, the binomial lattice model itself can prove helpful to engineers and
designers. For instance, an airport planner could employ the lattice structure to model the
development of traffic at a given airport over several decades. This provides distinct
advantages; unlike in conventional master planning methods where airports are designed
to best fit one - or very few - possible future traffic outcomes, use of the lattice method
allows stakeholders to view and best account for numerous uncertain possibilities with
relative ease.
Successful use of the binomial lattice requires satisfying three key assumptions which
should be considered in modeling physical systems. First, the user must have access to
sufficient past data with which to calculate viable values for the multiplicative factors (u
and d) and associated probabilities (p). Further, the user must have knowledge of the
initial state (S), which, in the airport example, is the starting demand for air
transportation. Equation 3-4 links the calculation of these variables to the length of each
period (At), the average growth rate as a percentage of starting value (v), and the
standard deviation ( a ) of the data as a percentage of starting value (S).
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Initial Value (S) = $200
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Period 2
Equation 3-4: Calculation of Parameters for Binomial Lattices
u = e
d = e-p 4
Second, the binomial model assumes the non-negativity of values modeled. In economic
(stock prices) and real (passenger traffic) systems, this requirement does not impose
important restrictions.
Third, the binomial model requires that the evolution of states is path-independent;
therefore, all paths to a particular state (defined by period and value) are equal in result.
In the stock price example, this implies that arriving at a stock price of $198 in Period 2
through Price up first and Price down second does not differ from arriving at the same
stock price through Price down first and Price up second. This condition, though perhaps
well suited to financial markets, holds important ramifications in engineering systems.
Indeed, the level of traffic at an airport in Period I may affect decisions on
expanding/contracting airport size, which would in turn affect airport traffic in Period 2.
Despite the usefulness of the binomial lattice in modeling certain physical systems, then,
the condition of path-independence can prove severely limiting, as explored further in
Chapter 5.
Decision Tree Analysis
Decision tree analysis provides a useful, graphical means of representing the effects of
uncertain events. Further, it allows planners to account for managerial flexibility, the
ability to make real-time decisions regarding system development (de Neufville, 1990a).
By integrating these elements, decision trees provide a powerful tool for determining best
choices under uncertainty.
This methodology permits multiple advantages over the binomial model. Foremost
among these, decision tree analysis does not assume path dependence and therefore
allows planners to consider the effects of real world changes (i.e. expanding an airport).
Further, it frees analysts to consider the impact of entirely different uncertain events
without subjecting the model to limiting parameters such as an average growth rate or a
predetermined evolution of probabilities. Conversely, decision trees can quickly develop
into "messy bushes;" modeling a large number of chance outcomes and future decisions
can quickly overwhelm computational power. In addition, the accuracy of a decision tree
largely depends on the ability of the user to correctly structure all chance outcomes,
future decisions, their probabilities and their costs.
Figure 3-6 expands the stock example from above for use in a decision tree. In this
version, the investor faces the question of whether or not to buy a stock (Stock A) for
$200.
Proper decision tree analysis requires that the investor, moving backwards through the
tree, execute decisions in order to maximize expected value. Therefore, if the stock price
increased in Period I, the savvy investor would choose to keep Stock A because the
expected value of keeping the stock ($222.40) is greater than the expected value of
selling it ($220). Conversely, the same investor would choose to sell the stock if its price
had declined during Period I. Regardless of the chance outcome in Period I, the investor
would choose to buy the stock since the expected value of purchasing it ($213.92), given
value-maximizing decisions in Period II, is greater than the expected value of not doing
so ($200).
Chapter 5 explores an analog of this example within the engineering world; the choices to
buy and keep stock are replaced by alternatives regarding how best to construct and
expand an airport structure. Indeed, decision tree modeling proves rather well suited to
considering complex transportation systems in which numerous outside factors can cause
step changes in demand and profitability.
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Figure 3-6: Stock Buy/Sell Decision Tree
EV (Buy Stock) = $213.92 Buy Stock
EV (Don't Buy) = $200.00
Given Option to Sell after Period 1:
If Price Down, EV (Keep) = $176.40 < $180 Sell Stock
If Price Up, EV (Keep) = $224.40 > $220 Keep Stock
CHAPTER 4: AIRPORT FLEXIBLE DESIGN STRATEGIES
Chapter 4 - Provides airport specific real options concepts as best applied by particular
stakeholders. As such, it includes a stakeholder analysis of major players on the
international, national/regional, and local/airport levels.
Airport decision-making occurs at multiple levels. Through a combination of rulemaking
authority and funding support, international, regional, and national authorities - in
combination with airport owners, designers, and managers - each contribute to different
facets of airport design. Together, these groups add specifications through a step-wise
and path-dependent process. Airport financing tells part of the story; because airports
often confer important economic benefits to their home regions, numerous government
agencies can become involved. Munich/Franz Josef Strauss Airport (MUC), for example,
was funded not only by the German national government (23% share), but also by the
city of Munich (26% share) and the Free State of Bavaria (51% share) (Dempsey, 2000).
At similar airports worldwide, private investors and even international bodies such as the
European Union also contribute significant funds and, in so doing, gain the right to set
requirements on airport design and operations. Though the context and detail of these
requirements may differ depending on the decision-maker, this section's central argument
hinges on the idea that airport stakeholders share a common challenge - dealing with
uncertainty - and a collective solution: flexible, real options based design.
However, it does not stand to reason that the same real options concepts are applicable to
each stakeholder. To the contrary, airport stakeholders each have different goals and
powers. Therefore, in order for the flexibility concept to be successfully integrated into
airport design, real options solutions must be tailored to the individual desires and
responsibilities of major stakeholders. Specific solutions must be addressed to each
major stakeholder. This chapter attempts to coordinate various real options
methodologies with international, regional/national, and airport level organizations of
influence. Three groups are given special consideration: international bodies hoping to
promote a safe and efficient global network, national and regional authorities developing
vital transport systems, and airport designers and investors seeking to ensure profitability.
Suggestions for applying real options concepts to each progress from simple solutions
such as amending airport planning documents to more complex structural fixes; real-
world examples taken from various airports are provided as necessary.
1. A Recap: Why Flexible Airports?
This chapter - not to mention the entire thesis - rests upon the contention that airports
can benefit from the increased flexibility facilitated by real options thinking. The
contention can be quickly defended. In 1983, Ben Bernanke6 argued that systems which
met two criteria - choice irreversibility and the need for information on unknowable
future events - often benefit from the ability to defer decisions, a central theme of real
6 A former MIT student and visiting Professor, Ben S. Bernanke currently serves as the Chairman of the
United States Federal Reserve.
options design. Airports clearly fit the bill. Despite dissimilarities in the scope of
choices available at the international, national/regional, and local levels, decisions in each
sector exhibit irreversibility. Both the political and financial capital required and the size
and detail of an airport construction project make it unlikely that decisions can be
reversed or altered once an airport location has been chosen, design approved, or facility
completed. Also true, the evaluation of alternatives at each level generally requires
assumptions about future scenarios and therefore hinges on information not yet available.
Just as changing capacity demands, regional economic health, and traveler requirements
may alter a national preference for air transport, new technologies, novel aviation trends,
and shifting airline configurations present volatilities which can affect the basics of
airport planning. As a result, airport decision making can consistently benefit from
deferring decisions and maintaining multiple alternatives for development. In short, real
options thinking can create value at every level of the airport creation process.
2. The International Community
Several international organizations act in concert to affect the design and operation of the
world's airports. Among these, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
International Air Transport Association (IATA), Air Transport Action Group (ATAG),
and Airports Council International (ACI) each strive to represent the needs of different
airport stakeholders and to define airport best practices. Together, they also work to
promote the common goals of airport safety and security, efficiency, and fair
competition. As such, although international actors are not necessarily involved in
planning the minute physical details of the airports with which they are associated, they
nonetheless can have important effects on airport location and design and can shape
thinking on the new reality of multi-airport systems (MAS) and low-cost-carrier (LCC)
growth. The following sections provide information on three major international actors
selected to represent common, international-level strengths and weaknesses from the
perspective of flexible planning.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Established in 1944 under the Chicago Convention, the ICAO is tasked with promoting
the "safe and orderly growth of civil aviation throughout the world" (ICAO, 1997). As
such, the organization seeks to promote safety, efficiency, and the rule of law by
providing guidance to States regarding the sustainable development of the air transport
industry. Among its many initiatives, the ICAO is currently working to tackle the rise of
globalization and trans-nationalization, which - according to its documents - have
challenged the regulatory regimes established in 1944. In so doing, the International
Civil Aviation Organization affects airport design through its Airport Economics Manual
(ICAO, 2006), a guide to planning and financing airports within uncertain environments,
and its Manual on Air Traffic Forecasting (ICAO, 1985), which describes various
methodologies for predicting future air transport demand.
The International Air Transport Association (IATA)
Established in Havana in 1945 with 57 members from 31 nations mainly in Europe and
North America, the IATA now represents over 250 airlines representing 94% of
international scheduled traffic (IATA, 2007). Having replaced the International Air
Traffic Association which was created at The Hague in 1919, the IATA may be
considered the oldest international body with authority over air transport. In modem
times, it seeks to represent the needs of the airlines by ensuring the coordinated
development of a safe, efficient, and capacity balanced air transport system. Further, the
IATA is currently involved in an initiative, "Simplifying the Business," meant to reduce
stresses felt by airport passengers during travel. In these efforts, the IATA cooperates
with various industry working groups to affect the development of airports and, in fact,
coordinates the steering group on European airports (EASG). The representative
document of the International Air Transport Association, the Airport Reference
Development Manual (IATA, 2004) influences the design of airports by promoting
ticketless travel and the creation of modular, expandable facilities.
The Airports Council International (ACI)
The ACI, which represents itself as "the voice of the world's airports" (ACI, 2007), was
established in 1991 as an integration of the Airport Operators Council International
(founded 1948) and the International Civil Airports Association (founded 1962). With
over 573 members representing over 1,600 airports and 4.4B passengers served in 2006,
the ACI works to support cooperation between various aviation stakeholders and to
simplify the passenger experience. Through the ACI Policy Handbook (ACI, 2006) the
Airports Council International presents recommendation on several issues ranging from
the transportation to and from the airport to the location of retail stores to such details as
size and type of taxiways, runways, and bridges which ought to be implemented.
Common Strengths of International Organizations
Using the above three groups as exemplars, the various international organizations which
affect airport design and operation share several common strengths in terms of promoting
real options principles. Foremost, there exists a real recognition of uncertainty and its
effects. The ICAO, in its Airport Economics Manual, for one, urges due consideration to
the "political, legal, economic, social, and technical factors, as well as [to] regional and
global developments that may affect the airport" (ICAO, 2006). Similarly, the
forecasting manual mentions numerous sources of uncertainty which ought to be
identified and accounted for. Further, the documents support the idea of continuous
planning, in itself a means of dealing with changing conditions.
Flexibility - said differently, maintaining future alternatives - also provides a common
theme. The IATA, for instance, now supports the concept of the modular airport, through
which designers may develop "expandable and flexible facilities that can meet airline
requirements in a cost-effective manner" (IATA, 2007a). The Airport Development
Reference Manual furthers the contention, noting that facilities design should incorporate
flexibilities which allow for future variations in building usage. As such, the approval of
an initial airport design should account not only for current needs but must also allow for
the possibility of future expansions and operation changes. Indeed, the IATA suggests
that airport operators should seek to expand current facilities (at minimal inconvenience
to the customer) in favor of constructing new facilities, whenever possible.
Along different lines, the ACI promotes the development of a common use environment
wherein airport infrastructures should provide for multiple uses. The ACI Policy
Handbook therefore discourages "the use of dedicated systems, wherever clearly defined
benefits can be achieved from applying economies of scale ... thus avoiding unnecessary
and costly capital investments" (ACI, 2006). Together, then, the Airports Council
International, International Civil Aviation Organization, and International Air Transport
Association currently press - on a base level - many of the principles of real options /
flexible design.
Common Pitfalls of International Organizations
Despite the common threads shared by the international groups overseeing air transport,
it is clear that many of the world's airports were not - and still are not - constructed for
flexibility. Certainly, some of these difficulties stem from the international arena. While
attempting to promote the safe and efficient development of air transport, groups like the
ICAO, IATA, and ACI nonetheless share pitfalls which prove contrary to the creation of
flexible, adaptable airports.
Focus on Forecasting
Despite recognizing the importance of uncertainty, for instance, the documentation
printed by international air transport bodies reveals a high dependence on forecasts and
master planning. The ICAO forecasting manual, for one, clearly notes the necessity that
the Council "foresee future developments likely to require action" (ICAO, 1985), a task
which must prove largely impossible given the complexity of air transport.
At the same time, the manuals offer little advice for anticipating and solving the problems
of uncertainty. Whereas real options thinking would suggest downplaying the influence
of forecasts and focusing on the development an adaptable infrastructure in the first
phases of planning, this principle does not appear strongly in the international literature.
To the contrary, the ICAO forecasting manual suggests a rigorous process of analyzing
the effect of each important, unknowable variable econometrically. Considering the
number of variables (Table 4.1) provided by the ICAO, however, this task can prove
quite daunting. In fact, the literature itself admits that the data required to accurately plan
for each type of traffic at an airport is often unavailable.
Table 4-1: Causal variables typic lly used in econometric forecasts (adapted from ICAO, 1985)
Type of pliase Variable Forecast application
Population/ Number of Passenger Forecasts
Households
Size and spending ability of GNP of country or region All types of forecasts
market Personal disposable income Non-business passengers
Exports & imports Outbound/Inbound
international flights
Ethnic or linguistic ties Proportion of population born Passenger forecasts for ain other regions route or group of routes
Published tariffs Route forecasts
Revenue yield All forecast types
Quality and Price of air Departure frequency Scheduled forecasts
service Number of connections on a Scheduled route forecastsroute
Travel time Route forecasts
Number of destinations served Regional forecasts
Access to air transport Proportion of market within a
services certain distance or travel time Airport or route forecasts
from airport
Applicable tariffs Route forecasts
Departure frequency on Route forecasts
Price and quality of competing air service
competing service Fare on a competing surface Route forecaststransport service
Travel time on competing Route forecasts
surface transport service
Indeed, it should be noted that, even in cases where some of the required variables prove
fully predictable, the benefit of the research required would be greatly diluted by the
influence of other, unknowable factors. To this end, Caves and Gosling, in their Strategic
Airport Planning, note the destructive effects of a forecaster's belief in the "myth of
predictability": presuming the future will be similar to the past on the basis of trend
projections, surveys, and so forth often leads to technological obsolescence and ill-
designed infrastructures (Caves & Gosling, 1999). Unfortunately, the suggestions of the
international community do little to head off this threat. To the contrary, the focus on
master planning may yield the opposite effect by "locking-in" inefficient designs early in
the planning process, well before important factors affecting airport traffic and revenue
can be determined.
Overlooking the Low Cost Carrier
Other pitfalls include an emphasis on airport concessions and a lack of recognition given
to changing conditions in the aircraft industry. The two ideas are directly related.
Whereas the ICAO supports fully exploiting the benefits of airport concessions -
especially in light of the non-aeronautical revenues brought in by airports like
Singapore/Changi (SIN) and London/Heathrow (LHR) - it neither accounts for changes
brought on by the growth of the low-cost carriers which typically prefer simpler facilities
nor for the development of multi-airport systems which are working to reduce the
economic power of single airports. Certainly, truly effective flexible planning must
account for these changes by trading off the benefits of building large, expensive airport
cities with the gains to be had from attracting low-cost carriers and developing
competitive airports within an airport system.
Real Options Solutions and International Organizations
Primarily, it would appear that international air transport literature could further the
shared goal of creating efficient, cost-effective airports through changed language. By
reducing the emphasis on forecasting and highlighting actual means of implementing
flexibility, pitfalls can be better avoided. The following examples illustrate.
Fending off Forecasts: Sydney/Kingsford Smith Airport
One clear step in avoiding disaster lies in eschewing single, deterministic forecasts as the
basis for infrastructural planning. Instead, planners may consider joining the ongoing
movement to estimate long term (10 - 20 year) forecasts with wide ranges that recognize
a spread of possible traffic levels (+/- 30% from the median), depending on experience.
Alternatively, planners may choose to develop different regionally-suited scenarios -
which themselves can be used to alter the results of independent forecasts - meant to
represent different possibilities for airport traffic.
While deciding whether to construct a new runway at Sydney's central Kingsford Smith
Airport (SYD), for example, the Australian government found it necessary to consider
multiple possible scenarios. Whereas other experts had relied on their own, unique and
conflicting forecasts, corporate planner Kinhill Engineers chose to envision three
possibilities: low, medium, and high traffic growth (de Neufville, 1991).
Table 4-2: SYD Third Runway - Three Forecasts
Forecast New RunwayS Required?
High Growth Yes
Medium Growth Yes
Low Growth No
Table 4-2 illustrates the risk associated with multiple forecasts, as presented to the
planners of SYD's third runway. Different forecasts, neither one more plausible than the
other, can suggest wholly different strategies for action. Herein lies a principal weakness
of master planning literature; the selection of tentative forecasts within the early planning
stages color all future decisions.
Kinhill Engineers, however, avoided the risks involved in choosing to support a single
forecast. Rather, they eschewed specific numbers and considered the decision to build as
a selection between risk profiles. Though a not constructing a third decision could prove
workable, they concluded, it involved high risks to the fluidity of Australia's aviation
transport system. Building a runway, of course, also carried its own risks and benefits, as
presented in Table 4-3. In the end, a comparison of risks and benefits - not a uncertain
prediction of traffic - led to the decision to build a third runway at Kingsford-Smith. The
Sydney example therefore displays the benefits of avoiding forecasts; applying this real
options principle is clearly consistent with creating capacity-balanced air transport
systems, a primary goal for international organizations.
Table 4-3: SYD Third Runway - Comparing Strategies
: :~: : High Growth Medur••iumGowth Low Growth
Neutral Decision:Good Decision: Good Decision:Build Runway No Capacity Gap No Capacity Gap Safer, more efficient runwayNo Capacity Gap No Capacity Gap configuration
Neutral Decision:
No Build Poor Decision: Poor Decision: No additional capital costs;SYD Congested SYD Congested higher operating costs due
to runway configuration
The Move from Master Planning: Austin-Bergstrom International Airport
In 1991, MIT Professor R. de Neufville, a supporter of real options thinking, commented,
"since master planning for airports is flawed at the core, is logically indefensible, and
produces unsatisfactory results, it must be replaced" (as cited in Dempsey, Goetz, &
Szyliowicz, 1997, p. 471). However, the common literature on airport planning has
certainly not abandoned master planning. Even so, changes are underway. While new
texts on airport planning emphasize flexibility in planning and an increased recognition
of uncertainty (Caves & Gosling, 1999; Kazda & Caves, 2000), successful airports
planners have begun modifying their methods. The recommendations of international air
transport organizations - and certainly the airports which follow them - could greatly
benefit from noting these trends.
At Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (AUS) in Texas, for instance, planners noted
an important flaw in traditional master planning: the practice of "freezing" the design
concept before detailed planning begun - and well before the construction of the airport
started - created a failure risk due to the possibility of unexpected requirements changes.
AUS chose to practice a different planning method. By deferring significant design
decisions until they were absolutely necessary, planners maintained the airport's
operational flexibility as "an effective way to minimize the impacts of potential changes
(Ragland, 1998)." This required identifying which airport elements could be decided
later, and - once a decision had to be made - designing in flexibility whenever possible
while still respecting previous environmental documentation, regional/local rules, etc. In
the parking facility, for example, the number of toll plazas can be changed to better
accommodate different levels of traffic. There and elsewhere, airport managers also
ensured that changes would be possible by crafting professional service agreements (with
contractors and other stakeholders) which could be reviewed and modified on a regular
basis.
In effect, AUS moved away from master planning's mantra of permanency in order to
allow for a phased and continuous planning process. The strategy has paid off. In 2006,
the airport - which serves both general and commercial aviation and provides a base for
the Texas Army National Guard - successfully catered to over 8.2 million passengers and
was awarded recognition by ACI-North America as the United States' best airport in
terms of passenger service and satisfaction (Austin-Bergstrom International Airport,
2007). Austin-Bergstrom was completed within a budget of US $800 million and is the
property of the City of Austin.
Luring Low Cost Carriers: Frankfurt/Hahn Airport
Whereas much of the formal literature on airport planning from the ICAO, IATA, and
ACI do little to mention the emergence of low-cost carriers and multiple airport systems
- in fairness, newer documents discuss each in detail, but largely outside of the context of
design - Germany's Frankfurt/Hahn (HHN) airport provides an example of success
garnered by catering to these changes. In a climate of change that requires the flexibility
to adapt, such an oversight clearly jars with the basic tenets of real options.
Despite being located near major airports at Cologne, Frankfurt, and Luxembourg, HHN
has proven quite successful at attracting airlines, freight forwarders, and so forth. By
actively encouraging the entrance of low-cost traffic, Hahn secured the arrival of
Europe's largest low-cost carrier, Ryanair, in April 1999. Specific steps included
abolishing landing fees for Boeing 737 weight aircraft (Francis, Fidato, & Humphreys,
2003) and investing in the expansion required to provide sufficient capacity for its rapid
growth. In this effort, Hahn spent some E 27 million on renovations before Ryanair
arrived (Gillen & Lall, 2004) in order to modify the airport to LCC specifications; the
renovations are ongoing.
Fortunately for its investors, HHN has become one of Germany's fastest growing
airports. In the fourteen years since its inception as a civil airport in 1993, Hahn has
managed to become the nation's eleventh airport in terms of international traffic and its
fourth largest cargo airport. The managers currently aim for Frankfurt/Hahn to become
Germany's leading low-cost airport.
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Figure 4-1: HHN passed the 1M, 2M, and 3M passenger mark in 2002, 2004, and 2005 respectively
(Frankfurt/Hahn Airport, 2007)
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3. The Regional & National Communities
At the national level, governments often seek to improve a national transport system by
choosing between road, rail, and air traffic while aiming to create successful monuments
to national success. Regional authorities, similarly, select from different plans to
compete for global traffic and to benefit the overall economy and environment, betting
that the resulting financial growth will exceed the substantial investment required.
Residing at this level, national and regional authorities therefore have greater control over
airport location and design specifics than their international counterparts. The State of
Minnesota, for instance, mandates that 90% of its population should be within 30 miles of
a paved and lighted airport and within 60 minutes driving time of an airport with
scheduled service (Howard & Keller, undated).
This section analyzes the goals and powers of national and regional air transport groups,
noting strengths and challenges with regards to real options planning. The United States
Federal Aviation Administration and the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority are
used as examples of typical national overseers. The represented regional powers are the
European Union, which oversees a supra-national region, and the Southern California
Association of Governments, which oversees a sub-national region. The section
concludes with real options proposals specifically tailored to avoid pitfalls generally
associated with groups at this level of airport planning.
The European Union (EU)
Founded in 1993 under the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union is the successor to
1957's European Economic Community. Through its agencies, departments, and forums
(European Aviation Safety Agency, European Energy and Transport Forum, Committee
on Transport and Tourism, etc.) the Union sets policies for transportation - and therefore
for airports - which apply to its 27 member states7.
Major aviation initiatives include the third package, which is meant to liberalize air
travel, create an integrated transport system with common rules and procedures, and to
deal with an impending capacity problem. As with many other national and regional
bodies, the European Union's transportation program also includes several social goals:
economic competitiveness, social cohesion, and cultural development. It is therefore
clear that, at this level of decision-making, those who influence airport construction must
consider several factors that cannot be "ordinarily" accounted for in airport planning and
financial analysis at all. Rather, airport location and design must be balanced against
environmental and social effects, the availability of other options (rail, for example), and
the promotion of fair competitive practices. The European Union is a case in point. In its
control of transportation, the EU affects airports through promoting co-modality, limiting
the ability of Member States to direct traffic, setting rules on air carriers, and even by
7 As of July 2007: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
defining airport categories. Further, the Union makes recommendations on airport best
practices and has discretionary funds to support airport development.
The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The United States FAA (as the Federal Aviation Agency) succeeded the United States
Civil Aeronautics Administration in 1956. Its goals include increasing safety, providing
for greater capacity, and ensuring that the United States shows international leadership in
air transport.
The Federal Aviation Administration exerts a great deal of control over airport design.
First, it defines the responsibilities of the airport. Again, there is a noticeable focus on
issues not directly connected with commercial air transport, reflecting the complex needs
of national governments. As such, the FAA requires that airports support national
objectives in defense, emergency readiness, and postal services while simultaneously
seeking to ensure that consumers are within 20 miles of a set level of air service. Printed
documents provide further goals, regulations, and recommendations. These documents
include the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (FAA, 2006), the Advisory
Circular on Airport Design (FAA, 1989), the Advisory Circular on Master Plans (FAA,
2005), and the 2008-2012 Flight Plan (FAA, 2007).
The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
The UK counterpart of the Federal Aviation Administration, the CAA, was established in
1972. Unlike the FAA, it operates as an independent aviation regulator without the
benefit of government funding. Under this system, it has responsibility over airport
economic regulation, airspace policy, safety procedures, and consumer protection.
Larger goals include environmental sustainability and the promotion of a diverse and
competitive aviation industry. Within the context of this work, it provides an interesting
contrast to the Federal Aviation Administration.
The Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG)
Like the European Union, SCAG is a regional body representing a consortium of
independent governments. However, though SCAG sets standards for airport
development as in the EU, SCAG members are sub-national. Regardless, the goals are
largely similar: SCAG promotes economic growth and international trade and supports a
functional regional transport system. In addition, the Southern California Association of
Governments is obligated to account for local concerns such as maintaining the personal
well-being and life quality of its population, supporting community development, and
developing a trust between government and citizens. Each of these initiatives affects its
airport policies.
Common Strengths of Regional and National Organizations
As with their international counterparts, the archetypal organizations represented here
(the EU, SCAG, FAA, and CAA) each demonstrate assets in terms of supporting real
options concepts. A focus on continuous planning and maintaining flexibility is
particularly apparent. Within the European Union, for instance, there exists a strong
emphasis on developing co-modality rather than on "placing all bets" on air transport
alone. As a result, great efforts are underway to link airports into a comprehensive
transport system. Stockholm/Arlanda Airport (ARN), for example, has three
underground rail stations with which it serves its 17M annual passengers. While one
station benefits long haul travel, the other two provide a consistent connection between
the airport and the city. At the same time - though in a different vein - the Federal
Aviation Administration supports initiatives to ensure that small airports maintain room
to expand and encourages airport operators not only to design master plans to each
particular airport but also to update their airport layout plans regularly.
Other interesting policies include concentrating on integrated transportation networks like
at Arlanda (EU, SCAG), unlocking existing capacity at regional airports rather than
building new, expensive facilities (EU, SCAG), and requiring that airport planners survey
the land around a planned airport facility in order to minimize the possibility that the
airport may eventually be locked in by urban development.
At the same time, the latest FAA advisory circular on master planning warns that public
involvement in the airport planning process should be implemented as early as possible,
"before irreversible decisions have been made" (FAA, 2005) in order to avoid future
difficulties as have been observed at several facilities worldwide.
The advice of the CAA is also particularly potent, as the Authority supports efforts to
ensure that all decision-making occurs in conference with airport customers: airlines and
air passengers. Further, it praises the option to defer important decisions until necessary
and makes informed references to forecasting, as follows:
... it is clear that forecasts have to be made because of the long lead-time
associated with infrastructure developments. The inevitable uncertainty
surrounding forecasts does not imply that such forecasts should be rejected but
rather that the conclusions drawn from them should reflect the necessarily
simplified nature of forecasting models. In particular, the more detailed the
conclusions drawn, the more risk that is likely to overlay them (CAA, 2003).
Common Challenges of Regional and National Organizations
As evidenced both through a light analysis of regional/national documents and through a
survey of airport experiences worldwide, national and regional organizations
unfortunately suffer from several pitfalls despite the positive points highlighted above.
These pitfalls are numerous but solvable, given real options solutions.
Focus on Forecasting: Part 2
Again, it is worth noting that an over-dependence on master-planning and forecasting can
prove quite troublesome; the problem seems at least as pervasive on the national/regional
level as on the international level. The FAA documents on master planning and
forecasting, for instance, provide great detail on the various factors required to create
accurate demand forecasts but give little advice on handling inherent uncertainties.
Table 4-4: FAA Chart on Aviation Demand Elements (FAA, 2005)
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literature later asserts correctly that "having a range of forecast activity allows airport
planners to develop flexibility in facilities" (FAA, 2005), the contention that planners
ought to eventually settle on a "middle-path forecast" carries significant risk as
demonstrated by the flaw of averages (Chapter 3). Simply recounted, building an airport
for 10 million passengers is a poor solution when given a high forecast of 20 million anda low forecast of no passengers at all.
Speculating on Traffic: Montrial/Mirabel and Washington/Dulles
Another common danger, made obvious by airports such as Canada's Montr6al/Mirabel(YMX), lies in guessing where air traffic will develop or in making assumptions as to
airline or passenger traffic patterns. In general, the government record for siting major
facilities based on these assumptions is rather poor. Mirabel, for instance, was opened in
1975 under the assumption that Montr6al would develop into Canada's economic center.
Constructed to accommodate 4 million passengers in its first year and over 40 million by
2025, Montr6al/Mirabel - then the world's largest airport by size - never served more
than 3 million people per year and is currently destined to be sold at great loss as an
amusement park (Canadian Press, 2006). Simply stated, the airport never experienced
the rapid customer support expected by the government which supported its creation.
Washington/Dulles Airport (DIA) provides a similarly interesting case. Here, the United
States government tried - and failed - to forcibly direct traffic to its new airport by
passing a series of prescriptive regulations meant to make DIA the region's international
airport. However, airlines circumvented the regulations in favor of Washington/National
(now Reagan) and Dulles remained underused for nearly two decades (de Neufville,
2000). In Europe, the French government would later experience similar difficulties in
developing Paris/de Gaulle as an alternative to Paris/Orly. Though both Dulles and Orly
have surpassed these issues - Dulles became a United Airlines hub and de Gaulle
surpassed Orly in 1991, 25 years after its opening - the examples remain informative.
Even powerful governments can experience great difficulties in forecasting or directing
specific traffic types at a specific airport, especially in multi-airport regions.
Unfortunately, the documents provided by several national and regional bodies do little to
give information on and to avert these problems.
Presumptions about People: Osaka/Kansai International Airport
Another pitfall lies in the inability of governments to accurately predict public support for
an airport. Though the FAA planning circular does emphasize the necessity of generating
public support, a few examples of past problems may prove useful. At Osaka/Kansai
(KIX), for one, the Japanese government proved unable to predict public reaction to the
new airport. Hoping to relieve complaints regarding noise at Osaka/Itami International
Airport (ITM), the government opened Osaka/Kansai in 1994 on an expensive man-made
island. However, the airport met significant difficulties when the people who initially
seemed to support the airport shied away from it in favor of the more conveniently
located ITM. Despite rapid passenger growth and some of the world's highest airport
fees, Osaka/Kansai consistently posts financial losses; its US $15 billion dollar debt is
expected to take over 30 years to liquidate (Dempsey, 2000). Certainly, few airport
investors could withstand such a dilemma.
Making Monuments: Mirabel and Kansai revisited
Yet another potential difficulty in the planning of airport capacity on the national and
regional levels lies in the desire to create monuments to local prosperity or as engineering
marvels. The reasons for doing so are obvious: being important points of entry, airports
often provide visitors with their first introduction to a city, nation, or region. However, it
ought to be noted that monuments are often large and quite expensive. Moreover, given
their size and importance, monuments may rely on overly favorable forecasts and are
difficult to plan incrementally. As examples, one may again note Montrial/Mirabel and
Osaka/Kansai. Mirabel was constructed to serve as Canada's premier gateway and today
serves no passengers. Kansai's recognition as a Civil Engineering Monument of the
Millennium (ASCE, 2001) likely does very little to offset its massive debt. Even in cases
where an airport finally reaches capacity - as Washington/Dulles did two decades after it
was constructed - significant money is wasted in the intervening period of under-use.
Prescription Airports and other Difficulties
In its policy paper, The Future Development of Air Transport in the United Kingdom
(CAA, 2003), the UK Civil Aviation Authority details its own list of "potential pitfalls"
for governments involved in the development of airports. Aside from those already listed
above, other pitfalls noted by the CAA include the risk of creating airports according to
inadaptable blueprints and investing in airports of poor commercial potential.
Other difficulties include a lack of recognition for the influence of low-cost carriers and
multiple airport systems and failing to provide methods for integrating flexibility into
infrastructure, both of which will be addressed further on in the chapter.
Real Options Solutions and Regional/National Organizations
Certainly, national and regional organizations must accommodate and balance several
desires: regional development, constructing monuments to success, environmental/social
responsibility, and - of course - ensuring the financial viability of their investments. The
following examples provide some real options solutions for balancing those priorities.
Landbanking: Sydney's 2"s Airport
For over twenty years, the government of Australia has sought to develop a second
airport for passengers flying into the nation's largest city, Sydney. Given that Australia
depends on air transport in order to manage the distances between its major cities, siting a
new airport is particularly important; the current airport, Kingsford-Smith (SYD), is
difficult to expand due to its closeness to the city center. One solution, certainly, would
have been to build a second airport at a site chosen based on the forecast air traffic
growth. However, this would have exposed Australia to the difficulties experienced at
Mirabel and Dulles. Alternatively, the government could have chosen to defer action on
a new airport entirely, thereby risking the possibility that no site would be available once
it became needed. Rather, the government protected itself by purchasing the land
required to build an airport in case it became necessary and deferred the decision on
actually building a new airport. This practice, known as landbanking, ensures that
national and regional governments can control zoning and development in areas of
concern. As such, landbanking, which can be financially provided for by national
organizations such as the FAA (FAA, 1997), can offer solutions to several difficulties. In
the case of Australia, the purchase of land at Badgery Creek provided a contingency
which satisfied different parties without requiring a commitment to build a new airport; a
potential capacity constraint was avoided at relatively low cost8.
At the regional and national levels, the practice of landbanking can be applied more
widely and can help avoid the pitfalls of speculating on where traffic will develop or
8 Indeed, it should be noted that the government applied several real options principles. Aside from
landbanking, Australia chose to build an additional runway at Kingsford-Smith, thereby allowing it to delay
an expensive, and (at that time) unnecessary decision the new airport (de Neufville, 1991).
presuming that the local population will choose to support a particular airport project. By
purchasing multiple sites, regional and national authorities can, in effect, "hedge" against
uncertainty.
A hypothetical example provides some insight. One may consider a case in which a
national or regional government intends to construct a new international airport gateway.
Given correct information regarding how various regions or cities will develop
economically and which would attract the greatest amount of traffic over time, selecting
an airport site would be simple. However, without such data, the risk of repeating
Mirabel would prove quite daunting. A 2003 report prepared for the United States
Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs hints at a possible solution: by
maintaining the right to construct that airport at multiple sites, the government can defer
decisions on where to build until more information becomes available (GRA
Incorporated, 2003). Given that the cost of purchasing land constitutes only a small
fraction of total airport costs, this course of action appears quite feasible. Table 4-5 uses
data from Denver International Airport, the world's largest airport by size, to support this
point.
Table 4-5: Airport Development Costs at DIA (Dempsey, 1997)
Land Acquisition (1 Purchase) $241.6
Land Acquisition (2 Purchases) $483.2
Airport Construction Costs $3,003.9
Miscellaneous Planning Costs $986.3
Actual DIA Total Cost"
(1 Purchase) $4,231.8
Assuming that the hypothetical lawmakers above decided to construct a new airport some
ten years before the airport's completion (as at Denver) and that airport costs paralleled
those at DIA, the cost of the land acquisition would be $241.6 million, or 5.7% of total
airport costs. Securing a second plot would increase that figure by the same amount;
assuming that the government decides to keep both purchases, some $241 million would
be lost. However, if the lawmakers selected a single site and prematurely built an airport
at the incorrect location, total losses would potentially rise to over $4 billion.
Conversely, deciding not to purchase any land at all would risk forfeiting the ability to
build an airport anywhere due to urban encroachment. In the case of Denver
International, the Rocky Mountain region would have forfeited its primary commercial
airport along with the economic benefits of 21.7 million passengers emplaned in 2005
alone (FitchRatings, 2006). Thus stated, the immense benefit of landbanking in order to
preserve airport alternatives - relative to the small costs - appear quite clear. The
practice can simultaneously serve national goals of capacity management, economic
development, and cost-efficiency at relatively low risk.
9 This figure does not include cost overruns at DIA. With overruns included, DIA cost US $5.3B(Dempsey, 1997).
Remodeling Military Airfields: Frankfurt/Hahn and Austin-Bergstrom
Another twist on the practice of landbanking involves transitioning former military
airfields into commercial airports. This process has several benefits. Maintaining
operations at a military airfield not only ensures that the land is available for future use
but also helps to ensure that the area will be established and publicly accepted as an
airport. Further, reusing military aviation facilities can help reduce the total costs of
constructing a civil airport. In 2003, one transportation consulting firm even went so far
as to suggest a policy of mandatory landbanking of all military airports with no current
aviation use, except in regions where the need for increased aviation capacity seemed
extremely unlikely (GRA Incorporated, 2003).
So far, the model has shown some success. Frankfurt's successful Hahn airport (HHN),
for instance, sprung from Hahn Airbase, one of the largest Cold War air force bases in
Europe. Investments into expanding Hahn, which showed an operating profit for the first
time in 2006, totaled £135 million between 1998 and 2005; by comparison,
Cologne/Bonn Airport (CGN) spent £325 million on its Terminal 2 alone (Airport-
Technology.com, 2005)10. Across the Atlantic, Austin-Bergstrom International Airport
(AUS) grew from the foundations of Bergstrom Air Force Base, which the military
commissioned during World War II. The airport, which ranked number 50 in US
enplanements in 2003, cost less than US $800 million. By comparison, the new runways
alone at Baltimore Washington International Airport (BWI; number 24 in enplanements)
and at Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport (MSY; number 50 in
enplanements) will cost US $600 million and US $452 million, respectively (FAA,
2003).
Incremental Development: Dallas Fort Worth International Airport
Though landbanking may provide a remedy for governments looking to avoid incorrectly
speculating on when, where, and how air traffic will develop, it does little to counter
tendencies to build colossal airport monuments well before they needed. In 2004, the
IATA, while recognizing the responsibility of national and regional governments to
provide for growth, suggested the use of incremental development (or phased expansion)
as a suitable alternative to building superstructures right away:
It is advisable for national governments to develop a strategic planning objective
for medium and long-term development of airports within their national
jurisdiction. This strategic proposal should look at existing air traffic control as
well as runway and terminal capacities and then should define strategic objectives
for the phased expansion or development of new or existing airports. (IATA,
2004, p. 37)
10 It is interesting to note that, in a feat of incremental development and civil-military conversion, Hahn's
first terminal had been the Officer's Mess of Hahn Air Force Base; the terminal served Hahn for seven
years.
A review of Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport's (DFW) master plan reveals the
success of this thinking. Established in 1974, DFW - the central airport of the
Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex - has emphasized the use of a phased capital improvement
plan meant to ensure the "goal of incremental or phased development that is timely and
logical" (Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, 1997). As such, its 20 year, US $5.5
billion dollar capital improvement plan has been broken down into three phases;
continuous planning and proactive management techniques, meanwhile, have been
designed to focus on market-based action. In other words, DFW's strategy is to operate
like a business: all investments require input from the airport stakeholders and must
directly correlate with providing soon to be needed capacity.
/ ~apital improvement Ilan (Dallasl/ort Worth International Airport, 1997)
Dallas/Fort Worth's terminal area development program seems particularly telling.
James Crites and Larry Bauman, while commenting on the Airport Development Plan,
noted that the program differs from those supported by traditional master planning; rather
than evaluating the airport's ability to fund new infrastructure only after the capital
improvement plan is complete, DFW planners sought a continuous planning approach
which integrated financial planning during each stage (Crites & Bauman, 1998). Further,
the DFW approach avoids building or demolishing infrastructure until absolutely
necessary. Rather, the plan maintains the flexibility to choose between different growth
concepts for as long as possible. Though safeguarding the possibility of major additions,
DFW need not commit to any expenditure until demonstrated traffic patterns demand it.
t~ort Worth International Airport, 1997)
Certainly, DFW's efforts have bore fruit. In 1997, the airport recorded its community
impact at US $11 billion including US $6 billion in wages and salaries for its 200,000
employees. In 2006, its 7 runways, 5 terminals, and 152 active gates gained substantial
praise. The sixth largest airport in the world in terms of passengers served with 60.4
million people passing through in 2006, CNN recognized the airport's incredible
transformation due to the addition of a new terminal and effective internal train system;
better yet, the Airports Council International named Dallas Forth Worth International
2006's number one airport in the Americas in terms of customer service and the filth best
airport in the world (Dallas Forth Worth International Airport, 2006).
Looking (again) to LCC's: Liverpool John Lennon Airport
Although constructing airports so as to cater to low-cost carriers is not in itself a real
options principle, maintaining the ability to serve different customer segments is. There
are therefore several reasons for revisiting low-cost carriers within the context of flexible
planning. First, numerous national civil aviation authorities operate with the intention of
developing air traffic in underserved regions, a particular strength of the low-cost carrier.
Second, government has a poor track record of determining what type of air traffic
(domestic, international, network carrier, or LCC) will develop where and when. Finally
and most importantly, low-cost and network carriers (NC) often demand different
services from the airports they patronize; as a result, the ever-changing landscape of air
transport may demand that new and developing airports have the flexibility to serve
either customer.
Liverpool John Lennon Airport (LPL) provides an interesting case. In an environment
where the Civil Aviation Authority supports a national aviation policy which operates
only in broad strokes and otherwise allows local officials to solve problems with a degree
of independence, Liverpool has grown largely without government intervention (Civil
Aviation Authority, 2003). Partly due to the influence of low-cost carriers, Liverpool has
become one of Europe's fastest growing regional airports; scheduled international traffic
increased from 189,000 passengers in 1997 to over 1.7 million just five years later (Ibid.).
Indeed, when Ryanair celebrated carrying its 7 millionth passenger to the airport in 2007
(after having established services there in 1988), the Lord Mayor of Liverpool noted that
Ryanair had helped put the city on the map (Liverpool John Lennon Airport, 2007). As a
result, LPL is an example of how due attention to changing conditions in air transport -
namely the rise of the low-cost carrier - can help national governments attain regional
development goals.
Table 4-6: Growth Pattern of Liverpool John Lennon Airport (Civil Aviation Authority, 2003)
4. The Airport Level Community
Having investigated the goals and efforts of various international, national, and regional
groups, one set of airport stakeholders remains: those on "the airport level." These
groups, unlike their counterparts above, interact directly with the airport and its
administrators as airport managers, passengers, airlines, and community members. With
this level of closeness, stakeholders at the airport level bring new goals and powers. The
viability of real options solutions increases. In order to illustrate this point, three groups
are examined in detail: airport manager BAA, low-cost carriers Ryanair and easyJet,
airline group Star Alliance, and the airline passenger.
BAA
Created in 1965 as the British Airports Authority, BAA became the first major airport
authority to go private in 1986. Today, it owns and operates seven airports in the United
Kingdom including Heathrow, Stansted, and Glasgow while maintaining management
contracts at several major airports including Baltimore Washington International (BWI)
and Logan International (BOS). At its UK airports, BAA holds direct responsibility over
several functions directly tied to airport design: the management of retail facilities and
car parks, provision of airport utilities, operation of flight information systems, and the
development of transportation to and from the airport all fall within its purview. Given
this list of activities, the influence of BAA and other airport owners and managers on
airport design is difficult to underestimate.
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Figure 4-4: Functions of BAA (Source: BAA website)
Current BAA initiatives include emphasizing communication with the local communities
affected by their operations, increasing surface access to its airports, developing an
integrated network strategy, and reducing the negative environmental impact of all
elements of air travel while continuing to grow the industry. Of course, maximizing the
financial value of its holdings also remains a key goal.
Ryanair and easyJet
As Europe's leading low fare carriers, Ryanair and easyJet have already exerted
significant influence on airport design. Together, they make significant demands on
airport facilities, capacity availability, and landside accessibility. Ryanair's significant
power to draw passengers, for instance, led Frankfurt/Hahn to spend E 27 million on
renovations before the airline even arrived; elsewhere, London/Luton Airport (LTN) built
better ground access to support easyJet's expansion, though the airline later criticized the
resulting increase in fees (Dennis, 2004). Elsewhere, low-cost carriers have made
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Liverpool John Lennon Airport (LPL) provides an interesting case. In an environment
where the Civil Aviation Authority supports a national aviation policy which operates
only in broad strokes and otherwise allows local officials to solve problems with a degree
of independence, Liverpool has grown largely without government intervention (Civil
Aviation Authority, 2003). Partly due to the influence of low-cost carriers, Liverpool has
become one of Europe's fastest growing regional airports; scheduled international traffic
increased from 189,000 passengers in 1997 to over 1.7 million just five years later (Ibid.).
Indeed, when Ryanair celebrated carrying its 7 millionth passenger to the airport in 2007
(after having established services there in 1988), the Lord Mayor of Liverpool noted that
Ryanair had helped put the city on the map (Liverpool John Lennon Airport, 2007). As a
result, LPL is an example of how due attention to changing conditions in air transport -
namely the rise of the low-cost carrier - can help national governments attain regional
development goals.
Table 4-6: Growth Pattern of Liverpool John Lennon Airport (Civil Aviation Authority, 2003)
Scheduled International Passenger Service from Liverpool John Lennon Airport
9-Jun-1993 I I 11-Jun-2003
Time Destination ITime Destination
Palma
Amsterdam
Malaga
Nice
Barcelona
Dublin
Paris CDG
Amsterdam
Geneva
Amsterdam
Madrid
Malaga
9-Jun-1993 I I 11-Jun-2003Time DestinationI ITime Destination
21:55 Dublin
13:55
14:00
14:15
15:45
16:00
16:55
17:55
19:05
19:15
21:05
21:40
22:15
Paris CDG
Dublin
Alcante
Amsterdam
Charleroi
Nice
Barcelona
Amsterdam
Paris CDG
Malaga
Palma
Dublin
4. The Airport Level Community
Having investigated the goals and efforts of various international, national, and regional
groups, one set of airport stakeholders remains: those on "the airport level." These
groups, unlike their counterparts above, interact directly with the airport and its
administrators as airport managers, passengers, airlines, and community members. With
this level of closeness, stakeholders at the airport level bring new goals and powers. The
viability of real options solutions increases. In order to illustrate this point, three groups
are examined in detail: airport manager BAA, low-cost carriers Ryanair and easyJet,
airline group Star Alliance, and the airline passenger.
BAA
Created in 1965 as the British Airports Authority, BAA became the first major airport
authority to go private in 1986. Today, it owns and operates seven airports in the United
Kingdom including Heathrow, Stansted, and Glasgow while maintaining management
8:50
6:00
6:15
6:30
7:00
7:50
7:55
8:00
9:45
12:00
12:35
12:35
13:55
Dublin
L6-
solutions. As such, the Star Alliance has openly sought the benefits of shared spaces
capable of serving more than one airline; low-cost airlines, meanwhile, have shied away
from monument-building and those in residential areas have supported controlled airport
growth.
Common Pitfalls of Airport Level Organizations
Despite the strengths of airport operators, airlines, and passengers, airports worldwide
nonetheless suffer from several difficulties which beg real options fixes.
Capacity Constraints
Airport designers and planners widely accept that airports built in or near urban areas can
prove rather difficult to expand. Urban encroachment, noise concerns, and issues of
safely flying aircraft over population centers can each limit an airport's growth prospects,
as has now occurred at heavily congested London/Heathrow (LHR) and Los
Angeles/International (LAX) Airports.
Urban areas are not the only source of capacity constraints, however. Rather,
Stockholm/Arlanda International Airport, (ARN), which is located approximately 25
miles from Stockholm, faced expansion difficulties due to environmental concerns.
Other facilities have suffered due to the failure of initial planners to anticipate the need
for future growth. de Neufville and Odoni noted of Heathrow, for instance, that the
location of its landside facilities along the airport's central axis - a placement which
otherwise helps to ensure better airfield traffic circulation - has the side-effect of limiting
its expansion (de Neufville & Odoni, 2003).
Uncertain Traffic Levels and Demand Peaking
Capacity constraints need not be constant. Rather, many airports experience difficulties
due to fluctuations in traffic. Multiple factors contribute to the dilemma. On one hand,
seasonal peaking may occur due to increased tourist traffic during the summer months, as
at London Luton. Otherwise, most airports experience daily peaks in traffic due to airline
scheduling. Peaking presents an interesting problem. Though airports must provide
enough capacity to handle peaks, this can lead to under-use once the peak has passed.
The difficulty present here is clear: airports must balance the need for spare capacity and
the desire to minimize waste. According to Odoni, may airports planners fail to find this
balance; errors in calculating peak-level capacity demands are quite common (Odoni &
de Neufville, 1992).
Duplicating Expenditures: Kansas City International Airport
Multiple investigators, including Professors de Neufville of MIT (de Neufville, 1995a)
and Trani of Virginia Tech (Trani, 2002), have considered the effects of airport
configuration on an airport's ability to provide maximum value. Some conclusions of
particular importance to flexible design may be determined. Both observers, for instance,
comment on the use of decentralized facilities - wherein passengers enter the airport at
separate landside access points - with de Neufville noting that the design is now
generally avoided by large airports".
Kansas City International Airport (MCI) provides a compelling case for this ethos.
Opened in 1972, MCI has been recognized as extremely friendly largely because
originating passengers can rapidly move from the entrance of one of its three
decentralized terminals and to their airplanes after having traveled only a few hundred
feet. There is a serious problem, though: because of its decentralized design, MCI must
pay for significantly more security equipment and terminal personnel as it would were it
to have a centralized terminal access point. In fact, the airport's aviation director
commented in 2007 that MCI would soon have no choice but to replace all three
terminals with a single facility as is common at other major airports, thereby cutting costs
by creating one security complex while giving passengers a central area in which to
purchase food and retail goods (Heyward, 2007). Of course, the price tag of such a major
reconstruction - which may require the demolition of some or all of the current terminals
- will prove quite expensive, the result of inflexible choices made over thirty years ago.
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" It should be noted that some airports have been successful with variations of the decentralized model,
including Dallas Forth Worth (DFW) and Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG).
Finalizing functionality: Baltimore/Washington International Airport
Aside from capacity and expansion problems, airport level groups also tend to face
difficulties resulting from assumptions about exactly what services an airport or airport
terminal will provide. Multiple examples demonstrate the risk of constructing airport
facilities to the specifications of a single customer or customer group. At MCI, for
instance, designers failed to plan for the possibility of high transfer traffic and created
terminal structures wholly unsuitable to the hubbing operations of TWA, which
abandoned headquarters there in 1982.
Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI) provides another example due to its
misfortune in dealing with US Airways during the 1990s (de Neufville & Odoni, 2003).
After having constructed an international terminal for the airline, BWI found itself with
an underused facility when US Airways relocated its international facilities to
Philadelphia. Unfortunately, due to a lack of flexible design principles, the terminal
could not be used to supplement the need for new service areas elsewhere. As a result,
when it became apparent that Southwest required additional space in order to support its
growth, BWI was forced to spend an additional US $100 million in order to create
duplicate facilities. The decentralized international terminal was simply too far away
from other facilities and not correctly designed to support new customer demands. In
finalizing the function of its US Airways terminal, BWI made itself vulnerable to
unforeseen fluctuations in customer demand.
Real Options Solutions and Local and Private Investment Organizations
As on the international and national/regional planning levels, several real options
planning solutions are available for those groups which actually plan and operate the
world's airports. In many cases, the costs and benefits of each alternative have been
studied, quantified, and put into practice. Detailed studies have been undertaken by de
Neufville, Trani, and Belin (Belin, 2000), among others. A few findings are listed below.
However, as the implementation of real options generally requires detailed engineering
studies and adaptation to each particular case, the following examples are not meant as
suggestions for any particular airport. Rather, they represent successes in flexible
planning, many of which are best considered during the early phases of airport
development or expansion.
Ensuring Expandability: Landbanking at the UPS WorldPort
Whereas the growth of other airport facilities has been limited by the encroachment of
urban developers, stakeholders at the UPS WorldPort sorting hub in Louisville, Kentucky
have managed to avoid these difficulties. The WorldPort, which lies at the center of the
of the UPS global network, is expected to increase in size from 5.1 million square feet in
the coming years by adding 1.1 million square feet in building space and up to 3.6 million
square feet in aircraft ramps (Bruns, 2006). After the expansion, the facility will be able
to handle as many as 136 aircraft on the ground at the same time while continuing to
significantly contribute to the financial stability and job market of the surrounding area.
The phenomenal expansion has not been perpetrated by fortune; rather, UPS has
commented that its decision to remain in Kentucky and to expand its operations there are
the result of aggressive landbanking on the part of the Louisville Regional Airport
Authority, which continually purchased land around the site in order to ensure the
possibility of later growth. As such, the continued success of the UPS WorldPort
provides an important example wherein the purchase of land assets before they became
necessary and close cooperation between airport level organizations has produced
positive results.
Ensuring Expandability: Take 2
Outside of landbanking, several other measures can assist in helping airports to expand
their capacity as demand requires. Among these, appropriate choices of internal transport
systems can foster sustainable, low-cost development. Hong Kong International Airport
(HKG), for instance, opted to provide intra-airport transportation using a self-propelled -
rather than cable driven - system of people movers. As a result, HKG - which was
named the 2nd best airport worldwide by Skytrax Research Advisors in 2006 (Skytrax,
2007) - can add cars and routes to support new passengers and facilities at minimum cost
(de Neufville & Odoni, 2003). Although the capital costs of self-propelled systems tend
to be higher, the additional flexibility provided may well offset any additional costs and
be cost-saving in the long term.
Busing has similar benefits. Whereas fixed transportation systems such as rail are
difficult to alter in terms of capacity and endpoints, buses can be deployed to different
locations only as necessary. At New York/Kennedy International Airport (JFK) for
instance, buses are deployed during seasonal peaks to deal with increased traffic levels.
As such, the airport operator only incurs additional transportation costs when the capacity
is needed; without such flexibility, the airport would be forced to suffer either from
overcapacity during low-traffic periods or under-capacity during high-traffic periods.
Both instances, of course, lead to losses in profitability.
Self-propelled people movers (including buses) can yield additional benefits to new
airports; both provide a relatively inexpensive means of transport without forcing airport
operators to commit to more fanciful systems before the success of the airport has been
proven. Further, when compared to expensive internal rail systems, self-propelled people
movers can help reduce overall airport costs and make the facility more favorable to
growth-stimulating low-cost carriers.
Other flexible design approaches can be applied to baggage carriage systems and to
terminal design. As studied by de Neufville, basic tug and cart systems seem to provide a
good option for unproven airports wishing to practice incremental development. Linear
midfield concourses, meanwhile, seem to allow for greater flexibility and expandability.
Both alternatives therefore offer the option to avoid monument building and expand only
as needed. At Denver International Airport (DIA), for example, tug and cart systems
provided sufficient abilities before their advanced baggage systems were functional; their
terminal design, in addition, allows for easy extension of linear concourses (de Neufville,
1995a).
Learning to Share: Shared gates and Common User Systems
Airport owners and operators are not alone in their growing avoidance of monuments. In
order to better compete with low-cost carriers and with each other, airline consortia have
also joined the movement in an effort to reduce operating costs, develop their customer
bases, and increase profitability. Whereas the airlines of yesterday may have demanded
fantastic terminal facilities with which to demonstrate market superiority, the modem
approach is far more timid. A 1995 article in the ASCE Journal Civil Engineering
explains:
The days of high-flying airport terminal projects are over. The 1980's philosophy
of 'build it, and they will come' has been replaced by a new approach designed for
a more conservative era in commercial aviation: Don't overbuild, but be prepared
to change. ... This new philosophy of terminal design has several impacts:
Terminals are being designed for incremental expansion, with the ability to
expand quickly and efficiently as traffic growth dictates. Airports are striving to
attain maximum efficiency from existing space, undertaking renovation projects
and finding interim uses for the conservative amount of spaces built in
anticipation of future demand (Reiss, 1995).
The terminal and gate sharing supported by airline groups including the Star Alliance
contributes an important element to increasing airport efficiency and to preventing the
duplication of expenditures. Shared lounges, for one, have multiple benefits over
individual lounges. First, they reduce overall space requirements. Whereas individual
lounges must each have the capacity to handle the aircraft assigned to them, lounges
which serve multiple gates do not require the capacity to service each gate (and its
aircraft) at once. Rather, shared lounges account for the fact that multiple gates are not
often used simultaneously. As a result, sharing lounges between four gates can reduce
space requirements by 85% over building a separate lounge for each gate (Belin, 2000).
This tends to increase the overall occupancy rate of the space, thereby decreasing waste
associated with under-use. Second, shared lounges make it easier to relocate passengers
from one gate to another, adding an important element of flexibility.
Shared terminals and gates, also instrumental to the Star Alliance "under one roof'
initiative, provides similar benefits. Whereas passengers connecting from one Alliance
flight to another gain in terms of ease of transfer, the airlines are able to share the costs of
maintaining a terminal. In addition, sharing requires fewer retail and service areas, again
reducing unnecessary duplications of effort.
Individual Lounges Shar
Figure 4-6: Size Benefits of Shared Lounges (Adapted from Belin, 2000)
Common user systems provide another element critical to the sharing concept. By
standardizing the systems which each passenger uses to check-in, handle bags, and
conduct business, airports can move away from the paradigm of carrier-dedicated spaces.
This mitigates the risks associated with finalizing one particular function per area.
Therefore, if a carrier decides to relocate, its former space can be quickly and
inexpensively converted to serve another airline (network or low-cost) or passenger
group (first class or coach, domestic or international). Numerous airports worldwide
have found success with these efforts. In 2002, for instance, Geneva/Cointrin
International Airport (GVA) signed on to a Common Use Terminal Equipment (CUTE)
system for its check-in and departure areas with the expectation of having over 40 airlines
operate the same system. After its success with the system - which was designed to
increase operational effectiveness by 25%, reduce passenger waiting time, and minimize
the amount of space required for dedicated check-in areas - GVA chose to upgrade to the
more advanced Common User Self Service (CUSS) kiosks in 2006.
Making Facilities Modular: Munich/Franz Josef Strauss and London/Stansted Airports
Sharing aside, numerous other design decisions can contribute to combating the provision
of dedicated terminals and the risks associated with dependence on a particular airline or
type of passenger. Together, modularity and multi-functionality can provide real options
methods for minimizing difficulties such as those experienced at Baltimore/Washington
International (BWI) and Kansas City International (MCI) airports.
Munich/Franz Josef Strauss (MUC) and London/Stansted (STN) have both established a
track record for employing modular designs to this effect. Munich's Terminal 1, car park
guidance system, and Terminal 2 baggage service all include elements of modularity.
The 25 mile baggage transport system, for one, consists of redundant structures and
standardized components which allow it to change its capacity through the addition or
removal of specific modules. Terminal 1 also provides for adaptability. With the
completion of Munich's Terminal 2, airport managers knew that the central carrier,
Lufthansa, would decide to leave Terminal 1 in favor of newer facilities. As a result of
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Terminal 1's modular design, though, the risk of having an underused facility had been
mitigated. Indeed, MUC's planners have exploited the modular design of Terminal 1 to
meet the contrasting demands of major network carriers, package-tour airlines operating
hubs, and low-cost carriers within the same facility (Munich/Franz Josef Strauss Airport,
2002)12. In 2005, the multiple low-cost carriers stationed in Terminal 1 experienced a 28
percent increase in overall traffic volume, serving 12.2 % of the airports total demand.
London/Stansted also boasts a great degree of flexibility due to a modular design. Since
iis opening, the terminal building has been extended by the addition of two structural
bays. Further extensions can continue to increase the airport's overall capacity.
Leaving Room: Providing Spare Capacity
Although modularity can allow for the rapid extension of facilities, most airports must
nonetheless ensure that some spare capacity it always on hand. Given the correct level of
spare capacity, this need not be considered waste, especially if the additional facilities
can be shared by different customers. Spare capacity provides multiple benefits. Aside
from helping to offset the effects of peaking, spare or redundant capacity mitigates the
risks associated with schedule uncertainty. For instance, additional facilities can provide
the space needed to cater to unexpected passenger levels in cases where airline delays
(due to weather, accidents, etc.) cause unexpected shifts in traffic.
The use of swing spaces enhances this functionality. By creating sterile corridors which
can be used either to connect or to separate various lounges, swing spaces permit airport
operators to allocate capacity flexibly. The technology has been proven at airports
worldwide; swing spaces already allow for lounges to transform from international to
domestic use.
Maintaining additional capacity carries other benefits. Having extra transporters on hand,
for instance, can help mitigate the losses incurred if other transporters fail. Nonetheless,
airport planners must be careful to differentiate between providing for spare capacity - a
real options concept - and building capacity before it is required. Whereas spare capacity
provides for unforeseen fluctuations in the short term, building unneeded capacity relies
on the speculation that traffic will develop in a particular manner over the long term.
5. Adapting to LCC and MAS: A Common Difficulty
In concluding the analysis of real options in airport design, it again becomes necessary to
consider the low-cost carrier and multi-airport systems. The reasoning is clear: there is
no question that the emergence of the low-cost carrier and of multiple airport systems has
significantly impacted the air transport industry (Chapter 2). Equally important, low-cost
12 Terminal 1, though modular, is not without flaws. Due to its decentralized nature, MUC is forced to
operate redundant operations in each module. Terminal 2 avoids this problem by using a central structure
meant to promote the use of the airport as a major European hub. Terminal 1, meanwhile, has been
dedicated to supporting point-to-point traffic.
carriers and the system of airports they support have had an important effect on airport
planning and design. However, the above sections show that each level of airport
planning (international, national/regional, and airport level) stands to make improvements
in adapting to the changing industry. Certainly, the experiences at Frankfurt/Hahn,
Liverpool, and other airports worldwide drive home the benefits to be had. What remains
undetermined, however, is how best to adapt airports in order to best succeed given the
industry's evolution. This final section therefore seeks to address the issue from a
flexibility-minded perspective.
Current Approaches: the Pitfall of Finalizing Functionality
In 2001, Michael Pitt outlined some current approaches to handling the rise of low-cost
carriers at major airports for Facilities magazine (Pitt, 2001). Given the different airport
requirements set forth by network and low-cost airlines, he argued, the provision of
separate facilities provided the best option for airport designers wishing to ensure
continued profitability. Various airports worldwide have followed this plan, including at
Marseilles/Provence (MRS) and Geneva/Cointrin International (GVA), where operators
opted to convert old facilities into LCC-specific terminals.
On its face, the separation of facilities appears wholly logical. In cases where the
differences between low-cost carriers and network airlines are sufficiently at odds, the
construction of entirely separate terminals - or even airports - can offer a simple
solution. As a result, low-cost carriers can be provided with terminals specifically
catered to their needs: minimal lounges and catering, simple single-story buildings, and
appropriate passenger services. Further, separating terminals allows airport planners to
account for design differences in terms of providing for transfer passengers, a customer
not currently served by LCC but quite important to most major network airlines.
Separating gates, in the meantime, can help to attract LCC by unbundling services -
including air-bridges, high-class lounges, and technologically impressive passenger
control desks - generally provided to national airlines. In the extreme, constructing
entirely separate airports to service LCC customers can help to ensure the reduced
congestion and fast-turnaround times which airlines like Ryanair demand.
Similar strategies have developed in the handling of multi-airport systems, where airport
operators have sought to divide responsibilities between airports within the same region.
Specialized services may be provided at each. In London, for example, Heathrow has
developed as a full-service intercontinental airport while Gatwick and Luton provide for
the low-fare and holiday-tour customer, respectively.
Table III Potential for resolving facilities requirement differences at same
airport
Access Location: current strategic direction means that low-fares
airlines actively seek cheaper secondary airports to ensure
minimal landing fees to maintain low fares. Ideally slots should
be made available for head to head competition to the same
location offering differentiated levels of service
Resolution: two terminals
Terminal Ticketing. Internet sales now dominate in the low-fares sector
No significant facilities issue
Resolution: none needed
Check in: speed is the only issue for the low-cost carrier here
The general high quality of check in facilities at BAA's airports
for example are of a higher standard than necessary
Resolution: two check in areas or two terminals
Terminal services: not wanted by low-fares carriers
Resolution: two terminals
Terminal facilities: not wanted by low fares carriers (except
toilets)
Resolution: two terminals
Gate Gate facilities: low tech required by low-fares carrier
Resolution: two terminals
Aircraft apron access to gate: no air-bridge to enable fast turn
for low-fares carrier
Resolution: use non air-bridged gate
Lounge: basic standard for low-fares airline
Resolution: two terminals
Passenger routing: segregation of in and out passengers to
provide for fast turn for low-fares carrier
Resolution: two terminals
General Catering. minimal requirement for low-fares carrier
Resolution: none needed
Cleaning: minimal requirement for low-fares carrier
Resolution: none needed
Standby aircraft parking: no requirement for low fares airline
Resolution: none needed
Cargo/baggage: aircraft clearance and reloading a priority for
low fares carrier
Resolution: directional. None needed
Figure 4-7: The two terminal solutions (Pitt, 2001)
This approach involves significant risks, however. As the examples of BWI and MCI
illustrate, building to the specification of one particular type of airport customer can yield
very negative consequences. The issue may be more pronounced when dealing with
LCC, as they have demonstrated a willingness to transfer airports as necessary. As a
result, the construction of separate, differentiated facilities appears to stand at odds with
ensuring flexibility, a central principle of real options design. Moreover, the construction
of entirely separate facilities risks cost-inefficient duplications of effort.
Seeking Similarities: Reconciling Differentiation and Adaptability
Though several observers of the air transportation industry have documented important
differences in the types of airport patronized by low-cost and network airlines, the crux of
flexible planning relies on the identification of similarities between apparently distinct
future scenarios, customers, and stakeholders. Numerous similarities shared by LCC and
NC are apparent; detailing those areas on which different carrier groups agree can
therefore reveal possibilities for using real options as a means of dealing with ongoing
changes in air transportation.
Overlaying the interests of major airline consortia, low-cost carriers, and airport
managers - each of which operates on the airport level - reveals numerous points of
agreement. Simply stated, air transportation stakeholders appear to be converging on
similar airport demands. For instance, various passengers and airline types have come to
demand a greater integration of transport networks. Though a common goal of low-cost
carriers like easyJet, which actively invests in transportation systems near its airports;
airport managers including the BAA, which operates its own rail services; and major
airlines groups like the Star Alliance, which is focused on increasing the connectivity of
its networks, have also pushed these initiatives. Petitions for decent (rather than
extravagant) passenger facilities and simple terminals are also increasingly pervasive:
while passengers still seek a minimum standard of service, even major airlines have
begun efforts to reduce costs by avoiding expensive, overly ornate terminal facilities.
Elsewhere, internet sales, paperless ticketing, and common user equipment are evolving
into industry standards with strong support from airport stakeholders on all levels. This
convergence has important implications: segmentation in the airline industry does not
necessarily demand segmented gates, terminals, and airports. Developing airport
facilities that can cater to different customers is far from impossible. In fact, should
current trends continue, the need for separate facilities may dissipate; in either case, real
options solutions can play an important role by allowing for the flexibility to serve
different carriers as the need arises.
Options in Operation: A Different Approach to LCC and MAS
Given a basis of common needs shared by low-cost carriers and their competitors, it
becomes possible to apply real options principles to mitigate the risks presented by
industry changes. Incremental development provides one choice of interest. Seeing as
low-cost carriers generally demand less complicated terminal systems, airport designers
may choose to first develop terminals to low-cost standards. If flexibly designed, the
facilities can then be upgraded later, as necessary. Modularity and multi-functionality
can also assist in this endeavor. Modularity, for one, gives airports the option to expand
and upgrade when and if requirements change. Otherwise, using multi-functional
facilities and implementing swing spaces can permit airports to cater to both LCC and
NC customers without requiring additional facilities, depending on peaking. This tack
may prove particularly interesting for new airports uncertain about future prospects.
Whereas building big initially may lead to significant waste, building smaller for low-
cost carriers can minimize risk while helping to attract airlines which promote
phenomenal rates of traffic growth. In fact, airport designers have begun to present new
solutions along these linesl.
Furthermore, this development standard seems well-suited to the promotion of regional
economic development fostered by international and national stakeholders. The research
efforts of Bonnefoy and Hansman support this point, as it shows that the entry of low-
cost carriers in areas with a "secondary population basin" tended to support the
development of those markets surrounding the secondary airport. More important, they
showed that that growth was not limited to the LCC; rather, secondary airports with LCC
patronage are capable of attracting new non-LCC service much to the benefit of the local
region.
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Figure 4-8: Distribution of Traffic at Manchester Boston Regional Airport
(Bonnefoy & Hansman, 2004)
Indeed, the experience at airports such as Manchester Boston Regional Airport (MHT)
could go so far as to suggest an "LCC-first" policy for the development of new airports.
Given that the airport is built flexibly, the facility can benefit from the rapid growth rates
provided by LCC while later enjoying growth in non-LCC markets.
"3 3DReid Architecture, responsible in part for development at several UK airports, has designed Airspace,a flexible, modular terminal solution (Farmer, 2002). Flyport, a competing modular terminal product based
on prefabrication, will be presented in October 2007 at the 16th inter airport Europe exhibition held atMUC (Flyport, 2007).
-
Regardless, the flexibility mantra is certainly not limited to an "LCC first" policy.
Constructing airports or terminals to the specifications of network carriers while
maintaining the option to convert them to low-cost service later - by removing undesired
and expensive equipment and services - also minimizes risk.
Similarly, the development of multi-airport systems (MAS) can benefit from the
provision of modular and adaptable airport designs. In this case, maintaining flexibility
can help ensure that airports within a system can adapt to new competitive contexts by
choosing to serve different customer sets.
Table 4-7 presents flexible alternatives suitable in providing for both the development of
multi-airport systems and the growth of the low-cost carrier.
Table 4-7: Real Options Approaches to LCC and MAS
RelatedReal Options Difficulty PositiveTime Frame Approach AvoiEquipment/ Value Added xamples
Actions
Current Airport
Operations
Airport
Development,
Expansion, and
Planning
Benefits of LCC
& MAS
Multi-functionality
Shared Spaces and
Equipment
Incremental
Development:
Build Simply First
Ensure
Expandability
Maintain Multiple
Options for Airport
Siting & Growth
Integrated
Transport
Networks
Promote Regional
Development
Betting on
traffic/customer
type (BWI)
Betting on
traffic/customer
type (BWI)
Monument
Building
Capacity
Constraints
Capacity
Constraints
Risk of
underused
capacity
Increase Airline
Competition
Building modular
spaces
Sizing gates for
different aircraft
Creating lounges to
serve different
passenger types
Using swing spaces
Common User
Terminal
Equipment
Centralized
Facilities
Common lounges,
terminals, and
airports
Tug and Cart
Systems
Self-Propelled
People Movers
Building Modular
Spaces
Landbanking
Maintaining
Military Airfields
Link airports with
roads/rail to
underserved areas
Support Passenger
Choice
Permits
reconfiguration
between LCC
& NC
Serves varying
aircraft mixes /
customer types
Allows
switching
between LCC
& NC
Increases
efficiency;
reduces
equipment
Minimizes
space
requirements
Allows
switching
customers
Reduces
capital costs
Provides for
future
expansion
Attracts LCC
and NC
Ensures
existence of
LCC
appropriate
airfields
Attracts LCC
and NC
Attract Rapid
Traffic Growth
MUC
Airport
Terminal 1
In
Common
Practice
MUC
Airport
Terminal 2
DIA
Airport
STN
Airport
HHN
Airport
LPL
Airport
Emphasize
cost-
efficiency
6. Finally Flexible: Real Options Solutions Reviewed
That uncertainty is an important factor in airport planning is not in dispute; however,
there remain important questions on how real options planning can assist in mitigating
risks. The preceding paragraphs argue that, although real options thinking is largely
based on a single concept - maintaining flexibility - that concept must be marketed to
different stakeholders differently, based on their individual goals and powers. The
following sections drive home this point by summarizing the objectives of various airport
groups and reiterating real options solutions which may be best pursued by each.
Real OPtions and the International Community
Although members of the international community do not necessarily exert a binding
force on the specifics of airport design, their objectives and abilities are well suited to the
promotion of real options. Common community initiatives such as advancing sustainable
development in air transportation and encouraging the financial success of airport
projects, for instance, can easily be furthered by flexible thinking. Certainly then, the
overlap between international goals and the power of real options implies that option-
based planning could receive significant buy-in from the international community.
Simultaneously, the influence held by international airport literature could significantly
advance flexible thinking worldwide by reducing reliance on forecasts and master
planning, thereby helping to mitigate expensive risks.
Table 4-8: Real Options and the International Community
Level Real Options I Positive
Level Suggestion Related Actions Difficulty Avoided Value Added ExamplesSuggestion Examples
Reduces risk of
Promoting scenario overspending
Fending off rather than forecast- Myth of
Forecasts: based planning predictability Mitigates
Promote new opportunity SYD Airport
planning costs 2nd Runway
paradigms Promoting use of Incorrect capacity Increases
wide error ranges planning appreciation of
uncertainty
International Suggesting deferral Building to old Permits time to
Organizations Moving away of decisions requirements survey market
Planning: Encouraging Gives AUS Airport
Promote negotiable Gives
flexibility professional service Design "Lock-in" flexibility to
agreements adapt services
Looking to
LCC and
Multiple Please See Table 4.7
Airport
SSystems
Real Options for Regional and National Community
Although airport planners on the regional and national levels often share the goals of their
international counterparts, these stakeholders tend to enjoy increased influence over the
specifics of airport development. However, they also carry the added responsibility of
balancing the development of aviation with other modes of transportation as well as with
social and environmental goals, thereby adding new layers of complexity and uncertainty.
Moreover, national players must handle difficulties including attempting to direct airport
traffic, lost opportunities resulting from under-capacity, and expensive construction well
before it is needed. Fortunately, real options thinking offers several possible solutions
which can be specifically catered to the needs of regional and national level
policymakers. Equally important, regional and national level stakeholders are uniquely
able to promote flexible planning by mandating the use of wide forecast ranges and by
amending their own policies to avoid rigid master planning. Moreover, regional and
national operators are likely the stakeholders most capable of advancing the use of
landbanking, co-modality, and civil-military airfield conversions in order to mitigate
uncertainty. Table 4-9 illustrates.
Real Options and the Airport Level Community
Finally, airport stakeholders on the "airport level," being the airport customers and
decision-makers, exert the greatest influence on airport design. As a result, these groups
are likely the most capable of advocating for real options thinking and the most likely to
receive the bulk of its benefits. Perhaps more than any other group, it is these airport
planners, managers, and customers which must buy into the flexibility concept.
Fortunately for real options advocates, there is a significant overlap between stakeholder
goals and real options abilities: reducing capital costs, ensuring adaptability to differing
customer needs, increasing the potential of profitability, and reducing the risks of
financial loss are all among the strengths of flexible planning. The airport level
community, correspondingly, is uniquely able to apply real options thinking "in" project
development, applying flexibility to the many detailed aspects of airport design. Table 4-
10 illustrates.
Table 4-9: Real Options and the National/Regional Community
Real Options PositiveLevel Real Option Related Actions Difficulty Avoided Value Added ExamplesSuggestion Examples
Regional and
National
Organizations
Co-Modality
Landbanking
Maintaining
Military
Airfields
Incremental
Development
Looking to
LCC and MAS
I
Using modular
terminals
Encouraging
continuous planning
Supporting market-
based expansion
Dependence on
only one transport
alternative
Capacity
constraints
Predicting what
type of traffic will
develop
I II I
Monument
Building
(KIX/YMX)
Speculating on
traffic growth
(YMX)
Misplaced/
Underused capacity
(IAD)
Developing multiple
transportation
systems
Integrating airports
into larger
transportation
system
Purchasing tracts to
support future
airports
Keeping military
airports in operation
Building airports on
military airfields
Supports
adaptability and
expandability
UK/EU
Transport
Plans
Provides
greater capacity
and redundancy
Improves
surface access
to airports
Increases
attractiveness to
airlines
Reduces land
costs
Ensures ability
to create new
capacity
Maintains
options for new
airports
Reduces overall
airport costs
Please See Table 4.7
Underused Airports
(YMX)
Capacity
constraints: lack of
new airport sites
Predicting where
traffic develops
(YMX)
Directing traffic
(IAD)
Capacity
constraints: lack of
new airport sites
Predicting where
traffic develops
(YMX)
ARN & LHR
Airports
LCC
Airports
SYD Airport
HHN Airport
AUS Airport
STN Airport
DFW Airport
Table 4-10: Real Options and the Airport Level
Level Real Options PositiveLevel Related Actions Difficulty Avoided Value Added Ea eSuggestion Examples
Airport Level
Landbanking
Incremental
Development
Looking to
Share
Multi-
functionality
Purchasing land
around airport
Building modular
facilities
Using linear
midfield terminals
Beginning with tug
and cart baggage
systems
Beginning with self-
propelled people
movers
Employing
centralized facilities
Operating Common
User Terminal
Equipment
Sharing gates,
lounges, and
terminals
Building modular
facilities
Capacity
constraints: urban
encroachment
(LHR)
Capacity
constraints
Limited
functionalities
Capacity
constraints: unable
to expand
Misused/
underused capacity:
built before
required
Redundant
operations and
duplicated
expenditures
(KCI/MUC
Terminal 1)
Uncertain Traffic
Levels
Demand Peaking
Betting on
traffic/customer
type (BWI)
Safeguards
room to grow
Aids
expandability
Reconfigures to
meet new
demands
Aids
expandability
Aids
expandability
Switches on/off
as needed
Gives
flexibility to
move traffic
Reduces space
and equipment
required
Enhances
efficiency &
speed
Benefits
hubbing
Offers spare
capacity
Reduces need
for separate
facilities
UPS
WorldPort
STN Airport
MUC
Airport
Terminal 1
DIA Airport
DIA Airport
JFK Airport
MUC
Airport
Terminal 2
GVA Airport
MUC
Airport
Terminal 2
MUC
Airport
Terminal 1
-" I I II
CHAPTER 5: THE PORTUGAL CASE STUDY
Chapter 5 - Presents two models developed for analyzing real options in airport systems.
This section also gives an introduction to Portugal, which yields a theoretical case study
in the application of the real options approach at new airports.
1. Portugal Overview
Located in the southwest portion of Europe's Iberian Peninsula, Portugal is in a period of
change. Having advanced an agenda for European progress (the Lisbon Strategy) during
its Presidency of the European Union in 2000, Portugal now seeks to fulfill its obligations
Sto that strategy. The Portuguese National Action
SPAIN Programme for Growth and Jobs (PNACE 2005 -
2008), as a result, defines a path for increasing the
GDP growth rate, raising employment, and
promoting economic competitiveness. In addition,
the Programme commits Portugal to increasing its
territorial cohesion and promoting an urban system
which integrates its cities and advances the
development of its more remote areas (Portugal,
2005). Though the strategies are diverse, the benefits
of aviation here are clear: regional development,
economic competitiveness, and national cohesion are
common goals for air transport worldwide. Indeed,
Portugal has placed both aviation and maritime
transport within its overall development strategy.
The Role of Air Transport
Tourism
Aviation already plays a major role in Portugal's
economic advancement. A favored destination for
Northern European vacationers, Portugal benefits
significantly from its aviation industry, which
directly accounted for 7.3% of employment and 6.4%
of GDP in 2006; with tourism related business
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Competitiveness Strategy
Aviation further plays an important role in Portugal's competitiveness initiatives and
development strategies. Aside from contributing to tourism growth in lesser developed
regions, air transport and its sister systems (high speed rail, maritime transport) are each
central to overall Portuguese growth. The Programme for development states this
objective clearly: in order to overcome its "peripheral" geographical position in relation
to Europe, Portugal intends to exploit its central location (between Africa, Northern
Europe, and the United States) and to promote its east-west and north-south maritime and
air routes (Portugal, 2006). Further, Portugal seeks to develop airline hubbing within its
territory by advertising its position in relation to major Northern European cities and its
relative lack of airspace congestion. Together, these initiatives give Portugal the
opportunity to better integrate with Europe, promote internal growth, and increase its
overall economic attractiveness worldwide.
Lisbon Portela Airport
Opened in 1942, Lisbon/Portela Airport (LIS) - which is operated by the fully state-
owned subsidiary ANA - has long served as Portugal's premier international gateway.
As such, LIS has provided an important impetus for development in the greater Lisbon
area. The nation's largest airport, Portela operates two runways which serviced
approximately 12 million passengers in 2006.
The continued growth of Lisbon/Portela, however, is capacity limited. One of the few
European airports located within a major city, LIS is now landlocked by urban
development. With a passenger growth rate of 11%, it will soon achieve full capacity
and, despite ongoing expansion, begin to experience difficulties as a result of too-high
demand by 2009 (Chevalier, 2005). As a result of Portela's rapid development, many
corners within Portugal have aggressively pushed for a major new Lisbon-area airport.
The New Lisbon International Airport
Goals
The development of the New Lisbon International Airport (here referred to as NLA)
augurs many benefits for Portugal as a whole. Aside from providing for the expansion of
the Portuguese passenger market, the airport's development is intended to help increase
Portugal's presence worldwide. According to the Novo Aeroporto S.A. (NAER), the
state-created company charged with preparing decisions regarding the new airport, the
new facility will also help to bring Portugal into the center of the European air transport
network and promote Portugal's importance as a transcontinental connection hub and
further promote regional development (NAER, 1982). Moreover, the new airport -
intended to be part of a multi-modal link between Portugal, Spain, and Eastern Europe -
may well grow into a major hub able to compete with Madrid for traffic.
Description and Stakeholders
As Portugal's new primary access point, the New Lisbon International Airport is
expected to cost some US $4.8 billion (f 3.6 billion) before accounting for the addition of
the highways and high speed rail links that will be required to provide better connectivity
Figure 5-0: Ota New Lisbon Airport Artist's Depiction
to the capital (Lopes, 2005). With a capacity of 40 million passengers per year on its two
runways, the new airport does not come at a low cost. However, if current projections of
33 million passengers served per year by 2039 (Lopes, 2005) are correct, the airport will
offer significant benefits.
As a result, the stakeholders in the project are numerous. Certainly, the airport offers an
exceptional development opportunity for its region and for Portugal as a whole. The list
of beneficiaries is not limited: aside from creating a projected 50,000 new direct and
indirect jobs, the new airport bodes well for Portuguese construction companies like
Mota-Engil, which has seen its stock price surge partially on positive news regarding the
airport (BPCC, 2007). Further, the Portuguese government and the wider European
community are heavily invested in the airport, which is expected to be financed partially
by the EU and supported by a loan from the European Investment Bank as part of its
initiative to develop the Trans-European Transportation Network. In addition, acquiring
tender on the new airport weighs heavily on Portuguese business and politics, as the
winning consortium is expected to gain control of the ANA, the national body nowdirecting the bulk of Portuguese air transport. As a result, the interest of the stakeholders
in the new airport is extraordinary.
Uncertainty
Despite the interest in Lisbon's new airport, the project is certainly not without
uncertainty, however. Indeed, a new challenge has recently arisen to the location of the
second airport, with the private Confederation of Portuguese Industry (CIP) supporting an
abandonment of one site in favor or another.
As a second airport, NLA also faces an important degree of uncertainty regarding its
ability to compete with and eventually replace Lisbon/Portela. Although the government
currently plans to close LIS and to transfer its traffic, the difficulty of governments in
closing old airports and redirecting traffic is well documented. Noted examples include
Paris Orly (ORY), where the forced competition with Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) cost
the French government a considerable sum of money, and Osaka International Airport
(KIX), which was intended to replace the still thriving Osaka Itami (ITM). The effect of
privatizing Portugal's airport authority, ANA, remains unknown.
Further, Portugal is certainly not immune from the effects of larger aviation trends such
as the growth of low-cost carriers (LLCC) and the unsteady performance of national and
network air transport providers (NC). Within the past year, for instance, Portugal's
largest airline (TAP) purchased the nation's second largest carrier (Portugalia), pending
government approval. In addition, low-cost carriers have been increasing their activity
in Portugal, with Ryanair, easyJet, bmibaby, and others servicing Portuguese locations.
The continued growth of LCC in Europe therefore raises important questions for the
development of a new Lisbon airport, as LCC have tended to have much different design
requirements when compared to other airlines. Further, although easyJet and Ryanair
currently provide service to multiple Portuguese destinations (including easyJet at LIS),
their development at the New Lisbon International Airport cannot be guaranteed,
especially in light of proposals to build a new LCC-specific Portuguese air center, LCC
opportunities elsewhere, and the development of facilities at Badajoz, just across the
border in Spain.
Certainly, the immense potential impact of uncertainties associated with the New Lisbon
International Airport makes it an interesting case for the study of real options. Moreover,
analyzing an Ota-like facility provides an opportunity to demonstrate the value of
flexibility in airport design. As a result, this thesis' final case study is designed with the
New Lisbon International Airport in mind.
2. Modeling the New Airport
While operating within an intricate system of external transportation types, airlines,
passengers, local community members, and various layers of economic and political
decision-making, each airport also exists as a complex system unto itself. The airside
which supports aircraft, for instance, can be broken down into several distinct parts: air
traffic control, paved thoroughfares, fueling stations, cargo facilities and so forth. Paved
thoroughfares can further be subdivided into the runways which provide for take-off and
landing and the set of taxiways which facilitate other aircraft movements and give access
to service vehicles participating in aircraft loading, fueling, service and maintenance.
The airport landside is no simpler. Rather, the landside may be construed to consist not
only of airport terminals but also of the parking garages, roadways and other
transportation links which connect the airport to its region. Further subdivided, the
airport terminal provides shopping areas, customs and immigration centers, baggage
handling, internal passenger transportation, waiting areas, and a slew of other necessities.
As a result of this complexity, any model attempting to simulate all airport operations
fully can easily become both large and unwieldy. Within the context of this thesis, then,
a simpler paradigm is required.
The models described in this chapter therefore focus on the centers of the airside and
landside: the terminal or passenger buildings (landside) and the runway (airside). Both
structures are at the core of airport operations and represent significant airport cost
expenditures. Further, they yield several opportunities for flexible planning. The
terminal and runway models, therefore, can be explored in order to reveal the strengths of
real options thinking and to support the development of curricular material.
The Airside Runway System
Airport runways perform an immensely important function: they are the means by which
an airport - otherwise simply a collection of buildings - takes meaningful form. Runway
design and certainly the number of runways provided are therefore of principal
importance, especially given that runways are quite often the limiting element in
determining how many passengers an airport can serve (Reynolds-Feighan,1999) and,
consequently, the size of the airport's revenue streams. Given this, an appropriately
constructed runway infrastructure must be correctly sized to serve its airport's projected
traffic levels: a runway system that is incapable of supporting the number of aircraft
movements required per year represents a lost opportunity for the entire airport system.
Conversely, with some runway prices rising above US $600 million (BWI), building and
maintaining an underused runway represents an expensive waste.
In this sense, evolution of demand is the main uncertainty involved in runway planning.
By and large, other factors are of secondary importance. Uncertainty about the type of
customer (LCC or NC), for instance, is less critical in this area because all customers are
generally constrained to using the same runways. The New Airport Runway Model,
therefore, focuses solely on volatility of demand. A binomial lattice method is employed
to model this volatility. The lattice method is well-suited to this purpose as it easily
replicates the growth of a single factor so long as that factor tends to have a constant
growth rate and volatility over the period of interest. Airport planners can reasonably
assume this to be true of passenger traffic.
The Landside Passenger Building
Compared to runway design, several more decisions and uncertainties affect the creation
of a successful terminal. For instance, runway planners need only consider how many
runways must be constructed in order to service a given level of total traffic. Terminal
design, conversely, must account not only for total traffic flow but also for traffic type
(i.e. low-cost or network), and passengers served (i.e. tourist, business, international, etc).
Terminal buildings built to the specifications of one network carrier may not be well-
designed to serve another network carrier; also important, such terminals almost certainly
will not be designed for servicing the low-cost passenger. As a result, terminal planning
is subject to new LCC driven uncertainties as well as to overall demand volatility; models
of terminal activity, therefore, must be able to represent these multiple uncertainties and
the set of very different options needed to combat them.
In this case, the binomial lattice tends to become unsatisfactory. Decision trees, however,
are quite capable of modeling the development of uncertain terminal-related parameters.
Aside from allowing planners to consider multiple unknown factors, decision trees permit
planners to consider the effects of sudden changes such as a switch from serving network
to low-cost traffic. Further, trees can simulate the large range of alternatives which may
become available to the airport planner at different periods in time.
3. The New Airport Runway Model: Inputs and Results
Given information on average passenger growth rate, volatility of traffic, expected
aircraft mix, and airport revenue streams, the New Airport Runway Model seeks to reveal
when best to construct additional runways at a new facility. By giving consideration to
probabilistic trends in demand growth, the model calculates the value of the airside
runway system as a function of when and how much runway capacity, in terms of aircraft
movements per year, is constructed. Further, the model compares various building
strategies: building only one runway, building two runways initially, or building one
runway initially and supplementing it with a second runway at a later date. Details
regarding the underlying operation of the runway model, including a full list of inputs,
equations, and assumptions are available in Appendices Al and A2. The following pages
present the application of the runway model to a theoretical representation of the New
Lisbon International Airport. Results are meant to inform the Runway Model processes
rather than to provide detailed advice on the construction of any particular airport.
Traffic Development
The New Airport Runway Model requires data on the expected development of passenger
demand in order to populate a table of possible traffic levels over the assumed period of
interest, twenty-five years. Relevant information includes starting demand, average
growth rate, and the standard deviation associated with sample passenger data. Given
that this information is unavailable for airports that have yet to be constructed, planners
may therefore seek sample data from other, similar facilities worldwide.
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Although Appendix A2 provides information on the derivation of the data used, Figure 5-
3 presents the default traffic inputs simply. While it is assumed that the New Lisbon
International Airport will provide for one-half of the current traffic at Portela in its
opening year, information regarding average growth rate and demand volatility derives
from representative years at Dulles International Airport (IAD). These inputs nearly
simulate forecasts that the New Lisbon International Airport, if opened in 2017, will
serve 33 million passengers by 2039: the model predicts an expected demand of 32.6
million passengers by that year. However, it should be noted that these inputs may be
overly optimistic; airports within a secondary airport system rarely start off carrying 50%
of total traffic to the region.
Revenue Streams
In order to evaluate various runway sizes and development strategies, the New Airport
Runway Model assumes that revenue is the primary benefit accrued from runway
construction. As a result, the model focuses on comparing the returns on investment of
various runway development strategies. One important simplification should be noted.
In an attempt to avoid conflict with other the New Airport Terminal Model, which
accounts for all fees paid by the airplane passenger, the Runway Model only accounts for
the fees charged to the airline company for normal runway use. Although the model can
be expanded to overcome this limitation, its current focus is on airplane landing and
parking fees.
As a result of its costing structure, the Runway Model requires detailed information on
fees as meted out based on aircraft weights. Sample data used in the simulation presented
here derive from Cardiff International Airport (CWL) in the United Kingdom.
IRevenues Streams by Aircraft
The Runway Model also requires an aircraft mix in order to determine the number of
aircraft movements required to service passenger demand in a given year, as bounded by
the maximum capacity of runway system. These calculations, along with data on average
fees, then translate into a value for total revenue.
Aircraft Mix
Avg. % Revenue/
Capacity MTOW Movements Movementpax mt L% Total [$1
B737-500 115.0 52.6 20.00% $342.49
A320-200 62.1 73.9 3. $342.49
B757-200 0.0 109.3 20.00% $342.49
8747-400 3820 398.3 30.00% $533.53
100.00%
Default values stored in Entries (Default)
Figure 5-3: Sample Data on Aircraft Mix
Runway Capacity and Costs
For the purpose of this example, it is assumed that airport designers plan to install two
runways of the same capacity, expressed in terms of aircraft landings per year, where the
total number of aircraft landings is assumed to be one-half of all aircraft movements. The
maximum annual number of landings per runway selected, 95,000, correlates roughly
with serving 21 million passengers annually, given the assumed aircraft mix. Using these
parameters, the model assumes that the runways at the New Lisbon International Airport
operates at a level similar to those at London Stansted (STN), where one runway caters to
nearly 24 million annual passengers.
For the purposes of the model, each runway costs US $200 million each, paid in equal
increments over twenty-five years after the runway becomes operational. Runway
operating costs are set at US $3 million per year each.
Whereas it is logically assumed that Runway 1 opens during the first year that the airport
serves traffic (Year 1), there is no default value for the year that the second runway
comes into operation. Rather, the model is allowed to make that determination.
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I lrnwnv I
-4: Sample Data on Runway Construction
Model Results and Analysis
Incremental Development: When to build
The Runway Model provides an important test for the concept of incremental
development. This results from the model's ability to choose the best possible year to
construct a second runway as a function of hypothetical probabilistic traffic growth and
runway capacity. The model provides advice on the best year to build either in terms of
maximizing net income or in terms of maximizing passengers served. As Figure 5-7
illustrates, maximizing the total runway revenue in the theoretical scenario modeled here
would require bringing a second runway online in Year 18.
Conversely, a second runway would not be required to serve all passengers until Year 9
even if demand grew at the fastest possible rate during those years, which - according to
the model - occurs with only a 7% probability. Given this hypothetical situation, it is
therefore clear that constructing both runways early on and providing for more capacity
than needed may lead to unnecessary waste.
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E (Runway Revenue)
Year Runway 2 Operationalized
Figure 5-5: New Airport Runway Model - Maximizing Net Income
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Year Runway 2 Operationalized
Figure 5-6: New Airport Runway Model - Maximizing Passengers Served
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The above conclusion does not however obviate the benefits of a second runway. Rather,
constructing a second runway can increase the overall value of the airport runway system.
However, due to the additional expense, there is also a greater downside risk. Figure 5-9
presents a value-at-risk/gain graph comparing the decision to build only one runway and
the decision to build two runways initially. The values presented represent net income in
Year 25 alone in Year 25 dollars' 4.
Figure 5-7: New Airport Runway Model - Value at Risk in Year 25 (Year 25 dollars)
Deferring Decisions
Whereas Figure 5-7 gives the best year to build based on the total range of traffic growth
possibilities, it is useful for airport planners to track possible demand on an individual,
per year basis. This allows planners to choose how to develop based on actual rather than
forecast events. Figure 5-10 provides a small sample of the binomial lattice showing
passenger traffic data, as explained in Appendix Al.
14 Although it is possible to create the value-at-risk graph for the total airside value over twenty-five years,
this calculation would overwhelm the computational capabilities of Microsoft Excel© with over 17 million
unique possibilities, given 1 year periods. Viewing the value-at-risk in Year 25 alone, however, is still
mildly informative. Were the full twenty-five year period considered, the downside risks would be far
greater. Of course, the upside potential would be somewhat increased as well.
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Figure 5-8: New Airport Runway Model - Sample Traffic Development
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Figure 5-9: New Airport Runway Model - Sample Airside Value
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Each cell in the lattice represents a different possible level of traffic; earlier years have
fewer possibilities than later ones. Meanwhile, lower cells represent less optimistic
demand states and therefore reduced cash-flow. Those cells in which a second runway is
required to satisfy total traffic are presented in red. Figure 5-11, similarly, gives the
lattice valuing the airside system. Those cells in which the probability of future revenue
growth justifies the construction of a second runway are presented in green. Even given
the highest possible growth rate - as indicated by the top row of cells - opening a second
runway would not maximize revenue until Year 11.
A comparison of Figures 5-10 and 5-11 provide the argument for incremental
development and deferring decisions. The markers showing in which state to open a
second runway do not match in the two Figures, signifying that high traffic in one year
does not necessarily suggest that a second runway ought to be opened; poor traffic
development in the following years can still lead to expensive waste if demand falls off.
Having the ability to defer construction decisions until continued growth is more likely is
therefore quite useful. In the hypothetical scenario presented, maximizing expected
profit even with the best possible rate of traffic growth (the top row of cells) requires that
a new runway is not put into operation until a full two years after it first becomes needed.
Viewed differently, deferring decisions allows planners to determine what "demand
state" has occurred before choosing to build. If airport operators find traffic levels to be
at the best possible position in Year 11, it makes sense to open a second runway.
However, if in the worst possible position, a second runway would only increase losses.
Making the decision to build without this knowledge is certainly quite risky.
Option Value
Given the defined framework, the lattice model is capable of calculating the value of the
option to build a second runway. Two options are present: the option to build at all and
the option to defer the decision on when to build. This determination is based on the
difference in earnings with and without the option.
Table 5-1: New Airport Terminal Model - Sample Runway Worth
(Expected Net Present Value)
IModel Run Results
Without the option to build a second runway, the airport runway system in this
illustrative but not representative example sees a net gain of US $59 million in net
present dollars over twenty-five years. Building two runways at once, however, results in
a hypothetical loss of over US $12 million. Again, this result shows the benefits of
incremental development. Premature investment carries unnecessary costs which are not
likely to be offset by additional traffic. Given this data, the airport planner can take into
account economies of scale. Scale effects would have to provide US $71 million in
savings in order to make building two runways at once worthwhile.
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The value of the option to build a second runway (given only one initial runway) is the
difference between the value of having only one runway and having the option to
construct a second. In this case, the value of the option is US $8 million. Higher initial
traffic levels or increased rates of traffic growth, however, could significantly increase
this figure.
4. The New Airport Terminal Model: Evaluating Real Options
Like the Runway Model, the New Airport Terminal Model provides a method for
evaluating various decision paths regarding the construction of a new airport. However,
the Terminal Model carries benefits over its counterpart in that it exploits the additional
freedom provided by decision tree modeling by considering multiple, discrete
uncertainties and alternatives over two periods. Conversely, the model is subject to the
limitations of decision trees, namely that its accuracy depends on the ability of the user to
correctly determine the probabilities associated with each chance event. As before, all
results presented are wholly dependent on user input data and are therefore theoretical.
Introduction to the New Airport Terminal Model
The New Airport Terminal Model decision tree considers two major uncertainties. First,
it considers the uncertainty concerned with the changing nature of European aviation by
evaluating the possibility that low-cost carriers, rather than network carriers, may
dominate an airport's function. The model assumes that this is the primary uncertainty
within the first ten years of airport operation. Second, the New Airport Terminal model
considers the effect of traffic volatility in the overall passenger market by investigating
three distinct possibilities: high, medium, or low growth. This uncertainty is assumed to
dominate for the rest of the period of interest, fifteen years. Given information on the
probabilities associated with LCC dominance and of low, medium, and high growth, the
terminal model can then be used to highlight best paths with regards to the sizing of
airport terminal buildings for the LCC and NC customer.
The Terminal Model operates by providing a two-stage decision process. By default,
planners select whether or not to build primarily for low-cost carriers (Big LCC) or for
network carriers (Big NC) in the first stage, Period I. A third alternative (Build for Both)
calls for a smaller combination of the latter two choices. "Build for Both" allows the user
to determine the value of not gambling with what type of traffic is most likely to develop.
The second stage, Period II, starts after year 10. In this stage, the planner has the
opportunity to make decisions on increasing the airport size. The airport operator may
either choose to increase airport size by large (Build Big) or small (Build Small)
increments. The superior decision, of course, depends on the level of growth experienced
during the remaining fifteen years analyzed by the model. Figure 5-12 provides a quick
illustration, given that the decision has been made to build for network carriers.
Appendices Al and A2, however, describes the evolution of the basic terminal model in
significant detail.
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Figure 5-10: Decision Tree I Build Big for Network Carriers
Real Options Evaluation
Before exploring more complex alternatives for constructing new airports, it is possible
to exploit the Terminal Model in order to demonstrate the value of multiple real options
concepts directly. This section provides the results from analyses designed to evaluate
different real options methodologies. An examination of the New Lisbon International
Airport using hypothetical data immediately follows. Source information for the data
used in each analysis, the appropriate inputs into the Terminal Model, and the full data
retrieved are available in the Appendix A5.
Deferring Decisions
Deferring decisions regarding development until absolutely necessary is a prime tenet of
real options thinking. The strength of this concept lies in ensuring the availability of
different alternatives during a project's life-cycle; further, it minimizes risk by giving
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planners the opportunity to gather additional information on uncertain events. The two-
stage decision tree in the New Airport Terminal Model can allow for this concept to be
explored within the airport context.
In order to demonstrate the value of deferring decisions, the analysis described below -
wherein a hypothetical airport is required to serve 20 million passengers - was
performed. According to plan, the airport is completed in two phases. First, a terminal
providing capacity for 10 million annual passengers for either network or low-cost
carriers is opened at the beginning of the first year. A second terminal is completed in
the 10th year.
Table 5-2: Deferring Decisions Evaluation - Two Strategies
Planners Planners
With 002n Without Option
Capacity Provided (pax) 10 million 10 million
Two strategies, displayed graphically in Table 5-2, are compared. In the first, planners
are incapable of deferring decisions regarding the structure of the 2nd terminal. Rather,
Terminal 2 must be constructed to serve the continued growth of network carriers at the
airport. A second strategy, however, permits planners to defer decisions on the
construction of the second terminal. In this case, planners are given additional time to
monitor competition between low-cost carriers and network airlines in the hypothetical
region. As a result, designers can ensure that the terminal opened in Year 10 will serve
the correct customer group.
By running the model twice to compare the results of the two strategies - as explained in
Appendix A5 - it becomes apparent that the ability to defer the decision on how to
construct can reduce the downside risks associated with airport development. Figure 5-
13 illustrates.
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Value at Risk
Figure 5-11: New Airport Terminal Model - Deferring Decisions can reduce Downside Risk
Multi-functionality: The Right to Switch
Outside of deferring decisions, other design strategies may be used in order to maintain
flexibility. Providing for the multi-functionality of a particular system, for instance, can
help to counter uncertainties concerned with changing requirements. Within the context
of hypothetical airports dealing with the changing traffic types, multi-functionality can
provide an important means of allowing planners to determine which customers are
served during specific periods of an airport's lifetime. Constructing a terminal facility
with the ability to switch facilities from LCC use to NC use is one interesting example.
PrnA 1 I uapaclry irroVlaeu (pax I iU million U minllon I
As before, it is possible to test for the value of building multifunctional terminal spaces
by applying the New Airport Terminal Model to a hypothetical situation. In this
scenario, an airport designed to serve 10 million passengers is considered. As in the
study of deferring decisions, planners are given the ability to "place bets" on which
customer to serve (LCC or NC) during the first ten years of airport operation. However,
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in this case, multi-functional spaces are used. The terminals therefore provide for limited
switching between carrier types; at the beginning of Period II, one-half of the terminal
capacity may be reallocated to serve another customer type. For instance, if the original
terminal is built to LCC specifications but LCC do not experience significant growth over
the first decade of airport operation, capacity for 5 million passengers may be reassigned
to serve network carriers.
According to the investigation's results - which of course depend on the theoretical
default values input in the New Airport Terminal Model - several situations exist in
which planners should consider switching capacity, assuming that switching is costless.
Table 5-4 shows that planners should switch capacity under two circumstances: if the
first terminal was constructed for NC customers but LCC became dominant (Al) or,
alternatively, if the first terminal was built for LCC customers and NC became dominant
(B2). No switching is required otherwise.
ken to Switch
Best Choice
Best Choice
D
Switch
(NC to LCC)
$67,837
No Change
$112,885
Switch
(NC to LCC)
$43,184
No Change
Because it mitigates the dangers associated with predicting the type of customer served,
multi-functionality reduces the risk of downside loss, as shown graphically in Figure 5-
14.
Value at Risk
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Figure 5-12: New Airport Terminal Model - Multi-functionality can reduce Downside Risk
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Ensure Expandability
In addition to deferring decisions outside of the critical path and ensuring multi-
functionality, real options thinking also places great value on maintaining the ability to
expand. Within the context of airports, landbanking is one popular means of making sure
that facilities have room to grow. Again, the New Airport Terminal Model allows for an
evaluation of this option within the context of a simplified, hypothetical airport.
Big NC Strategy
Period I
Big LCC Strategy
No LCC Capacity No LCC Capacity
10 million for NC 10 million for NC
10 million for LCC 10 million for LCC
No NC Canacitv No NC Canncitv
In this scenario, planners again choose to build customer-specific capacity for either 10
million LCC or 10 million NC annual passengers. Whereas one strategy does not allow
for expansion after that, a second strategy permits an increase in capacity of 5 million
annual passengers for either customer in Year 10. Comparing the two strategies provides
for an evaluation of the expansion option.
Table 5-6 shows three cases in which expansion is desired: if planners chose to build for
the non-dominant carrier in Period 1 (Al and B2) or if the probability of revenue growth
outstrips the capacity available to the airport (B1). In the first two cases, additional
construction corrects for earlier errors; in the third, it allows the airport to take advantage
of new growth.
;62
Best Choice D E D D
Best Choice Build Big Build Small Build Big Build Big
Within the parameters of this scenario, maintaining the ability to expand increases the
upside gains associated with the airport project. However, Figure 5-15 also reveals a
reduction in downside losses due to the possibility of corrective expansion.
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Value at Risk
Figure 5-13: New Airport Terminal Model - Expandability shifts the VaRG curve
5. The New Airport Terminal Model: Lisbon Airport Scenario
Having considered the benefits of real options through a variety of simple scenarios using
the New Airport Terminal Model, it is now possible to evaluate a much more
complicated set of decisions. Whereas the previous scenarios only considered the value
of one real option at a time, such a simplified analysis is not well suited to considering
the breadth of options available when creating a new airport. Rather, several alternatives
- and the real options they encompass - must be accounted for at the same time. The
hypothetical Lisbon Airport Scenario considers a more complicated example.
System Development: Period I
Several uncertainties may affect the design of a successful terminal structure at the New
Lisbon International Airport (here referred to as NLA). These include the availability of
external funding from the European Union, the lifetime of Portela Airport (LIS) after
NLA opens, the trends governing low-cost and network carriers in the airport region, and
the overall strength of the air transportation industry in Portugal. Modeling each of these
possibilities in a decision tree would quickly yield a "messy bush" wherein the number of
individual nodes grows exponentially with each new building alternative or chance
outcome. Therefore, the configuration of the New Airport Terminal Model presented
below focuses first on the development of LCC in Period I and on the total air
transportation industry in Period II.
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Main Uncertainty: Who will provide the majority of NLA traffic?
Period I examines the first ten years after the opening of the New Lisbon International
Airport, during which the primary uncertainty is assumed to concern which group - low-
cost or traditional network carriers - will provide the majority of service at the airport.
Figure 5-14: Period I Chance Outcomes
Given that NLA is constructed, two possibilities are assumed. The airport will either
primarily serve low-cost carriers with probability, p, or network carriers with probability
(p-i). The two chance outcomes imply very different revenue streams and cost structures
for the airport.
System Development: Period II
Main Uncertainty: How rapidly will NLA's air traffic develop over the next 15
years?
In Period II, which lasts from Year 10 to Year 25 of airport operation, the main cause of
concern for airport operators is the development of traffic. This development may
depend on several external factors including economic growth in Portugal and the Lisbon
region relative to other areas worldwide, trends in fuel prices, the development of
competing transportation modes such as road and rail, and the preference for face-to-face
rather than internet communication for business transactions. Further, the ability of the
Portuguese interests to transfer traffic from Portela to the new airport - a task which has
proven difficult in several similar situations worldwide - could also have a significant
impact on the long term growth rate at New Lisbon International.
This aggregation of different chance outcomes highlights one strength of decision trees
relative to binomial lattice models. Whereas the development of a binomial lattice
requires assumptions regarding the growth rate of traffic over the total lifetime of the
airport, the decision tree model can accommodate step changes in that growth rate
resulting from a series of unpredictable factors.
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1. LCC Dominate
Build Ota
2. NC Dominate
p-1
Figure 5-15: Period H Chance Outcomes
For the purposes of the model, the plausible growth rates at the new airport have been
aggregated to represent high growth, which occurs with probability p3, medium growth
(p4 ), and low growth (p5), as in Figure 5-17.
Sample Data
The Lisbon Airport Scenario deals with a higher level of complexity than each of the
previous real options examinations. This is evident in that it provides room to consider
new construction strategies and to incorporate forecasting into the planning process.
A Third Alternative
In the Lisbon Airport Scenario, planners regain the capability to evaluate three rather than
two construction alternatives in Period I. Aside from granting planners the ability to
consider more alternatives simultaneously, this third option explores the full versatility of
the New Airport Terminal Model. Within the context of this scenario, the third
alternative allows planners to consider the ramifications of building a much smaller
airport initially. Whereas construction alternatives A and B focus on building large
facilities for network carriers and low-cost carriers respectively, alternative C allows for
the creation of a minimum-capacity facility which does not particularly favor either
customer group. Alternative C, therefore, explores two real options principles. First, it
calls for a strategy of incremental development. Second, it defers the decision on
whether the airport should primarily serve the low-cost or network carrier customer until
Period II.
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3. High Growth
p 3
Period I /4. Medium Growth
p 4
5. Low Growth
p5=1-p3-p4
Capacity BuiltIMpaxl; .U; B
Path Dependence of Probabilities
Unlike previous iterations of the New Airport Terminal Model, the Lisbon Airport
Scenario allows for past decisions to affect future probabilities. In this case, the size of
the construction at the start of Period II affects the probabilities describing low, high, and
medium growth in Years 10 - 25. This initiative is meant to incorporate known evidence:
the experiences of airports like Frankfurt/Hahn (HHN), Baltimore/Washington Thurgood
Marshall International (BWI), and Denver/International (DIA) indicate that airlines are
attracted to facilities which can accommodate their growth most easily.
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Entries Form A
Purpose: Accepts user inputs in white squares as to the probabilities of specific events.
PERIOD I: THE FIRST 10 YEARS
Discount Ra L i .12
PERIOD II: THE REMAINING 15 YEARS
LCC Dominant
Given Decision: Build Big (D), LCC Dominant 1)
Event A
3 High Gmwth LD3= 40. 35.00%
4 Med. Growth LD4I= 60I00 50.00%
5 Low Growth L5= 0. 15.00%
Total 1 100%
Given Decision: Build Small (E), LCC Dominant (1)
Event Assumed D~lV4
3 High Growth LE 2000 300%
4 Aied Gro#th LE4 45.00% 50.00%
5 Low Grth LE5= 35.00 15.00%TOa 100%
NC Dominnt
Given Decision: Build Big (D), NC Dominant (2)
Evso v1hAf eatValue
3 High Growth AM = 23. 16.00%
4 Mod. Grmwlh ?D4 57.001 50.00%
5 Low Growth # = 20.00 35.00%
TOW 1 100%
Given Decision: Build Small (E), NC Dominant (2)
Evest Waegmd- i Default Value
3 iHo Growth NE3 - 10. 15.00%4 MAd Gtoakh AE4 - 45. 50.00%
6 Low Growt A1155 - 45. 35.00%
TOWl `100%
Figure 5-16: Lisbon Airport Scenario Path Dependent Probabilistic Growth Rates
Forecasts
In order to correctly size each element of the construction project, the Lisbon Airport
Scenario employs forecasts provided within the Terminal Model. Given the input values
partially described in Figure 5-18, the forecasts presented in Figure 5-19 are observable.
As in the Runway Model, the forecasts closely match those already created for the New
Lisbon International Airport: according to the model, probability-adjusted expected value
of traffic in 2039 is 33.3 million annual passengers.
LCC componentLCC Dominant NC component
NC Dominant LC C comn• tINC component
Forecast
58,000
5,000
5,000
31,000
Forecast
39,000
3,000
3,000
21,000
Low Growth
Forecast[kpax]
22,000
3,000
3,000
12,000
Figure 5-17: Lisbon Airport Scenario - 25 Year Traffic Forecasts
Construction of the airport facilities in Period I are designed to closely mirror the medium
growth forecast. If the airport planners decide to build under the belief that network
carriers will dominate (A), for instance, they build to the forecast: room is allocated for
21 million NC passengers and only 3 million LCC passengers per year. Choosing to
116
-- -
construct primarily for the low-cost carrier (B) similarly follows the forecasts for LCC
dominance.
I Canacites I
Airport Scenario - Terminal Capacities
Capacity additions in Period II, meanwhile, are meant to complement decisions made in
Period I. Choices (D), for example, are sized such that they augment construction
strategies from Period I. For instance, if planners choose to build the smaller option (C)
in Period I, Period II will allow them to expand the airport in order to capture the benefits
of passenger growth. Decisions in Period II also allow the flexibility to correct planning
errors in Period I. For instance, if the new airport is designed to suit the dominance of the
network carrier but LCC prove more important, planners can construct a large LCC-
suited structure in order to compensate. Finally, construction decisions in Period II allow
for the airport to compensate if passenger volumes are higher than expected or to remain
at the current capacity (E). However, as at real airports, it is not possible to reduce
capacity; wasted construction cannot be recovered. It should be noted that the maximum
capacity of the theoretical airport is 50 million annual passengers, 10 million more than at
NLA.
Lisbon Airport Scenario Results
Results after Period 1
As the Lisbon Airport Scenario is significantly more complex than its predecessors, it
becomes useful to analyze the results of each decision at the end of both Period I and
Period II. As depicted in Figure 5-21, Alternative (C) provides the best results, showing
a net loss of US $599 million in present dollars. Alternatives (A) and (C) yield net losses
of US $1.2 billion and US $839 million respectively, in present dollars. 15
Results I Period I only
tigure 5-19: Lisbon Airport scenario - Ieriod I Kesults
'1 It should be noted that the negative NPV values reflect that the hypothetical airport considered in the
Lisbon Airport Scenario has not yet managed to repay the costs of investment within the time period under
examination. This is not unusual for airports of a significant size, as is discussed in the later sections.
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Results after Period II
The results after Period II can be examined in two stages. Considering expected returns
independently of which carrier type dominates is particularly informative. Figure 5-22
reveals that, if airport planners successfully forecasted which carrier type would become
dominant in Period I (cases A2 and B1), no new construction is required. For instance, if
designers constructed the terminal building to NC parameters and network carriers indeed
dominate the market (A2), they need not continue construction (E / Build Small) in
Period II. However, large construction projects may be required if planners incorrectly
choose which carrier type will lead the market (Al).
Outcome Specific Results 1 2 Periods
Al A2 B2 B2
E(NPV k$$734,163 $784,527 $268,812 $625,448
Best Choice D E E E
Best Choice Build Big Build Small Build Small Build Small
E(NFig [ 0: $224,021 $262,051
Best Choice E E
Best Choice Build Small Build Small
Figure 5-20: Lisbon Airport Scenario - Partial Results
Overall Results 1 2 Periods
MAI B
E(NPV) k$] $751,791 $393,635
Gain in P2 $430,675 $446,303
$237,331
Gain in P2 $361,030
Best Choice
i n Period I, the best choice is to Build for Both (C)
E (NPV) $237,331 [k$]
Figure 5-21: Lisbon Airport Scenario - Final Result
Considering the probabilities associated with LCC or NC dominance gives the result that
airport planners should choose to build a small, hybrid LCC/NC facility in Period I, as
shown in Figure 5-23. Looking back to Figure 5-22, the best outcome after building a
smaller facility in Period I is to build another small facility in Period II. This result is
counterintuitive, as the capacity provided by this path is significantly less than predicted
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by the medium growth forecast. The result is also not particularly well aligned with the
low growth forecast. An analysis of this result follows.
Lisbon Airport Scenario Analysis
The results of the theoretical Lisbon Airport Scenario provide interesting data regarding
not only real options but also about the common logic of building airports to suit the
forecast capacity. The following subsections discuss these issues in detail.
Deferring Decisions
The above analysis makes one point most clearly. Forecasting the type of customer
served and unilaterally choosing to cater to that customer can prove costly. Figure 5-24
illustrates the difficulties, associated with incorrect forecasting within the context of the
hypothetical Lisbon Airport Scenario. Detailed analysis of the model's calculations
proves this result.
Figure 5-22: Lisbon Airport Scenario - Costs of Predictive Action
In order to analyze this phenomenon, it is necessary to compare the effects of predicting
traffic types in Period I without considering the airport planner's ability to construct a
second terminal at Year 15. This temporary assumption removes the planner's ability to
correct erroneous conclusions reached in Period I. In effect, if the airport is built for LCC
carriers, this section of the analysis precludes constructing capacity for network carriers
in Period II. The assumption will be nullified later.
Under the conditions described above, poor predictions can prove quite costly. If airport
planners assume incorrectly that network carriers will dominate airport traffic and build
to that assumption, a penalty of US $176 million is incurred. Incorrectly assuming that
LCC will dominate, however, leads to a higher penalty of US $366 million.
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Correction Coss t
New Capacity Construction NPVPrediction Outcome CostlYr (Construction)
.. ... millions millions]
LCC Dom Predict Right 0 n/a n/aPredict Wrong 20 (for NC) 107 234
NC Dom Predict Right 0 n/a n/a
Predict Wrong 20 (for LCC) 71 156
Figure 5-23: Lisbon Airport Scenario - Costs of Corrective Action
Rescinding the assumption that airport planners cannot correct for past errors does not
significantly change the picture. For instance, ameliorating a situation in which the first
terminal was constructed for NC capacity that did not appear requires constructing
capacity for 20 million annual passengers (as per the inputs in Figure 5-20) for low-cost
carriers at Year 15. This results in a loss of US $71 million for fifteen years (a total of
US $156 million in Year 1 dollars) in order to pay for the construction effort. This
correction would reduce the losses incurred from a poor prediction from US $961 million
to $734 million.
If, however, airport planners incorrectly assumed LCC dominance, the costs of correcting
the error are significantly greater. Constructing a second terminal with the capacity for
20 million annual NC customers would require US $107 million for 15 years, or a total of
US $234 million in Year 1 dollars. In this case, the costs of correction are so high that
they could not be recovered within the time period analyzed by the New Airport Terminal
Model. As a result, the model shows that the benefits of correcting the error simply do
not necessitate the costs. Rather, Figure 5-22 illustrates that - if the airport only remains
open for 25 years - it is better to do nothing at all (E/ Build Small) in this case (B2).
Incremental Development
The New Airport Terminal Model's second major finding lies in its support of the
incremental development concept. According to the results of the hypothetical Lisbon
Airport Scenario, constructing smaller terminals is widely preferred to building larger
ones.
First, the model suggests that constructing a smaller hybrid terminal in Period I produces
superior financial results than constructing a larger terminal to primarily serve either the
LCC or NC customer. Second, the model concludes that choosing not to increase
capacity in Period II is almost always the superior alternative. Indeed, it only suggests
building new capacity in one case where a false prediction requires corrective action.
Figure 5-26 reproduces this result. Secondary cases presented in the appendices bolster
this conclusion and further explore the concepts of hybridization and switching within the
context of the hypothetical Lisbon Airport Scenario.
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Big LCC I Second UPW 15"1."'1' I 1% -394NC Dominant No
Big NC Third -752NC Dominant No
Figure 5-24: Lisbon Airport Scenario - Comparing Strategies
Two Important Considerations
In drawing conclusions from the Lisbon Airport Scenario, two important considerations
are due further thought. First, the current parameters of the New Airport Terminal Model
restrict it to the analysis of only twenty-five years of airport operation. Many airports
would be incapable of recovering all costs within this period. Frankfurt/Hahn, despite
having experienced exceptional growth, expects to see its first annual surplus in 2009,
some 16 years after opening to civil aviation (Frankfurt/Hahn, 2007a)16; Japan's
Osaka/Kansai is expected to take 30 years to pay off its debt alone (Dempsey, 2000). It
is therefore possible that extending the period analyzed by the model will change its
results. Figure 5-27 illustrates.
Big LCC Second 446 First
Big NC Third 431 Secon
Figure 5-25: Lisbon Airport Scenario - Period H Gains
Although building a smaller terminal in Period I - and not increasing its size thereafter -
produces the best financial results over a twenty-five year period, the net income
provided by such a construction plan during the last fifteen years of airport operation
(Period II) is rather small when compared to other alternatives. As a result, although the
"Build for Both" strategy may break-even most rapidly, it does not necessarily produce
the highest profit levels over longer periods of time. Conversely, the "Big LCC"
alternative produces the greatest net income in Period II; this result is discussed further
on.
16 For reference, all outcomes within the hypothetical Lisbon Airport Scenario yield positive annual
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) within ten or eleven years after
opening. Frankfurt/Hahn achieved this goal in 2007, 14 years after its opening.
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This realization explains the counterintuitive result that the airport, if constructed
according to the "Build for Both" strategy, ought not to be expanded during Period II.
According to the model parameters, it is simply impossible for the additional construction
to pay for itself before the end of the analysis period. This fact neither negates the
conclusions of the New Airport Model nor does it mar the positive conclusions regarding
incrementalism, however. Indeed, from the perspective of the airport's financial
portfolio, incremental development remains the broadly preferable option. Certainly,
increasing the time period investigated does not reduce the risks associated with building
large airports before demand necessitates the capacity provided for. Montr6al/Mirabel
failed to recover its costs in 32 years. Rather, incrementalism still severely reduces the
downside risks associated with airport construction, as evidenced by Figure 5-28.
Figure 5-26: Lisbon Airport Scenario - VaRG
A second important consideration is required. The parameters of the New Airport
Terminal Model restrict it to considering only the financial portfolio of the given airport.
Financial benefits which accrue to the airport region as a result of air traffic - tourism,
business, jobs, etc - are not accounted for and are simply beyond the constraints of this
thesis. Considering these effects, however, could support the different construction
strategies. Nonetheless, the principle of incrementalism remains; constructing capacity
before demand necessitates it remains risky.
6. The New Airport Terminal Model: Regional Development Scenario
Given the rise of low-cost carriers and their apparent predilection for secondary airports,
some researchers have considered the ability of an LCC-airport archetype as a model for
regional development (H1frsch, 2003). Given the stated goals of the Portuguese
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development regarding increased connectivity between remote regions and the economic
development of depressed areas (Portugal, 2005), the idea seems worthy of a hypothetical
exploration through the New Airport Terminal Model. The findings of the theoretical
Lisbon Airport Scenario, in addition to its support for real options principles, seem to
support this examination. In fact, several parameters indicate that choosing to cater to the
low-cost carrier may prove broadly preferable for regional development purposes. First,
the "Big LCC" construction alternative has the largest upside potential of the three
strategies. Second, it provides for the fastest rate of growth in Period II net income,
implying significant expected long term benefits of a LCC-favoring strategy. Third, the
negative result of incorrectly predicting LCC dominance (US $625 million) is far less
than that associated with incorrectly predicting NC dominance (US $961 million), even
without accounting for the costs of corrective action.
Certainly, this result is a function of assumptions internal to the input data. The Lisbon
Airport Scenario assumes that LCC are more likely to dominate the European passenger
market than their NC competitors (Mercer, 2002). Further, the inputs allow LCC to
benefit from higher growth rates (Dennis, 2004) and require fewer funds to serve LCC
customers (Pitt, 2001).
Nonetheless, recognizing the analytical basis supporting these assumptions reveals an
interesting construction path not directly considered by the Lisbon Airport Scenario but
relevant to regional development: build for LCC first. Chapter 4 indicates the reasoning
presented by Bonnefoy and Hansman: low-cost airports, though generally cheaper to
build and maintain than their NC counterparts, not only grow rapidly but also tend to
attract larger airlines as they grow (Bonnefoy and Hansman, 2004). The Regional
Development Scenario, therefore, explores this possibility. Although all of the
population inputs in this scenario are the same as in the Lisbon Airport Scenario, the
construction strategies differ. Appendix A6 shows the scenario set-up. The results are
presented here in brief.
Regional Development Scenario: System Development & Results
truction
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Rather than building primarily for LCC or for NC, the Regional Development Scenario
compares the "Big LCC" and "Build for Both" strategies already developed with a plan
calling for building a medium-sized LCC facility (Medium LCC). This structure
accounts for the benefits of incrementalism while still attempting to cater to the LCC
customer. Figure 5-29 presents the results: constructing a medium-sized LCC-serving
facility shifts the VaRG curve significantly, both increasing upside gain and downside
losses.
Figure 5-27: Regional Development Scenario - VaRG of LCC-based Strategies
The resulting risk reduction translates into significant differences in overall profit.
Granting planners the ability to employ multifunctional facilities and to switch capacity
between customer types increases the benefits even further. The following figures show
the results of a scenario in which that the capacity for 5 million annual passengers may be
switched between customer types at the beginning of Period II.
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Table 5-9: Regional Development Scenario - Three Strategies for LCC-based Construction
Given Multi-functionality
With switching allowed, the argument for a "Medium LCC" construction strategy
becomes even more persuasive. Indeed, the use of multi-functional facilities - as defined
in the experimental Lisbon Airport Scenario - shifts all the associated value-at-risk/gain
curves. Regardless of strategy, downside losses are reduced significantly for the twenty-
five year period.
$ 700 $ 600 $ 500 $ 400 $ 300 $ 200 $ 100 $0 $ 100 $ 200 $ 300
--. - - Big LCC (No Switching) -- -'- Medium LCC (No Switching) --- --- Build for Both (No Switching)
-+- Big LCC (Switching) - Medium LCC (Switching) --- Build for Both (Switching)
Figure 5-28: Regional Development Scenario - Multi-functionality improves VaRG of LCC-based
Strategies
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Regional Development Scenario: Analysis
The construction of airports for regional development carries different objectives and
risks than airport projects in well-established areas. Surely, the availability of demand is
more uncertain. Further, underdeveloped regions may be less likely to attract the
operations of network carriers, meaning that the construction of large NC-centered
facilities in underdeveloped regions is quite risky. There is a possibility, however, that
the growth of LCC may be altering the picture. The Regional Development Scenario
highlights some benefits of the approach.
As is well-proven, building a large facility can lead to immense losses. In the
hypothetical Regional Development Scenario, an incorrect forecast can lead to losses as
great as US $625 million in Year 1 dollars. A new conclusion, however, shows that
building a medium-sized LCC facility (Medium LCC alternative) can provide benefits far
superior to those provided by constructing a small facility split between LCC and NC use
(Build for Both alternative). This result corresponds with the works of Tretheway and
H6rsch, who argue that LCC development can provide opportunities for increased airport
revenues (Tretheway, undated) and perhaps act as a tool for regional growth (H6rsch,
2003).
LCC-based Stra lea s
26 Year PVStrategy NPV Ranking Outcome Action 25 Year
........ . .[$I. m illons ]
S LCC Dominant Build Big for LCC 131
Medium LC First NC Dominant Switch -142
LOO Dominant Switch -224Build for Both Second
LCC Dominant No change -269
Big LCC Third NC Dominant Switch -625
Figure 5-29: Regional Development Scenario - Comparing LCC-based Strategies
Given this strategy, the arrival of an LCC at the regional airport provides a US $130
million dollar profit in Year 1 dollars. If NC rather than LCC arrive, however, the right
to switch mitigates the associated risk. Hypothetical losses fall from some US $262
million to US $24 million in Year 1 dollars, giving the multi-functionality option an
expected value of US $238 million.
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Figure 5-30: Regional Development Scenario - Results of LCC-based Construction Strategies with
Multi-functionality
The implication is simple: given the possibility of low-cost service, a new paradigm for
air transport in underserved areas may be developing. Under this structure, stakeholders
can choose to build smaller LCC facilities at relatively low cost. As a result, the cost of
failure is small compared to the construction of large LCC or NC facilities. Further, the
cost of proving unable to attract significant LCC patronage can be mitigated through
provisions for multi-functionality. The benefits of success, however, are also great, as
evidenced by Liverpool's John Lennon Airport (LPL), Belgium's Charleroi (CRL), and
Frankfurt's Hahn (HHN). Attracting a low-cost carrier to the airport not only serves the
region well but also allows for the airport to recoup its costs rather rapidly.
7. Peering Backwards: A Review
That uncertainty governs the operation of physical systems is not in question. Rather,
several studies - including de Neufville and Odoni, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2005; Bernanke,
1983 - have proven this within several contexts. Other works emphasize the need for
planning methods to mitigate uncertainties and therefore to reduce the risks of extensive
loss. What is still required, however, is a demonstration of processes to evaluate the
benefits of risk mitigation within the airport context.
This chapter presented two methods for evaluating risk mitigation strategies: the New
Airport Runway Model and the New Airport Terminal Model. The first, a scenario
reproduction based on binomial lattices, is well equipped to survey issues dealing with
the development of a single uncertain parameter, given a historically-determined
volatility and growth rate. The latter model, though more complex, allows for replication
of more realistic scenarios with changing uncertainties and multiple decision points.
Both models, of course, carry respective benefits, drawbacks, and flexibilities.
Regardless, both are useful for analyzing decisions within the airport context.
Hypothetical experiments within the New Airport Runway Model, for instance,
demonstrate the value which can be offered by the real options concepts of deferring
decisions and incremental development. Simplified airport mock-ups within the New
Airport Terminal Model, in addition, reveal processes for evaluating the benefits of
multi-functionality and expandability as well. In each case, it is clear that - in many
cases - the proper use of real options can both reduce the risk of loss and increase the
probability of financial gain.
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Finally, the more complex Lisbon Airport Scenario and Regional Development Scenario
demonstrate methods of comparing a variety of airport development strategies. Although
all results are solely dependent on input values, it is nonetheless interesting to note the
findings of the hypothetical simulations: real options concepts such as deferring
decisions, maintaining expandability, incremental development, and multi-functionality
can provide impressive benefits within the airport context. More intriguing, the
theoretical scenario suggests that construction strategies focused on building limited
facilities catering to low-cost carriers can help offset developing uncertainties within the
air transportation industry. Given proper consideration, then, the New Airport Runway
Model and the New Airport Terminal Model reveal the usefulness not only of real
options thinking but also of the processes for evaluating them.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
Airport planning has always contained an element of uncertainty. Indeed, the
construction of most physical systems is subject to unpredictable changes in
requirements. Transportation systems, however, appear particularly prone to risk.
People usually do not travel for traveling's sake. Rather, the success of a transportation
project is closely tied to the demand for tourism and business, to general economic inputs
such as regional GDP and income per capita, to oil and gas prices, and to general shifts in
customer preferences. Within the context of expensive transportation constructs
including high speed rail and aviation, the need for mitigating uncertainty is therefore
quite clear.
Although several planning methods have evolved to allow for the proper consideration of
uncertainty, many industries still have room for progress. Within air transport, the
rigidity of the master planning method has come into question; there has been a call for
change. Several major airports have already begun shifting their strategies by steadily
abandoning their reliance on pervasively incorrect forecasts (Sydney/Kingsford-Smith)
and inflexible master planning (Austin-Bergstrom International). Instead, new facilities
have looked to incorporate flexibility (Munich/Franz Josef Strauss) and multi-
functionality (Geneva/Cointrin International). In light of these developments, real-
options thinking can undoubtedly play a major role in creating new airport planning
processes.
Ongoing changes within the airline industry seem to make this shift more important. In
an industry where low-cost carriers, multi-airport systems, deregulation, and privatization
are steadily reshaping old paradigms, the ability to adapt has become increasingly vital.
It is certainly no longer assured that particular airlines will operate regional monopolies
and provide airport traffic. Further, it is no longer guaranteed that an airport will garner
traffic based on location alone. Rather, in the developing environment, it appears that
airline and airport differentiation will increase: many airports will need to adapt to
changing customer requirements. Here, real options and its principles of deferring
decisions, incrementalism, ensuring expandability, and providing for multi-functionality
can prove most useful.
The thesis conclusions bolster this thinking. Example airports and mathematical
scenarios, for instance, demonstrate the possible benefits of incremental or phased
development. At Dallas/Fort Worth Airport (DFW), for one, planners matched their
construction strategies to proven growth rates; Hong Kong International (HKG),
alternatively, uses self-propelled people movers to allow managers to quickly support
demand increases. The power of deferring decisions outside of the critical path is also
made evident; in an environment where customer requirements are changing, deferral can
both significantly reduce downside risks and increase the probability of success as at
Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (AUS). At the same time, the research
demonstrates the considerable advantages which can be accrued through maintaining
alternatives for growth through landbanking (as at the UPS WorldPort) or through the
upkeep of military airfields, as at Frankfurt/Hahn (HHN). Moreover, the gains available
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from multi-functionality become evident both through examination of facilities such as
Geneva/Cointrin (GVA) and through theoretical analysis. In short, real options planning
presents an opportunity both to reduce the risk of loss and to increase the possibility of
financial gain within airport systems worldwide.
Nonetheless, two requirements must be fulfilled in order for real options to become the
standard approach. First, real options thinking must be adopted by stakeholders
throughout the aviation industry. Second, common methods for evaluating option value
must gain prominence. In addition to simply showing the benefits of flexible planning
under certain conditions, this thesis takes action to further both of these requirements.
By examining the goals and powers of various airport stakeholders, it becomes clear that
the validity and usefulness of various flexible solutions differ not only on the basis of the
particular airport but also on the basis of the airport actors. Whereas international
organizations are well poised to change the language of airport planning, national and
regional groups have the power to enforce change and to pursue real options "on" airport
systems by promoting landbanking, maintaining development options, and supporting co-
modality. Airport owners, planners, and managers, however, are uniquely positioned to
apply flexible planning methods to specific engineering decisions by employing
modularity and multi-functionality.
Finally, the thesis' two models tackle the promotion of stakeholder-independent means
for the preliminary evaluation of options principles. The New Airport Runway Model
and the New Airport Terminal Model, therefore, provide for rapid comparison between
simple airport construction strategies and can prove useful within pedagogical contexts.
More important, the models demonstrate methodologies for analyzing flexibility and
highlight the benefits which real options can offer to airport development projects
worldwide. Through hypothetical analyses of the New Lisbon International Airport, it
therefore becomes clear not only that real options can have positive implication for air
transport planning, but also that the proper evaluation of real options strategies can
become commonplace.
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A. APPENDICES
Al. The New Airport Runway Model: A Simple Binomial Lattice
Determining how much runway capacity to construct at a new airport is an important
element for ensuring success. Too little capacity leaves demand un-served; too much
capacity represents waste. Given that the development of traffic over time cannot be
known beforehand with certainty, methods for modeling growth are quite useful. The
binomial lattice provides a simple means of showing the possible traffic levels and the
associated probabilities each.
System Development
Binomial lattices are capable of modeling uncertain trends, so long as those trends may
be assumed to have a constant average rate of growth. Two simplifications underlie the
model. First, lattices assume that the uncertain factor being modeled can change in only
one of two ways - increase or decrease by fixed multiplicative factors - during any given
time increment or period. If the period is small compared to the total length of time being
analyzed, the model provides acceptable results despite its underlying simplification.
Second, lattices assume path independence. Starting from the same period, an increase
followed by a decrease in the uncertain parameter leads to the same result as a decrease
followed by an increase. This requires that the value of the increase factor is the inverse
of the value of the decrease factor, as explained further on.
This set-up leads to the strength of the binomial lattice. Assuming that the system may
only evolve in one of two ways during each period reduces the complexity of the
problem. Moreover, path independence causes the lattice to recombine. Without this
assumption, ten periods with two possible outcomes after each one would lead to some
2^10 possibilities at the end of the analysis. Recombination, however, reduces the total
number of possibilities to 10.
In the case of the New Airport Runway Model, the uncertain factor being considered is
the demand for passenger traffic. Twenty-five periods, with each period representing one
year, are considered. As presented in Figure A-1, a single initial demand (in yellow)
yields twenty-five different possible demand levels (in red) by the end of the analysis.
The lattice presented represents fabricated data for the New Lisbon International Airport
(here referred to as NLA) in Portugal.
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rigure A-I: new airport Kunway iMooel - Sample uemana Lattice
In order to fully consider the development of traffic, a second lattice is required in order
to calculate the probability of each demand state. According to Figures A - 2 and A-3,
the probability of arriving at the highest level of demand in Year 25, 272 million
passengers per year, is highly unlikely. However, there is an 18% chance that 40 million
passengers will require air transportation services (circled in green).
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A2. The New Airport Runway Model: Inputs and Instructions for use
Entries Form A
Entries Form A accepts the user inputs required to create the demand and probability
binomial lattices. Required inputs include initial passenger demand, the average growth
rate of passenger traffic, and the standard deviation in actual year-to-year growth. It also
calculates the increase and decrease factors for both lattices.
Observed Passenger Data
Observed Passenger Data
Default
V[ ]  % of SValue
Initial Demand S = 6000,0 6,000,000 pax
Standard Deviation D = 15.90% 15.0%yr
AverageGrowth Rate R = F. .0% 7.10% %yr
Figure A-3: New Airport Runway Model - Default Passenger Data
The default value of the initial demand used assumes that the New Lisbon International
Airport will serve one-half of the region's forecast traffic upon its opening in 2017. The
average growth rate of 7.10% per year has been derived from sample data from
Washington Dulles International Airport (lAD) during one of its growth periods. IAD
data also provides the standard deviation of yearly rates of growth. Dulles data was used
because it - as presumably NLA will - experienced rapid growth after the introduction of
multiple key carriers. Although the average rate used is less than the current growth
being experienced at Portela, these inputs provide forecasts which closely match those
presumed for the new airport. This can be shown by calculating the expected level of
passenger traffic in Year 22, when NLA is forecast to support 33 million passengers
(BPCC, 2007).
Equation A-1: New Airport Runway Model - Calculation of Expected Passengers per Year
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22
Expected Passengers in Year 22 = (Probabilities I Year 22) * (Demand Levels I Year 22)
Expected Passengers in Year 22= (0.00 * 273) + (0.00 *198) + (0.02 * 144) + (0.05 *105) +.. +
(0.00 *. 132) million passengers
Expected Passengers in Year 22 = 32.6 million passengers
Probability Data
Starting Probability P =
Time Step At =
Discount Rate DR =c? • ,i·i•• i!i• ·i•ii•i•i? ii,¸•l-y ;iM i !i ~i !iiiiiii i• i·•~~~- iii  !"iiii ii  ¸ i "l!•iii,!i \W~!!•i•¸! i• i!
! • i~~~~i!,i•! -4"iii i~i• i Ii• i -•  !!• i ·- •i i~!!i ~ iii•iiii ~i!!!• ,il! i ,ii
1 yr
12 %
I I
Figure A-4: New Airport Runway Model - Additional Default Values
The model further accepts data as to the certainty that the starting demand input is
correct. In this case, the information is assumed to be accurate; the initial demand occurs
with 100% surety. Each time increment is assumed to represent one year. A discount
rate of 12%, which is typical for government applications, is applied to all revenue
estimates.
Finally, Entries Form A calculates the values of the multiplicative increase and decrease
factors which are applied to both the demand and probability lattices.
gure A-5: New Airport Runway Model - Default Lattice Multiplicative Factors
Equation A-2: New Airport Runway Model - Calculation of Lattice Multiplicative Factors
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Additional Terms
Deftault
Value
Growth Rate = v
Volatility = c
Time increment (length of period) = At
Increase Factor = u = e-
Decrease Factor = d = e- -
Probability Increase Factor p = .5+
Probability Decrease Factor = 1 - p
i L L
Entries Form B
Entries Form B allows the user to give information required to calculate airport revenues.
Revenue Streams and Aircraft Mix
Figure A-6: New Airport Runway Model - Default Values for Landing/Parking Fees and Aircraft
Mix
Revenue streams are determined based on a modifiable hypothetical aircraft mix at the
new airport. Using the hypothetical aircraft mix and assumptions as to what percentage
of runway movements are served by each aircraft, the New Airport Runway Model
determines how many landings per year are required in order to serve passenger demand.
Equation A-3: New Airport Runway Model - Calculation of Landings Required
Passenger Demand
Landings Required = arcPassengerDemand
(Average Aircraft Capacity * % Movements Served by Aircraft)
This figure - the number of landings as bounded by the airside capacity - then translates
into a revenue figure. In this case, airside revenue is assumed to compose of landing fees
per metric ton and one hour of parking fees per aircraft only. Default fee values have
been adapted from sample information provided by Cardiff International Airport in the
UK (CWL, 2007). The sample aircraft mix is purely hypothetical.
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Revenues Streams b Aircraft Weight
310TW 310W Landing PrtgFe
,wn max Fees
0 25 31 205
25 200 34 308
200 max 21 513
m e 0 "o too a'crnmd per 24 r or purt thereof
Defeuk value stored m Entries B 0efayuR
Aircraft Mix
Avg. % Revenul
Capacity TOW Movemenft Nevemen
lpaul tIrra [% TOW~l 1$I
B737-500 a1150 526 20.00% $34249
A320-200 162.0 73.9 30.00% $342.49
B757-200 1900 109.3 2000% $342.49
B747-400 382.0 398.3 30.00% 33.53
100.00%
Def.ut vaes stored in Ettres B Qfefaut)
Equation A-4: New Airport Runway Model - Calculation of Revenue per Year
Aircraft Revenue per Landing = Aircraft MTOW * Landing Fee + Parking Fee
Total Revenue = MAX(Landings Required, Runway Capacity)*
Percentage of Movements per Aircraft * Aircraft Revenue per Landing
Runway Data
Finally, the New Airport Runway Model calls for information on runway capital costs,
operating expenditures, and maximum capacities. This data allows for the determination
of net income calculations.
IRunway 2 I
Default values assume that each runway can support approximately 95,000 landings in a
given year, thereby serving some 21 million passengers per annum given the input
parameters. This data correlates closely with actual traffic values at London/Stansted
Airport (LTN), which serves nearly 24 million passengers per year using a single runway.
Runway 1 is opened in Year 1 of airport operation by default. This value is fixed. The
input value regarding opening Runway 2 is also Year 1. This value is also fixed.
However, the New Airport Runway Model determines the best year to operationalize
Runway 2.
Capital costs are repaid in equal increments over twenty-five years regardless of when the
runway comes online. Operating costs are assumed to be US $3 million per year.
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Free Calc
The "Free Calc" tab, using the default data input in Entries Forms A and B, determines
the best year to construct a second runway given the total set of probable demand levels.
Further, it allows the user to directly vary in what year Runway 2 is opened. This user
input is accepted in the white cell shown in Figure A-7. Choosing to operationalize
Runway 2 after Period 25 has no effect on the model; it simulates a scenario in which the
second runway is not constructed at all.
Second Runway
Period Operationalized 26
MovementsRunway 95,000
Cost/Runway ($) 200,000,000
Payback Time (yrs) 25
Capital CostsAnnum 8,000,000
Operating Costs ($) 3,000,000
Figure A-7: New Airport Runway Model -Free Calc Sample Input
Quick Results
The "Free Calc" tab is divided into several areas. The first division presents quick results
regarding the value of the Airside as a function of the user input data. Further, it suggests
the best year to open the second runway in order to maximize profit and passengers
served.
Quick Results: GraphicalRepmeetatione & In t ion
If Runway 2 is constructed in Period 26, Airside Value = $ 35 million.
To Maximize Profit, Build in Period 18.
To Maximize Pax Served, Build in Period 9.
Figure A-8: New Airport Runway Model - Sample Results
Basic Binomial Lattices
The second division reproduces the binomial lattices which calculate total passenger
demand and the probability of each.
Construction Limited Lattices
The third division applies Equations A-3 to the demand lattice in order to determine the
total number of landings required to serve the passenger demand and the actual
passengers served given capacity limitations. Figure A-9 presents the lattice showing the
actual number of passengers served. Reddened cells indicate that the total number of
passengers served, given only one runway, is limited by airside capacity.
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Revenue Development
The fourth division applies Equations A-4 to show the expected revenue associated with
each level of passenger demand and the expected value of revenue in each year.
Further, this division calculates the total expected value of the airside system over
twenty-five years. This value is presented in the first cell.
The airside value is calculated by working backwards through the lattice. The last
column of cells presents actual revenues associated with each possible level of demand in
the last period. Each preceding cell presents the sum of the probability weighted revenue
of the next year and the revenue provided by the level of demand corresponding to that
cell.
Equation A-5 presents the calculation, using Figures A-10 and A-i 1 as an example.
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$ 24,090
$ 24,090 $ 24,090
$24,090 $24,090$ 24,090 $ 24,090$ 24,090 $ 24,090$ 24,090 $ 24,090
$24,090 $24,090
$ 19,253 $ 24,090
$11,333 $14,979
$ 5,571 $ 8,223
$ 1,378 $3,308
$ 1,673 $268
$3,892 $2,871
$5,507 $4,764
$6,683 $6,142
$71538 $.7,144$ 8,160 $ 71873
$8,612 $8,404
$8,942 $.8,790
$9,181 $19,071,
$9,356 $9,275
$9,483 $9,424
$9,575 $9,532
$9,611
Figure A-10: Revenue Development
IYear24 Year 251i
Equation A-5: Calculation of Airside Values
Value (Year 24, Cell 1) = Prob_up * Revenue(Year 25, Cell 1) + Prob_down * Revenue (Year 25, Cell 2)
+ Revenue (Year 24, Cell 1) [k$]
Value (Year 24, Cell 1) =.72 * 21,412 +.28 * $21,412 + .$24,090 [k$]
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Yer 24 Year 25
$40,529 $21,412
S$21,412
$40,529 $ 21,412
$40,529 $21,412! -$33,441 $21,412
$ 6,629 $ 5,545
$1,622 $630
$11,993 $5,549
$21,281 $11,083
$21,930 $111469
.$22,401 $11,750
$22,994 $12,103
$ 23,176 $12,211$ 12,290
Figure A-11: Airside Value
r$24,09 124,090I
Expected Value Lattices
The fifth division gives the probability-weighted number of passengers served at each
level of demand.
Equation A-6: Calculation of Expected Passengers Served
Graphical Representations and Interpretations
Finally, the last division provides advice regarding the best year to open the second
runway in order to maximize the expected passengers served and expected airside value.
The New Airport Runway Model will always suggest constructing a second runway as
soon as the possibility of capacity-limitations exists. However, the year-to-open in order
to maximize revenue considers all possible growth rates and probabilities.
No Expansion Calc
The "No Expansion Calc" tab replicates the values in the "Free Calc" tab assuming that
the second runway is never constructed.
Expansion Calc
The "Expansion Calc" tab replicates the values in the "Free Calc" tab assuming that the
second runway is operationalized during the first period, Year 1.
Option Calc
The "Option Calc" tab determines the value of the option to expand when the demand
level and probability of increased revenue require it. This calculation requires three
lattices. The first lattice replicates the determination of airside value in the "No
Expansion Calc" tab; it assumes that a second runway is never completed. The second
lattice replicates the determination of airside value in the "Expansion Calc" tab.
Finally, the third lattice is created by comparing the values in each cell of the preceding
two, starting with the column in the final period, Year 25. At each preceding cell, the
Runway Model determines whether having a second runway would increase the net
income. If so, the Runway Model assumes that the runway is opened. Figures A-12
through A-14 illustrate. A-14 shows instances where it is best to open a second runway
in green.
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E(Passengers Served I Year x, Cell y)= Probability (Year x, Cell y) *
Min (Airside Capacity in passengers, Passenger Demand I Year x, Cell y)
YeOW9 IYer I Year Yemr12 1 V*13 1Yer14 Yawr I yowl
All values in millions of dollars.
AN values in present dollars for that year.
ragure A-I2: new Airport Kunway Model - Airside Value without 2" Runway
Figure A-13: New Airport
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Expected Value Lattices
The fifth division gives the probability-weighted number of passengers served at each
level of demand.
Equation A-6: Calculation of Expected Passengers Served
Graphical Representations and Interpretations
Finally, the last division provides advice regarding the best year to open the second
runway in order to maximize the expected passengers served and expected airside value.
The New Airport Runway Model will always suggest constructing a second runway as
soon as the possibility of capacity-limitations exists. However, the year-to-open in order
to maximize revenue considers all possible growth rates and probabilities.
No Expansion Calc
The "No Expansion Calc" tab replicates the values in the "Free Cale" tab assuming that
the second runway is never constructed.
Expansion Calc
The "Expansion Calc" tab replicates the values in the "Free Calc" tab assuming that the
second runway is operationalized during the first period, Year 1.
Option Calc
The "Option Calc" tab determines the value of the option to expand when the demand
level and probability of increased revenue require it. This calculation requires three
lattices. The first lattice replicates the determination of airside value in the "No
Expansion Calc" tab; it assumes that a second runway is never completed. The second
lattice replicates the determination of airside value in the "Expansion Calc" tab.
Finally, the third lattice is created by comparing the values in each cell of the preceding
two, starting with the column in the final period, Year 25. At each preceding cell, the
Runway Model determines whether having a second runway would increase the net
income. If so, the Runway Model assumes that the runway is opened. Figures A-12
through A-14 illustrate. A-14 shows instances where it is best to open a second runway
in green.
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E(Passengers Served I Year x, Cell y) = Probability (Year x, Cell y) *
Min (Airside Capacity in passengers, Passenger Demand I Year x, Cell y)
Year9 IYearlO Year11 IYearI12 jYearw13 jYear14 IYear15 Yearo16
pear 24 [Ye25$252$ 194
$137
$8$45
$13
$ 11
$43
All values in millions of dollars.
All values in present dollars for that year.
iF gure A-14: New Airport Runway Model - Airside Value with Option to Expand
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trends governing low-cost and network carriers in the airport region, and the overall
strength of the air transportation industry in Portugal. Modeling each of these
possibilities in a decision tree would quickly yield a "messy bush" wherein the number of
individual nodes grows exponentially with each new building alternative or chance
outcome. Some simplifications are required.
In order to limit complexity, the New Airport Terminal Model considers only two major
uncertainties. Correspondingly, it allows for two points at which airport planners and
managers may make build decisions critical to airport success. Twenty-five years of
airport operations, broken down into a ten year increment (Period I) and a 15 year
increment immediately following (Period II) are modeled. The following subsections
describe each period in detail. Figure A-i encapsulates the concepts graphically.
Period minLaefme Ucertain Design Decision
0 - 10 years Customer typed served
International or Domestic? How to build.
Low cost or network?
Short haul or long haul?
10-15 years Traffic Growth Rate
Low, medium, or high traftic growth? How to buildLevel of competition from other modes? build.
Figure A-15: New Airport Terminal Model - Period Specific Details
Period I: Who will provide the majority of New Airport traffic?
During the first twenty years since the airport's opening, Period I, the New Airport
Terminal Model examines uncertainty regarding which group will provide for the
majority of airport traffic. The Terminal Model assumes that only two major possibilities
exist. This assumption matches well with normal airport dichotomies: traffic is often
either international or domestic, direct or transfer, low-cost or network, etc. Although the
user may select any combination, the following description assumes that competition
between low-cost carriers and traditional network carriers will provide the most
important uncertainty at the new airport. This also holds true for the Lisbon Airport
Scenario presented in Chapter 5.
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1. LCC Dominate
Build Ota P
2. NC Dominate
p-1
Figure A-16: Period I Chance Outcomes
Thus, given that The New Lisbon International Airport is constructed, the airport will
either primarily serve low-cost carriers with probability, p, or network carriers with
probability (p-i). The two chance outcomes imply very different revenue streams and
cost structures for the airport.
Table A-1: Description of Chance Outcomes
Chance Event Assumption
1. LCC Dominate 1. Low cost carriers become the dominant air
transport service providers in and out of Europe.
2. The power of the Portuguese national carrier is
curtailed.
2. NC Dominate 1. The current power of the network carriers in
Portugal and around Europe is maintained
2. Portugal's national carrier and other network
carriers dominate traffic in and out of NLA airport.
3. The power of the low-cost carrier is curtailed.
LCC Dominate (Outcome 1)
This chance outcome assumes that low-cost carriers become the dominant air
transportation service providers throughout Europe and, subsequently, for Portugal. It
thereby simulates the reduction in influence of the European network carriers and of
Portugal's national carrier, TAP. This outcome would concur with predictions as to the
continued growth of the low-cost carrier throughout Europe (Mercer, 2002, among
others). Further, Outcome 1 may be construed as accounting for the real possibility that
NLA could provide a prime candidate for low-cost service by allowing LCC to bypass
the more crowded Portela airport when flying passengers into Lisbon in the years before
Portela is slated to close. Given this outcome, NLA airport will prove most successful if
it is constructed to suit the needs of the low-cost carrier.
NC Dominate (Outcome 2)
This chance outcome assumes that a situation more similar to the status quo, wherein the
national carrier and larger network carriers dominate transportation at Portela airport,
continues at NLA airport. Given this outcome, The New Lisbon International Airport
will prove most successful if it is constructed to the specifications of the network carriers.
Construction Alternatives
The New Airport Terminal Model provides airport planners with three separate
construction alternatives at the beginning of Period I. Appropriate use of the Terminal
Model assumes that each alternative is keyed to handling uncertainties regarding the type
of traffic served by the airport. Again, the description below assumes that the primary
uncertainty deals with the competition between low-cost and traditional network carriers.
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However, users can modify the Terminal Model to represent several different
possibilities.
1. LCC Dominate-,
A. Build Big for NC p2. NC Dominate
1-p1. LCC Dominate
Build Ota B. Build Big for LCC p
2. NC Dominate
i-p
1. LCC Dominate
B. Build for Both
2. NC Dominate
i-p
Figure A-17: Period I Alternatives and Chance Outcomes
Figure A-17 reveals three possible construction alternatives which airport designers may
choose without prior knowledge of which chance outcome - LCC dominate or NC
dominate - will come to pass. These alternatives match those modeled in the Lisbon
Airport Scenario presented in Chapter 5. The alternatives are either building a large
airport akin to Portela to support the network carriers (A), building a large airport to
accommodate mainly low-cost carriers (B), or to delay the decision on which group of
carriers to support by building a smaller airport to support both in the short run (C). The
Terminal Model assumes that the chance outcome is unaffected by this choice during the
first period. This assumption is not without merit; if the primary uncertainty is which
carrier-type will dominate European air travel, it is unlikely that the construction of a
single airport in Portugal would have a significant impact on the resolution of that
question on a Europe-wide level.
Alternative C, constructing a smaller airport meant to host both LCC and NC, represents
two real options concepts. First, it allows planners to defer their decisions on which
carrier to build for. Second, it espouses the principle of incremental development by
stressing the gradual development of the facility.
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Table A-2: Description of Period I Alternatives
Alternative Name Description
A. Build Big for NC 1. Large NC-focused facility comparable to Portela
2. Bulk of facility built immediately
B. Build Big for LCC 1. Large LCC-focused facility
2. Built to accommodate a surge of LCC traffic (and
the decline of the national carrier) in Portugal
3. Bulk of facility built immediately
C. Build for Both NC and 1. Smaller facility
LCC 2. Partially designed to accommodate moderate
growth in network carriers at NLA
3. Partially designed to accommodate moderate
growth in low-cost carriers at NLA
Build Big for Network Carriers (Alternative A)
Given this alternative, NLA is constructed with the capacity required to support traffic in
the case that the current, network-carrier dominated traffic flows observed at Portela
airport are maintained. This design is therefore best suited to Outcome 1, wherein the
network carriers continue to determine Portuguese air transportation and continue to
develop at today's rate of growth. Conversely, this alternative would falter given
explosive growth of low-cost carriers and the decline of network carriers in Portugal.
This is an artifact of terminal design; experiential data show that terminals designed
primarily for the use of network carriers do not often prove optimum for attracting low-
cost airlines. Therefore, if network carriers in Portugal falter, an airport built in this
fashion may find it difficult to recover losses by seeking out greater LCC patronage.
Build Big for Low-Cost Carriers (Alternative B)
Alternative B presents the possibility of constructing NLA airport primarily to serve the
LCC customer. The airport terminal would thus be best suited to accommodate the rapid
growth of low-cost carriers accompanied by relatively small network carrier activity.
Possible construction features would therefore include simple terminals with rapid-check
in facilities (perhaps through decentralization), adequate but not ornate retail facilities,
minimalist lounges, inexpensive surface access, and the spare capacity for rapid growth.
Other features may include monetary support for promotional events, joint marketing,
and a reduced emphasis on high-tech gate access. As a result, airport owners would
likely experience significant cost savings in the construction of the terminal compared to
Alternative A. Possible disadvantages to this alternative, however, would become
apparent if the network carriers remained dominant (Outcome 2). In that case, NLA
would likely find it difficult to attract the level of participation from network carriers that
would be necessary to recover losses incurred during construction.
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Buildfor Both LCC & NC (Alternative C)
In contrast to Alterative A and Alternative B, Alternative B suggests that designers
construct the airport without assumption as to which outcome (LCC dominant or NC
dominant) is most likely. Rather, airport designers could construct a smaller facility
meant to accommodate either low-cost carriers or network carriers for a short period of
time, effectively deferring the decision as to which group of air carriers would prove the
most important in the future. Such a course, however, assumes that a degree of multi-
functionality is constructed into the facility and that the airport planners ensure that the
terminal could be expanded as need be in future.
System Development: Period II
Period II: How rapidly will NLA 's air traffic develop over the next 15 years?
In Period II, which lasts from Year 10 to Year 25 of airport operation, the main cause of
concern for airport operators is the development of traffic at the New Lisbon
International Airport. This development may depend on several external factors,
including the economic development of Portugal and the Lisbon region relative to other
areas worldwide, trends in fuel prices, the development of competing transportation
modes such as road and rail, and the preference for face-to-face rather than internet
communication for business transactions. More locally, the ability of the Portuguese
government to close Portela and to transfer its traffic to the new airport - a task which
has proven difficult in several similar situations worldwide - could also have a significant
impact on the long term growth rate NLA.
This aggregation of different chance outcomes highlights a strength of decision trees
relative to binomial lattice models. Whereas the development of a binomial lattice
requires assumptions regarding the growth rate of traffic over the total lifetime of the
airport, the decision tree model can accommodate step changes in that growth rate
resulting from a series of unpredictable factors. As a result, users operating the New
Airport Terminal Model may choose to replicate the effect of any combination of events
on traffic growth.
Figure A-18: Period HI Chance Outcomes
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3. High Growth
p 3
Period I T4. Medium Growth
p4
5. Low Growth
p5= -p3-p4
 -18: Period H Chance Outcomes
For the purposes of the Lisbon Airport Scenario, the plausible growth rates at the New
Lisbon International Airport have been aggregated to represent high growth, which
occurs with probability p3, medium growth (p4), and low growth (p5) in Figure A-18.
Table A-3: Description of Period H Chance Outcomes
Chance Event Description
4. High Growth 1. Exceptional economic development in Portugal
2. NLA develops to become a major regional airport
5. Medium Growth 1. Baseline economic development in Portugal
2. NLA growth rates slightly below trends at Portela
6. Low Growth 1. Low economic development in Portugal/Europe
2. Traffic slow to develop at NLA
Construction Alternatives
As in Period I, the New Airport Terminal Model allows the user to replicate construction
alternatives at the beginning of Period II. However, in this case, capacity changes are
more limited; the user only has two alternatives from which to choose. Of course, the
Terminal Model assumes that these alternatives correlate with attempts to handle
uncertainties surrounding traffic growth (low, medium, or high growth) in Period II. In
order to add additional flexibility, however, the Terminal Model will accept different
capacity alternatives depending on the outcome of Period I. For instance, in the case of
the Lisbon Airport Scenario - in which either LCC or NC may dominate in Period I - the
Terminal Model will allow the user different build choices for LCC-dominant and NC-
dominant scenarios. Given that LCC are dominant, the Model assumes that the airport
operator expands in order to serve the LCC customer; otherwise, the Model assumes that
the operator expands in order to serve the network carriers.
1. LCC Dominate
p
Period I
2. NC Dominate
I-p
D. Build Big for LCC
E. Build Small for LCC
D. Build Big for NC
E. Build Small for NC
Figure A-19: Period II Alternatives
The Lisbon Airport Scenario in Chapter 5, for instance, presumes that airport operators
either opt for large or small expansions to the airport terminal facilities. Figure A-19
illustrates the shape of a section of the decision tree after Period I assuming this setup.
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Table A-4: Description of Period H Alternatives
Alternative Name Description
D. Build Big 1. Major increase in the size of the facility
2. Assumes increase primarily serves the dominant
traffic type (LCC or NC)
E. Build Small 1. Minor increase in the size of the facility
2. Assumes increase primarily serves the dominant
traffic type (LCC or NC)
Build Big
Within the context of the Lisbon Airport Scenario, the Build Big alternative corresponds
to a large increase in capacity. The capacity increase can serve multiple purposes. For
instance, choosing to support a large capacity increase can correct for under-development
(or incorrect development) in Period I or simply prepare the airport facility for positive
traffic forecasts. In the case of the latter, Build Big should serve the airport best given
high rates of traffic growth. However, it will likely result in waste if the rate of traffic
growth is either low or negative.
Build Small
Referring again to the Lisbon Airport Scenario, the Build Small choice is best suited to
situations in which the current airport capacity is sufficient for the current and forecast
levels of traffic. If the capacity developed in Period I is insufficient or if passenger
demand is expected to outstrip airport capacity however, building small would force the
airport to surrender an opportunity for increased size, importance, and profit.
Period II Growth Rate and Correlation with Period I
In order to better replicate conditions within the air transport industry, the New Airport
Terminal Model allows the user to enter Period II growth rates which differ depending on
the outcome of Period I. The Lisbon Airport Scenario, which considers the possibility
that LCC may come to dominate the European domestic market, encounters the necessity
of this flexibility. A great deal of research within Europe shows that low-cost carriers are
growing at rates far outstripping their legacy counterparts. Therefore, an LCC dominant
air transport market may well grow at a different rate than an NC dominant market.
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Low Cost Altnetr
Chartaw Airines
Exhibit 1 Projected Change in Intra-European Passenger
Airline Market Shares, 2000.2010
S%
20%
60% Network
(Internationaikegi-nal)
2000 2010
$Qorwv. AtA tATA Mwru onelph.
Figure A-20: LCC growth rates surpass those of NC (Mercer, 2002)
System Development: Full Decision Tree
The following figures present the full New Airport Terminal Model decision tree as
designed for the Lisbon Airport Scenario.
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A4. The New Airport Terminal Model: Inputs and Instructions for use
The New Airport Terminal Model requires several simple inputs in order to determine
which decision path maximizes the net present value of the airport being considered
within a twenty-five year period. This section details what inputs are required and where
they may be toggled in the Terminal Model. As such, this section is meant to serve as a
guide to users wishing to conduct further sample runs. Further, the section also describes
default inputs; these defaults were used in the Lisbon Airport Scenario unless otherwise
stated.
Entries Form A
Entries Form A, the first tab in the Microsoft ExcelC driven terminal decision tree model,
accepts user inputs as to the probability of the various chance events accounted for by the
model.
Period I Probabilities
PERIOD 1: THE FIRST 10 YEARS
Event Default Value DiscountRabte 0.12
1 LCC dominant P= 5.00 65.00%
2 NC dominant (1-P)=  .0  36.00%
Figure A-24: New Airport Terminal Model - Default Period I Probabilities
The New Airport Terminal Model's default values assume that low-cost carriers will
come to dominate the European aviation industry (within the first few years after the
airport's opening) with a 65% probability. This value has been selected in order to pay
service to several predictions of ongoing LCC growth; it is not, however, assumed to be a
definitively correct assumption.
A discount rate of 12%, which is common to government projects, is used.
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Period II Probabilities
PERIOD II: THE REMAINING 15 YEARS
LCC Dominant
Given Decision: Build Small (E), LCC Dominant (1)
Event Assumnd Probablit Default Value
3 High Growth LE3= 00% 35.00%
4 Med Growth LE4 = 5000% 50.00%
5 Low Growth LE5 = 1500%
Total 100% 100%
Figure A-25: New Airport Terminal Model - Default Period II Probabilities I LCC Dominant
NC Dominant
Figure A-zb: New Airport Terminal Model - Default Ieriod UI Irobabilities I NC Dominant
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Default probabilities for high, medium, and low growth over Period II are assumed in the
absence of detailed market data. As Figures A-25 and A-26 illustrate, medium growth
patterns are the most likely. Further, the probability of high, medium, or low growth,
though affected by events in Period I (what type of traffic is most important at the
airport), has no dependence and by decisions on how to build in Period II.
The Lisbon Airport Scenario deviates from the default values already shown. Rather, the
input values used are modified in an attempt to represent experiential data garnered from
across Europe. Sample airports such as Frankfurt-Hahn (HHN) have borne out a simple
principle: traffic development at new airports will likely not prove independent of
decisions on how to build the airport (especially for LCC customers), as the Terminal
Model presumes in Period I. Rather, the decision to cater specifically to low-cost carriers
does help determine the probability of rapid traffic growth due to the entrance of players
such as Ryanair or easyJet, a phenomenon which could be repeated at new airports in
Portugal. Further, research suggests that LCC prefer serving airports with the additional
capacity required to support rapid expansion; those airports are therefore more likely to
benefit from the high-growth rates often accompanying LCC patronage (Barrett, 2004).
Being cognizant of this dynamic, the Lisbon Airport Scenario's input values reflect some
dependence both on the type of traffic which has come to dominate and on how much
free capacity is provided for expansion. Therefore, airports with larger capacities are
more likely to attract new airlines and their associated traffic. This effect is more
pronounced with low-cost carriers, as research suggests that spare capacity is a top
priority for these airlines (Warnock-Smith, 2005).
LCC Dominant NC Dominant
Figure A-27: Lisbon Airport Scenario - Period II Probability Values
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Given Decision: Build Big (D), LCC Dominant (1)
Event Assun-ad Deufalt Value
3 High Growth LD3 = 40.00% 35.00%
4 Med. Growth LD4 = 600% 50.00%
Total l% 100%
Given Decision: Build Big (D). NC Dominant (2)
Event Asayued Probabi Default Value
3 Hi Growth N03 = 23.0 15.00%
4 Med. Growth ND4= 57.0 50.00%
SLow Growth ND5 = 20.0% 35.00%
Total 100% 100%
Given Decision: Build Small (E), NC Dominant (2)
Event Assumed Probabilt Deault Value
3 High Growth NE3 = 10.00% 15.00%
4 Med Growth NE4 = 45.00% 50.00%
5 Low Growth NE5 = 45.% 35.00%
Total 100%
-- -
Entries Form B
Airport Capacity
Entries Form B, the second tab in the Microsoft ExcelC workbook, allows the user to
change the size of each airport construction alternative in terms of passengers served per
year. Demand is generally assumed to be divided into two non-overlapping categories.
This is a simplification; in certain cases, passenger types can and do overlap (with
domestic and international travelers being a notable exception). However, the
assumption of separation should prove suitable for preliminary analyses.
The input form accepts data regarding construction for Period I under the heading "Initial
Capacities (people)". Non-positive capacities yield erroneous results. Inputs regarding
construction for Period II are accepted under the heading "Capacity Increases (people)".
Here, negative values carry a specific meaning regarding the switching of spaces.
110= W40
'igure A-25: New Airport TIerminal Model - Default Construction Alternatives
Within the context of the Lisbon Airport Scenario, the separate demand types are low-
cost and network carrier passengers. As a result of the non-overlap assumption, these
passenger groups are modeled as being entirely exclusive. As such, capacity designed to
service low-cost carriers cannot service passengers flying on low-cost airlines. The
converse is also true: passengers on network carriers cannot be accommodated with
facilities for low-cost carriers. Although this separation is not necessary, research has
noted that both low-cost airlines and low-cost passengers tend to desire different services
from their terminals.
capackes
Initial Ca ts
Decision LC .N
&. Big NC 2,000,000 00050000,
S. ftg LCC 281000 2,000C. Small O18 5,000,2ff 3,0000
rigure A-29: New Airport I erminal Model - Sample Capacity Inputs with Switching
Referring back to the concept of switching terminal spaces from one use to another, a
negative value in the square highlighted in Figure A-29, for instance, means the
following:
* Build Big (LCC) - LCC proved dominant in Period I
171
I
* Build Big (LCC) - The model will consider this a large capacity increase
and use the associated probabilities. This has no effect given
default values.
* -5,000,000 - The capacity for 5 million people will be switched from the
NC use to the LCC carrier.
It should be noted that the default values used in the thesis' Lisbon Airport Scenario
result from forecasts internally generated by the model.
Traffic Development
Growth Rates & Demand I Chance Event
Period 1: The First 10 years
Chance Event LCC Demand NC Demand LCC Growth NC Growth
1.LCCd. 200001 2,0011 50. 20 .00O
2. NC dom. _ 20_02q0 200,000 20.00_ 40.00%
Period 11: The Next 15 Years
i ominant inant
LCC Growth NC Growth LCC Growth NC Growth
High Growth 12.00% 8.00% 3 High Growth 12.00%
Med. Growth 9.00 6.00% 4 4 Med. Growth 6.00% 9.00%
Low Groth5. 4.00% 5 5 Low Growth 4.00% 5.00%
Figure A-30: New Airport Terminal Model - Default Growth Rates
Model users further have the ability to define initial traffic levels as well as growth rates
for different customer types. In order for the model to function, initial demand levels
must be positive and non-zero. Default values provide for an arbitrarily selected 200,000
passengers a year in each of the two non-overlapping categories; this input provides a
lower bound for airport traffic, barring negative growth rates17 . The Lisbon Airport
Scenario uses slightly higher base demand, at 275,000 per category. This value allows
for the expected value of passenger traffic at Year 22 to match actual predictions for the
New Lisbon International Airport.
Default growth rates derive from various sources. Period I growth in low-cost and
network carrier growth in Period I, for instance, loosely mirror events at the relatively
new facilities at Frankfurt-Hahn and Hong Kong International (HKG), respectively.
These values are slightly below the current experience at Lisbon Portela Airport.
However, given the volatility of new airports in multi-airport systems, this reduction in
average growth is not unlikely. Indeed, it may well be generous. Period II growth rates,
on the other hand, derive from data available on Frankfurt-Hahn and Denver International
Airport (DIA); medium growth rates roughly mirror nominal industry growth as provided
by Eurocontrol (Aguado, 2006).
17 Users wishing to employ negative growth rates must be cautious; the Terminal Model is not designed to
screen out negative passenger levels which may result from negative growth.
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Airport Revenues
Figure A-31: New Airport Terminal Model - Default Revenue Structure
The Model determines costs and revenues based on the size of capacity increments and
the development of traffic as described by the user inputs.
Revenue calculations rely on user estimates as to the average revenue obtained per
customer. Different values may be assumed for LCC and NC passengers, as low-cost
customers and airlines tend to pay significantly less in airport fees than their network
carrier counterparts. Average revenue per passenger values derive from Munich Franz
Josef Strauss International (MUC) and Frankfurt Hahn (HHN) airports for NC and LCC
passengers, respectively.
Airport costs, meanwhile, are determined using a simple computation, as described in
Equation A-7. Average capital costs for network carriers and low-cost carriers come
from various sources while average maintenance costs per person are available from the
World Bank (Gannon, 1995). Although there is evidence to suggest that low-cost
terminals enjoy lower maintenance costs, no data was available on the savings; therefore,
this phenomenon remains unaccounted for in the Terminal Model. For calculation
purposes, the Terminal Model assumes that maintenance costs are paid on a yearly basis
at the beginning of the year; capital costs are paid out over the period currently being
examined (Period I or Period II) in equal increments. All costs and revenues are
discounted to net present values in the final value calculations.
Equation A-7: Airport Costs
Total Capital Cost = (Capital Cost/m 2 )* Airport Size
Total Maintenance Cost = (Maintenance Cost/P erson)* Passengers-Served
Airport Sizing
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U I
Given information on how many passengers designers wish to serve, the New Airport
Terminal Model independently determines the size of the facilities required as a function
of desired passenger capacity, design service standards for the network and low-cost
carriers, and average dwell time. Each of these values must be input by the user. Default
values, however, were determined using data from London Heathrow Airport (LHR) and
other experiential data.
In airport planning, the peak capacity of an airport is usually estimated using a series of
conversion factors in order to calculate peak capacity based on the busiest day of the
year. This information is simply unavailable for new airports like New Lisbon
International, as the airport has not yet opened. Therefore, the model accepts a single
input, the peak hour conversion factor, to convert the total desired passenger capacity into
an estimate of peak traffic. The size of the terminal (m2) required is thus determined as
in Equation A-8.
Equation A-8: Calculating Airport Size
Terminal Size (m2) = Peak Hour Passengers * Dwell Time * Design Service Standard
Peak Hour Passengers = Peak Capacity * Peak Hour Conversion Factor
As per normal airport planning techniques, the terminal is sized to fit the number of
passengers in the building at any particular moment during the year's busiest hour. Each
passenger is then assigned a certain amount of space, the design service standard.
Forecasts Tab
Although real options thinking generally condones a reduced dependence on forecasting,
it is quite clear that forecasts must remain an important part of the airport planning
process. In light of this, the New Airport Terminal Model internally produces forecasts
and presents them in their own tab; these numbers are intended to help the user
appropriately size construction projects at the beginning of Periods I and II.
The forecasting methodology is simple. The Model assumes that, given an initial
passenger demand, the growth rate during each Period remains constant. Equation A-9
provides a sample calculation using the default values as highlighted in Figure A-33.
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Growth Rates & Demand I Chance Event
Period I: The First 10 years
Pedod II: The Next 15 Years
Hi G th 12.00% 8.00% 3 High Growth 8.0 12.00%
9.00% 6.00% 4 4 Md 6.00% 9.00%
Growth5.00% 4.00%5 Low Goth 4.00%1 5.00%
Figure A-33: New Airport Terminal Model - Forecasting Sample Inputs
Equation A-9: Terminal Model - Sample Forecasting Result
I f'1r' hf m;,,--
Period II Forecasts: Traffic
NC Dominant
d II Forecasts: Traffic at Yr 25
ew Airport Terminal
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NC Demand (Yr 10) = NC Demand (Yr 0) * (1 + NC Growth Rate (Yr 0)) 9
NC Demand (Yr 251 NC Dominant) = NC Demand (Yr 10) * (1 +NC Growth Rate (Yr 10))14
NC Demand (Yr 10) = 200,000 * (1 +.4)9
NC Demand (Yr 10) = 4,132,209= 4 million passengers
NC Demand (Yr 251 NC Dominant) = 4,132,209 * (1+. 12))14
NC Demand (Yr 25) = 22,617,920 = 23 million passengers
Lisbon Airport Scenario Forecasts
Forecasts in the Lisbon Airport Scenario differ from those in the Terminal Model's
default state due to higher initial demand inputs. Figure A-35 illustrates. The user may
note that the expected value of passenger traffic in Year 22 (2039, assuming that NLA
opens in 2017) is approximately 33 million passengers assuming that no additional
construction occurs in Period II (Build Small). This is meant to match current NLA
forecasts (BPCC, 2007).
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SIMPLE FORECASTS
c at Yr 10 I
Period II Forecasts: Traffic at Yr 25
FORECAST CHECK
Forecast Check: E (Yr 22 Demand)
Forecast Check: E (Yr 22 Demand)
re A-J5: Lisbon Airport Scenario - Forecasts
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Calculator Tab
The Calculator Tab calculates the net present value (NPV) of decisions in Period I only.
The user can toggle which construction alternative is being considered by editing the
number and letter values in the highlighted cells. Changing the values in these cells will
cause the Calculator tab to show calculations distinct to that combination of Period I
construction choice and chance event. Table A-5 and Figure A-36 remind the user which
letters and numbers correspond to Period I decisions and events in the Lisbon Airport
Scenario. Changing the values in the highlighted cells has no bearing on the operation of
the New Airport Terminal Model; rather, this functionality is designed only to allow the
user to explore individual scenarios in detail.
PERIOD I: THE FIRST 10 YEARS
Altemative B Insert A - C
Chance Event 21 Insert 1 - 2
Initial Capacity 28,000,000 ,2,000,000 pax
Initial Demand 200,000 200,000 pax
Growth Rate 0.2 0.4 pax/yr
Figure A-36: New Airport Terminal Model - Sample Period I Calculator Tab Inputs
Table A-5: New Airport Terminal Model - Period I Calculator Tab Inputs
Alternatives Chance Outcomes
A Build Big for NC 1 LCC Dominant
B Build Big for LCC 2 NC Dominant
C Build for Both
For the convenience of the user, the Calculator tab presents independent computations
broken down by passenger type. For the Model default state, this represents LCC and
NC customers. Figure A-36 shows the calculations for the first three of ten years in
Period I. The first group of rows presents information on the available LCC capacity in
terms of passengers served and actual physical size of LCC terminal facilities. The
second group of rows gives the actual LCC passenger demand and passengers served.
The number of passengers served is bounded by the actual capacity of the facility. Rows
thereafter describe airport revenue streams per year. Terminal capital costs are paid in
equal increments starting in Year 0, the year before the airport begins serving customers.
Finally, the net-present value of the facility is provided per customer type.
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LCC Capacity and Revenue Development
Year 0 1 2 3
LCC Capacities (thousands)
LCC Capacity (people) 28,000 28,000 28,000 28,000
LCC Capacity (size) 933 933 933 933
LCC Demand (kpeople)
LCC Demand 200 240 288
LCC Served 200 240 288
LCC Capital Costs $135,758 $135,758 $135,758 $135,758
LCC Ops/Maintenance $600 $720 $864
LCC Income $3,200 $3,840 $4,608
LCC Cashflow $135,758 $133,158 $132,638 $132,014
Overall DCF (LCC Costs) $135,758 $121,748 $108,799 $97,245
Overall DCF (LCC Total) $135,758 $118,891 $105,738 $93,965
NPV(LCC Costs) I Period 1 Pk$] $910,270
Figure A-37: New Airport Terminal Model - Example Calculator Tab
Aggregated data for the entire facility as constructed in Period I is presented in a series of
Microsoft ExcelC data tables at the bottom of the tab, as demonstrated in Figure A-37.
The overall cost shown provides a summation of capital and maintenance costs. This
result, of course, depends on a combination of the decisions and chance events in Period
I. According to the figure, for instance, if planners build an airport designed for NC but
LCC come to dominate the market (Al, as highlighted for reader ease), airport costs
come to US $814 million. Total cash-flow, which includes income from passenger fees,
however is US $675 million.
Overall Results
NPV(Overall Costs) I Period I [k$j Alternatives
AB C
1 $814,183 $1,034,737 $338,769
2 $815,232 $1,021,594 $330,486
NPV(Overall Cashflow) I Period I [k$] Alternatives
A B C
1 $675,087 $837,129 $155,737
2 $656,728 $884,559 $179,273
I(NPV (v'Mrnll C.•hflnur I Parind I -tlI
B C
$668,662 $853,730 $163,975
rigure A-38: new Airporn ierminai iviooe - Sample reriod I Calculator Kesults
Finally, the Calculator tab shows the New Airport Terminal Model's calculation of the
expected value of each construction decision given Period I only. This value is the sum
of the products of the probabilities of each chance event and their corresponding net
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present value. The expected net present value of building for NC (A), then, is as
presented in Equation A-10, using default values in the New Airport Terminal Model.
Equation A-10: New Airport Terminal Model - Sample Period I Computation
E(NPV I A) = Pr (1) * Cashflow (A 1) + Pr (2) * Cashflow (A2)
E(NPV I A) = 65% * (-$675 million)+ 35% * (-$657 million)
E(NPV I A) = -$669 million
Calculator2 Tabs
The remaining Calculator tabs calculate the net present values for each available
alternative in Period II. These net present values represent the total value of the airport in
25 years. As before, the user can toggle which construction alternative is presented on
the screen by editing the values in the highlighted cells. Table A-6 recaps the
combinations as used in the Lisbon Airport Scenario.
Table A-6: New Airport Terminal Model - Period II Calculator Tab Inputs
Alternatives Chance Outcomes
D Build Big (LCC or NC) 1 High Growth
E Build Small (LCC or NC) 2 Medium Growth
3 Low Growth
Six different Calculator tabs provide the data required for Period II with each one
corresponding to a particular combination of decisions and chance events in Period I:
they are Calculator2 (Al), Calculator2 (A2), Calculator2 (BI), Calculator2 (B2),
Calculator2 (C1), and Calculator2 (C2). Each performs the same function of calculating
expected net present values of net income. However, each tab is keyed to its own
combination of Period I occurrences. Therefore, all information regarding Period II,
assuming that the original airport structure was constructed to LCC standards and LCC
came to dominate the passenger market is presented under tab Calculator2 (B 1).
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SUpdated Values for Period II
Figure A-39: New Airport Terminal Model - Sample Period H Calculator Tab Inputs
Period II revenues are calculated in exactly the same manner as in Period I. Revenue
summaries are presented in a series of data tables at the bottom of the page. Figure A-39
presents sample results from Calculator2 (Al), which assumes that the original terminal
was built to service NC traffic but LCC carriers proved dominant (Al). In this case,
highlighted cells represent results given that airport managers choose to build large
structures in Period II and a high rate of traffic growth comes to pass (D3).
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Overall Results
NPV(Overall Costs) I 2 Periods [k$]
D
3
D3
NPV(Overall Cashflow) I Period 2 only [k$]
$121,139
$113,113
$106,285
$838,657
$837,241
$836,036
$553,948
$561,974
$568,802
$562,759
NPV(Overall Cashflow) I 2 Periods [k$]
E(NPV_Overall_Cashflow) 1 2 Periods [k$]
Figure A-40: New Airport Terminal Model - Sample Period H Calculator2 Results
E(NPV)
33
AID
$263,679
$255,653
$248,825
$871,551
$870,134
$868,929
$411,409
$419,434
$426,262
$416,224
AlE
The expected value of overall cash-flow in Period II is calculated in the same manner as
in Period I. Equation A-11 shows how the New Airport Terminal Model computes the
expected value of building big for LCC given that (Al) occurred in Period I, given the
probabilities used in the New Airport Model.
Equation A-11: New Airport Terminal Model - Sample Period H Computation
E(NPV | D) = Pr (3)* Cashflow (D3) + Pr (4) * Cashflow (D4) + Pr (5) * Cashflow (D5)
E(NPV I D) = 40% * (-$ 411 million) + 60%* (- $ 419 million)+ 0% * (-$426 million)
E(NPV I D) = -$416 million
Results Tab
The Results tab presents expected net present values associated with each decision
alternative (A-E) and suggests the best decision path as determined by maximum net
present value calculated over twenty-five years of airport operation. This process begins
by collating data from other tabs and presenting them in a single, accessible format.
182
Figure A-41: New Airport Terminal Model - Sample Results Presentation
The final recommendation of the New Airport Terminal Model is presented at the bottom
of the Results tab; this counsel provides guidance on how to build in Period I given the
input values. The Model simply selects the Period I alternative with the greatest
probability of positive financial returns (highest expected NPV) over the period of
interest, twenty-five (25) years. The calculation of the expected value of each Period I
alternative proceeds as described in Equation A-12 using information as highlighted in
Figure A-41.
Equation A-12: New Airport Terminal Model - Sample Results Tab Calculation
E(NPV I A) = Pr (1)*(E(NPV) I A1)+ Pr (2)*( E(NPV) I A2)
E(NPV I A) = 65% * (-$416 million) + 35% * (- $366 million)
E(NPV I A) = -$399 million
In addition, best choice recommendations are also presented for Period II. According to
Figure A-41, for example, if Al occurs, the Model suggests that managers "Build Big."
As per the setup of the Model, this large construction would serve the LCC customer.
This counsel, however, should not be interpreted as final; this would remove the ability to
defer decisions. Rather, given that airport managers have ten years to re-evaluate airport
trends, it is quite likely that the Model should be run again with new data before such a
decision is made. Such an evaluation concludes the use of New Airport Terminal Model
for the particular case being modeled. Repeated analyses, however, can be used to
present a fuller picture and to compare the effects of changing various sample inputs.
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Results from Period I
E(NPV)
E(NP) [k$J $668.662 $853,730 $163,975
Results from Period II
Al A2 81 B2 C1 C2
E(NPV) [kij $416,224 $365,978 $411,375 $616,699 $46,793 568,114
Best Choice D E E D D D
Best Choice Build Big Build Small Build Small Build Big Build Big Build Big
E(NP) fk) $39,636 5483,239 $50,755
Gain in P2 $270,024 $370,491 $214,730
Best Choice C $50,755 (kS]
In Period I, the best choice is to Build for Both (qC
A5. The New Airport Terminal Model: Evaluating Real Options
The following sections describe the Terminal Model setup used to evaluate the possible
benefits of real options thinking in airport planning. The New Airport Terminal Model
default values were used with one exception; initial traffic is 250,000 passengers per
customer type rather than 200,000.
Deferring Decisions
Two Strategies
Table A-7: Deferrin2 Decisions Evaluation - Two Strategies
Planners Planners
With Option Without Option
Period I Capacity Provided (pax) 10 million 10 million
Customer Served LCC or NC LCC or NC
SNew Capacity (pax) 10 million 10 million
S Customer Served LCC or NC NC
Model Set-up
Initialapacities
Initial Capacities (people) Capacity Increases (people)
Decision LCC NC LCC NC
ABig NC 10000 Build Big(LCC) 10,000,000
B. Big LCC 10000 D Bld Big(NC) 10,00,
E Build Small (LCC) 10 000,
E Build Small (C) 10,000,000
Figure A-42: Deferring Decisions Evaluation - Strategy without Option
Capacities
Initial Capacities (people) Capacity Increases (people)
Decision LCC NC LCC NC
A. Big NC 10,000, A D Build Big(LCC) 10,000,
B. Big LCC 10, 00 B D Build Big(NC) 10,000,000
E Build Small (LCC) 10,000,000
_ E Build Small (NC) | 10,000,0
Figure A-43: Deferring Decisions Evaluation - Strategy with Option
(Note: In this scenario, airport planners must build additional capacity for 10 million
annual passengers at the end of ten years. The Build Big and Build Small options are
therefore not differentiable.)
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Model Results & Option Value
Given default values, it is possible to determine the value of the deferral option 18 by
running the model once for each strategy and comparing the expected financial results.
ation - Result of Strategy without Option
Build for LCC
(B)
$24,466
$235,118
$24,466 [k$]
Given the hypothetical data in this scenario, the airport nets some US $24 million in
present dollars. The picture, however, is much improved if planners are given the option
to choose which customer to build for in Period II. In this case, the best possible choice -
given the input data, building for LCC (B) - yields an expected profit of US $103 million
in present dollars.
Strategy with Option
Build for LCC(B)
$103,175
Gain in P2
Best Choice
$254,417 $313,826
$103,175 [k$]
In this particular circumstance, then, the value of maintaining the flexibility to choose
which customer to build for in Period II is worth US $79 million.
18 This model assumes that buildings constructed for low-cost and network carriers are not interchangeable.
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Gain in P2
Best Choice
$43,775
Value-at-Risk/Gain
Figure A-44: New Airport Terminal Model - Deferring Decisions can reduce Downside Risk
Multi-functionality: The Right to Switch
Two Strategies
Table A-10: Deferring Decisions Evaluation - Two Strategies
Co With Option Without Option
Capacity Provided (pax) 10 million 10 million
I Customer Served I LCC or NC 1 LCC or NC
Model Set-up
The model set-up is described in Figures A-45 and A-46. Negative capacity increases
indicate that capacity has been switched from serving one customer to another.
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Value at Risk
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--- Strategy with Option -- Strategy without Option
Period I
Capacities
Initial Capacities (people) Capacity Increases (People)
Decision LCC NC LCC NC
A. Big NC 10,000,000 D Stch (LCC)
B. Big LCC 10,00 OB D Switch (NC) _
FigrE ANo Ch 0 0o
Figure A-45: Multi-functionality Evaluation - Strategy without Option
Figure A-46: Multi-functionality Evaluation - Strategy with Option
Model Results & Option Value
Actually valuing the option to switch requires one additional step. In order to do so, the
model is run again without giving the airport managers the ability to switch capacity.
Rather, no change in capacity occurs at the beginning of Period II, ten years into the
airport's operation and fifteen years from the end of the period being observed. Figure
A-46 illustrates.
As before, the option's worth is found by subtracting the expected net present value of
the airport with and without multi-functionality.
Table A-11: Multi-functionality Evaluation - Value of Strategy without Option
E(NPV) k$] $256,779 $6,979
Gain in P2
Best Choice
$148,401 $203,673
$6,979 [k$]
Lacking the option to switch leads to an expected loss of US $7 million in present dollars.
Table A-12: Multi-functionality: Value of Strategy with Option
E(NPV) [k] $164,128 $58,261
Gain in P2
Best Choice
$241,051 $268,912
$58,261 [k$]
Conversely, the value of an airport with the ability to switch its terminal capacities based
on the dominant carrier is estimated at US $58 million in present dollars. Given the
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I-A
hypothetical data, the option is worth US $665 million; this value also represents the
maximum amount that should be spent ensuring that the terminals, if designed for a total
of 10 million passengers, are able to switch one-half of their capacity.
Value-at-Risk/Gain
Figure A-47: New Airport Terminal Model - Multi-functionality can reduce Downside Risk
Ensuring Expandability
Two Strategies
Table A-13: Deferrine Decisions Evaluation - Two Strategies
Big NC Strategy
Big LCC Strategy
Planners
With Option
No LCC Capacity
20 million for NC
20 million for LCC
No NC Capacity
Either 5 million for
LCC or No Change
Either 5 million for
NC or No Change
Planners
Without Option
No LCC Capacity
20 million for NC
20 million for LCC
No NC Capacity
No Change
No Change
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Value at Risk
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Model Set-up
Ca acities
Initial Capacities (people)
Decision LCC NC
A. Big NC 1 0 10,000
B. Big LCC 10000
C. Small Ota
Figure A-48: Ensuring Expandability - Strategy without Option
Capacities
Initial Capacities (people) Capacity Increases (people)
Decision LCC NC We NC
A.Big NC 10000 D Bild Big(LC) 5000000 0
B. Big LCC 1000 0 D Build Big(NC)0 000
C. Small Ota EEBuild Small (LCC) 0E Build Small (NC) 0
Figure A-49: Ensuring Expandability - Strategy with Option
Model Results & Option Value
The difference in profit margins, as in previous examples, again shows the value of real
options given the sample airport used. Planners who lack the ability to expand as
necessary lose an expected US $7 million in present dollars (given the hypothetical data),
as shown in Table A-14.
Gain in P2 $148,401 $203,673
Best Choice $6,979 [k$]
Designers with the option to expand, however, fare better. Table A-15 shows three cases
in which expansion is desired: if planners chose to build for the non-dominant carrier in
Period 1 (Al and B2) or if the probability of revenue growth outstrips the capacity
available to the airport (BI). In the first two cases, additional construction corrects for
earlier errors; in the third, it allows the airport to take advantage of new growth.
pandability Evaluation - When to Expand
$254,962
Build Big
$67,837
Build Small
$175,204
Build Big
B2
$101,662
D
Build Big
This simple variation in strategy provides an additional US $83 million. This value is
also the maximum amount that airport planners should spend on ensuring that the airport
can expand according to the parameters laid out in Table A-13, given that the airport only
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Best Choice
Best Choice
i
remains open for 25 years. At airports that remain open for longer, however, the value of
the expansion option is significantly increased.
- Valuing the strategy without expansion
Build for LCC8,301
(B)
$78,301
Gain in P2 $215,711 $288,952
Best Choice $78,301 [k$]
Value-at-Risk/Gain
Value at Risk
0.9
. ;0.8
0.7
S 0.6
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S0.4
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-. 0
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: ::. ' ~~-- i--·::; ;-
F- Strategy with Option --- Strategy without Option
Figure A-50: New Airport Terminal Model - Expandability can shift the VaRG curve right.
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A6. The New Airport Terminal Model: Regional Development Scenario Inputs
This section gives the inputs used in the theoretical Regional Development Scenario.
Unless otherwise stated, the default values from the Lisbon Airport Scenario were used.
System Development
Two Strategies
struction
Table A-18: Regional Development Scenario - Three Strategies for LCC-based
25 million for LCC
25 million for LCC
5 million for NC
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Model Set-up
Capacities
Initial Capacities (people) apacity Increases (people)
Decision LOC NC LCC NC
A. Big NC 25,000,0002 5,000,000 A D Build Big(LCC) 20,000,000 0
B. Big LCC 10,000,0001 5,000,000 B D Build Big(NC) 0 20,000,000
C. Small Ota 1 10Coo0 1 0,000,000 0 EjBuild Small (LCC) 0 0
.... E Build Small (NC) [0 1 0
Figure A-51: Regional Development Scenario - Strategy without Switching
,,Capacities
Initial Capacities (people) Capacity Increases (people)
Decision LCC N.. LCC NC
A. Big NC 25,000,000( 5,000,000 A D Build Big(LCC) 20,000,000 0
B. Big LCC 10,000, 5,000,000B D Build Big(NC) 0 1 20,000,000
C. Small ta 10,0000001 10 000 00 EBuild Small (LCC) 0 -5,000000SEBuild Small (NC) -5,000,000 0
Figure A-52: Regional Development Scenario - Strategy with Switching
System Outputs
Model Results & Option Value
Table A-19: Re i o n al Development Scenario - Valuing the strategy without Multi-functionality
Al A2 B1 B2
E(NPV) [k$] $268,812 $625,448 $130,728 $1
Best Choice E E D E
Best Choice Build Small Build Small Build Big Build Sn
C1 C2
$224,021
Build Small
41,796
nail
$262,051
Build Small
Table A-20: Re gional Development Scenario - Valuing the strategy with Multi-functionality
lAl A2 BI B2
E(NPV) [k$] $317,421 $507,609 $130,728
Best Choice D E D E
Best Choice Build Big Switch (to NC) Build Big Swit(
C1 C2
$112,288
E
$232,541
$23,956
:h (to NC)
Switch (to NC) Switch (to NC)
One additional model run shows the Terminal Model's preference for switching, building
big, or doing nothing.
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Initial Capacities (people) Capacity Increases (people)
A. Big NC 25,000000 5,000 000 D Build Big(LCC) 0 0
B. Big LCC 0,000000 500000 B D d Bg(NC 0 0
C. Small Ota _0 jOZpp 10,00000 C EBuitld Small (LC) 0 -5,000,000
E Bld Smal (NC -5,000,000 0
Figure A-53: Regional Development Scenario - Third Strategy
Table A-21: Re ional Development Scenario - Preference for Actions
i iAl A2 B1:
Preference: 1 Do Nothing Switch (to NC) Buil
Preference: 2
Preference: 3
Preference: 1
Preference: 2
Preference: 3
Build Big (for
LCC)
Switch (to LCC)
Cl
Switch (to LCC)
Do Nothing (Build
Small)
Build Big (for
LCC)
Do Nothing
(Build Small)
Build Big (for
NC)
d Big (for
I ( N\
Switch (for LCC)
Do Nothing
(Build Small)
82
Switch (to NC)
Do Nothing (Build
Small)
Build Big (for NC)
Switch (to NC)
Do Nothing
(Build Small)
Build Big (for
NC)
Interpreting Table A-21, if Al occurs, the Model chooses not to build in Period II; if Al
occurs, the Model chooses to switch its LCC capacity to NC capacity; if B 1 occurs, the
Model chooses to build big for LCC, etc. Switching provides the superior alternative in
four out of six possible cases. The benefit is reflected in the VaRG curves.
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Value-at-Risk/Gain
Figure A-54: Regional Development Scenario - Multi-functionality improves VaRG of LCC-based
Strategies
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Value at Risk
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A9. Airport Reference Codes Used
Country City Airport Name IATA Code
Australia Sydney Sydney/Kingsford Smith Int'l SYD
Belgium Charleroi Brussels/ South Charleroi CRL
Canada Montreal Montreal/Mirabel Int'l YMX
China Hong Kong Hong Kong Int'l HKG
France Paris Paris/Charles de Gaulle Int'l CDG
Paris Paris/Orly ORY
Germany Cologne Cologne/Bonn CGN
Frankfurt Frankfurt-Hahn HHN
Frankfurt/(Main) Airport City FRA
Munich Munich/Franz Josef Strauss Int'l MUC
Japan Osaka Osaka Int'l (Itami Airport) ITM
Osaka/Kansai Int'l KIX
Netherlands Amsterdam Amsterdam/Schiphol AMS
Portugal Lisbon Lisbon/Portela LIS
Lisbon/New Lisbon Int'l -- (NLA here)
Sweden Stockholm Stockholm-Arlanda ARN
Switzerland Geneva Geneva/Cointrin International GVA
United Liverpool Liverpool/John Lennon LPL
Kingdom London London/Heathrow LHR
London/Gatwick LGW
London/Luton LTN
London/Stansted STN
Rhoose, Wales Rhoose/Cardiff Int'l CWL
United States Austin Austin-Bergstrom Int'l AUS
Baltimore Baltimore/Washington Int'l BWI
Thurgood Marshall
Boston Boston/Logan BOS
Dallas Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l DFW
Denver Denver Int'l DIA
Kansas City Kansas City Int'l MCI
Los Angeles Los Angeles/International LAX
Manchester Manchester-Boston Regional MHT
New Orleans Louis Armstrong New Orleans MSY
Int'l
New York New York/John F Kennedy Int'l JFK
New York/LaGuardia Int'l LGA
Newark Newark/Liberty Int'l EWR
Providence Providence/Theodore Francis PVD
Green State
Washington, DC Washington/Dulles Int'l IAD
Washington, DC Washington/Ronald Reagan Nat'l DCA
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